A wide array of Australian analysts, journalists and parliamentarians past and present were quick to criticise the Rudd proposal for being ‘half-baked’, lacking in detail and presumptuous for not having consulted other regional leaders in advance. These complaints were not without some substance – not only was the initial articulation of the idea rather sketchy, with distracting references to the European Union, but even the distinguished former diplomat, Richard Woolcott, nominated to lead regional consultation process evidently learned about the proposal only a few short hours before it was announced.
But none of these issues were decisive and as Richard Woolcott himself has said, the circumstances were much the same nearly twenty years earlier when then Prime Minister Bob Hawke tasked him with leading a similar initial consultation process on APEC. Much more important than the flurry of debate within Australia has been the reaction within the Asia-Pacific region. Some commentators were sceptical or even dismissive of the proposal, with most government spokesmen expressing polite, non-committal interest in hearing further details. Significantly, no head of government spoke decisively against the proposal.
In the world of multilateral diplomacy, that constitutes a positive outcome. It is very rarely the case that proposals for large-scale multilateral engagement engender clear and strong enthusiasm – almost always the benefits are too diffuse for this to be the case. Much more telling is whether they generate clear and strong opposition. And that has not been the case.
The real diplomatic action – which for the most part does not appear in the newspaper headlines – is now underway. Rudd’s special envoy, Richard Woolcott, has undertaken a first consultative foray into the region, focusing on key Southeast Asian countries. Subsequent rounds will see him working his way around the wider region. There have been no official statements from Rudd about progress, but informal indications are encouraging. This will help to build momentum.
Ultimately, the reason some version of Rudd’s proposal is likely to succeed is that there is an underlying need for it. There is real scope for improving on the current situation of regional consultation arrangements to the advantage of all. Notwithstanding the variety of existing frameworks for regional engagement along various dimensions – most prominently ASEAN, the ASEAN + 3 framework, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC – the inescapable problem is that none of these arrangements brings all the main players from South Asia to the Americas together. It makes no sense that there is no framework which also includes both India and the United States. While all existing frameworks serve some specific purposes, none adequately meets the needs of the region as a whole. There is no particular virtue in preserving the status quo for its own sake; more than anything else it is inertia and the inherent difficulty of taking multilateral diplomacy into new areas that preserves it.
Leadership to overcome these problems could come from almost anywhere in the region, but as middle-sized player Australia is one of a handful of countries that is well-placed to offer it. And with Rudd’s quiet persistence it is quite likely that we will see results. Increasingly, the issue that is coming into focus is the modalities of just how a comprehensive framework for regional engagement might be developed from the status quo.
There are several broad possibilities. One is that it could evolve by adapting one of the existing frameworks. For instance, the membership of the East Asian Summit might be expanded eastward across the Pacific. Or the membership of APEC could be adjusted and expanded westward to South Asia. A second broad possibility is that a special gathering could take place on the coat-tails of an existing forum. Here too there are several imaginable variants, but by way of illustration, an appropriately comprehensive gathering of leaders could be engineered at the same time as the ASEAN or APEC summits, and evolve over time from there. Or third, an entirely new framework could be purpose built from scratch.
None of these broad possibilities is clearly superior to the others. Each has distinctive pros and cons. In the end, it is likely to be the path of least resistance that prevails. And it may be that a one-off and more limited gathering of pivotal leaders is needed to kick start the process and help cut through some of the initial complications.
To succeed, Rudd’s initiative will need to evolve into something much broader than just another proposal from a regionally activist Australian leader. At least some countries and some other leaders will need to come to view it as advancing their interests. This is quite likely to happen and in the process the character and form of the initiative will evolve as ‘authorship’ widens. Indeed, that is what happened with all previous efforts to build frameworks for regional engagement, from ASEAN and APEC onwards.
The absence of a vocal chorus of public support for Rudd’s initiative might be thought of as telling evidence of a lack of demand or even interest. It is not. Frameworks for multilateral regional engagement – whether in the Asia-Pacific region, or any other – are not essential elements of international engagement. That is why there is almost never overt demand for them. But they can be very helpful, even if in quiet and low-profile ways. There was no great demand for ASEAN at the time of its birth, but all Southeast Asian countries place value on it now. Similarly, for all its limitations, heads of state continue to invest time and effort in the APEC process.
Kevin Rudd’s proposal has already evolved somewhat since his first speech in June. It will continue to do so as momentum gradually builds behind and as an informal coalition of leaders willing to support its development emerges. It is an idea whose time is coming.
The most important question to ask is what benefit does the Asia Pacific Community bring to member countries that is not already being served by the various regional groupings.
Andrew MacIntyre tells us that the idea will have traction in the region but he does not tell us why.
What are the incentives for the different set of countries – both developed and developing countries – to join the APC? Most countries won’t have any interest in loose regional cooperation that cannot provide any tangible benefit. When APEC was proposed, it was an idea that suited its time – open regionalism with voluntary liberalisation when liberalisation was a bad word. Member countries benefited from the non – threatening manner of economic liberalisation within APEC.
Andrew notes that since no leaders in Asia spoke against it, it was a good sign diplomatically. A better appreciation of Asia culture would explain the non-response as disagreement as Asians choose remain silent and allow everyone to ‘save face.’
At a time of proliferation of regional groupings, spelling out clearly the additional benefit from this initiative or positioning it in relation to the whole region’s economic political and security interests is what is required.
It will be interesting to see what response comes after the current financial meltdown.
Having been lectured by the West on corporate governance after the Asian financial crisis some of the Asian countries are doubtless looking with polite interest at Western crony capitalism. (I am pleased to say almost of our examples of corporate misgovernance in our course came from Wall Street and London in the 1920 and we did not join the then fad of saying Asian corporate governance was somehow inherently worse that that in OECD countries.)
Nor will – or should they – want to harmonize their tax systems on Australian or US lines. Having attracted so much capital with competitive tax systems why throw away that advantage by joining an EU style creeping uniformity? As Andrew says, any reference to the EU would be an instant turn-off for Asian countries rivalling Switzerland as a haven for EU investors.
Whether an East Asian forum becomes a counter to the EU and OECD vision of economic policy may be an interesting question.