Consider the increase in Iranians following the first Gulf War or the increase in South Americans in response to liberalisation of permanent residency for ethnic Japanese foreigners in the early 1990s. Neither of these was as smooth as might have been possible. But, where have large influxes of ethnic minorities ever gone smoothly? Thus, I reject that the idea that Japan is xenophobic while acknowledging that the high ration of homogeneity in Japan makes multiculturalism more difficult.

 

An increase of immigration of the size suggested will without a doubt cause social friction, tension, and conflict. It will result in more questions about foreigner crime, and other anti-social behaviour will be attributed to the increase in foreigners. Most reading this will know that foreigner crime is over-reported in Japan and that once visa-overstaying is taken out of the mix, your average Japanese is more likely to be a criminal than your average foreigner in Japan. It is, in fact, the elderly who account for the largest increase in crime in Japan, which is understandable considering the Lost Decade and aging population. However, one should not underestimate the difference between domestic organised crime, which can appear familiar and controllable, and foreign-led organised crime, which is the primary source of anxiety in Japan because it seems to breach so many of the unwritten rules (eg use of guns, tacit understanding with police, visibility).

 

My second point in response to questions was about demographic change in Japan. The immigration proposal is directly linked to the aging and shrinking population in Japan. It is argued that increasing immigrants will address the shortfall in the working-aged population necessary for the economy to maintain if not grow. This is also repeated in the most recent government report on immigration which notes present policy is to have ‘more open acceptance of skilled foreign workers…[and] responding to a population-decreasing society’.

 

Demographic change is the biggest issue facing Japan for the next half century. It impacts all issues: politics, security, law, health, and everything in between. Thus, it is important touchstone to constantly return.

 

Immigration, however, is not a very effective way to impact aging demographics. Migrants tend to be too old and bring too many elderly with them to have serious impact on a country’s demographic profile. Nevertheless, in a multi-pronged approach to the demographic issue, it is one tool that can be used, along with policies aimed at increasing female and elderly employment participation rates and other policies to increase the birth rate.

 

The truly radical policy I would like to see the Japanese government explore further in responding to the demographic challenges is changing society to allow for a shrinking population. Can we envision a world where everything is not driven by growth of economic outputs, but rather using efficiency gains and fundamental changes in societal priorities to value a less financially robust but hopefully more humanistically balanced society? I admit this has not a small amount of Utopianism to it, but in light of global warming, energy crisis, food shortage, urban congestion, pollution, and so forth, I argue it is time to explore this vein seriously.

 

Finally my third point is a political one about an influx of foreigners. As we have seen in Australia, not to mention Europe and everywhere else receiving large in-takes of migrants, large incoming migration will attract a conservative response. I have no doubt Japan and its policy makers are smart enough to understand these equations and do the cost-benefit analysis necessary to make the decision regarding whether addressing demographic pressures is acute enough to warrant the predictable side-effects.

 

Japanese big businesses are pushing for an immigration policy that allows them to remain competitive in the globalised market. Politicians from an unexpected corner—the conservative heart of the long ruling Liberal Democratic Party—have responded with this provocative proposal. The benefit of the proposal is it exposes in the barest terms the struggle between economic growth and demographic change facing Japan. The proposal will most likely eventually be watered down, but an increase in skilled migration such as we are seeing coming from the Philippines and Indonesia for nurses and aged carers that directly addresses needs of the changed society is welcome. In addition and perhaps more importantly, however, Japan—and other aging and decreasing child birth countries following Japan such as Australia—need to begin to explore how a country can live with a smaller economic footprint so that prosperity in the post-developed state is not measured by those developing state markers of annual GDP growth.