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Japan’s aid to the South Pacific and the China factor

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In Brief

History has a funny way of repeating itself. In a little-reported development last month, Japan offered to contribute peacekeepers to the Australian-led stabilization mission in the Solomon Islands—the site of some of the fiercest fighting between Japanese and Allied forces of the Pacific campaign in World War Two. While the prospect of Japanese troops returning to Guadalcanal may raise eyebrows on both sides of the Pacific, this is a positive development: It signals Japan’s willingness to cooperate with Australia and other liberal democracies in securing regional stability—and to balance the growing weight of China.

Japan’s offer follows from the annual Trilateral Security Dialogue between the U.S., Japan and Australia, as well as the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Australia and Japan signed in March 2007.

Help is certainly needed in the South Pacific. The Solomon Islands government collapsed in 2002, necessitating armed intervention from Australia and other neighbours. Fiji still has not recovered from its 2006 coup, Papua New Guinea remains volatile, and deep-seated problems of weak governance, conflict and corruption afflict much of the region. For this reason alone, Japan’s willingness to re engage in the Pacific Islands should be encouraged.

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But there are other, longer-term reasons for Japan’s renewed interest in the region. A decade ago, Japan was the leading aid donor to the Pacific Islands, contributing more bilateral aid to the region—with the exception of Australia in Papua New Guinea— than any other country. But the relative weight of Japan’s contribution has steadily declined, with Oceania receiving only 1.5 per cent of Japan’s aid budget over the past decade. By contrast, China’s engagement has grown considerably over the same period. In addition to its familiar pattern of building high-profile sports stadiums and government buildings in island capitals, China has expanded both its diplomatic network and its aid disbursements to friendly island governments, mostly in response to Taiwan’s ongoing search for diplomatic recognition in the Pacific. China has also expanded its military links in the region, inking military cooperation agreements with Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea—the three Pacific states that maintain standing armies—and announcing future plans to train their senior military officers in Beijing.

China has also increased its political links, particularly with fellow non-democracies such as Fiji and Tonga. Beijing’s increasingly close relationship with Fiji’s military regime is a case in point. Shunned by Western donors, Fiji’s interim government recently received a huge increase in grant support from China, with no hectoring about democracy and human rights.

An increased Japanese presence would offer an alternative partnership model for the Pacific Islands, one of a genuine Asian democracy working in close partnership with Australia and the United States. Indeed, the Trilateral Security Dialogue is predicated on the shared interests that these three key liberal democracies of the region have in working in tandem on Asia-Pacific security.

Whether Japanese peacekeepers will be welcomed in the Solomon Islands is ultimately up to the 16-member Pacific Islands Forum, which meets later this month in Niue. Accepting Tokyo’s tentative foray into the turbid waters of the South Pacific would be a smart step towards this elusive goal.

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