Current Secretary of the Treasury, Hank Paulson, claims that President Bush chose the path of engagement. This is far from true. It is true that US engagement with China, economically and strategically, has grown enormously under the Bush Administration. But a review of media reports from 2000-2001 show that, in fact, at the outset Bush rather chose to antagonize, not to engage, China.

Here’s a reminder of how the US-China relationship looked at the time:

As a candidate, Bush was criticized for being “stuck in a cold war time warp” and relying on “isolationist, right-wing advisers for guidance” (30/4/2000). He talked strongly of defending Taiwan militarily, and selling arms to Taiwan (a long term policy, but not one traditionally trumpeted loudly). His enthusiasm for the misguided Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) plan was perceived in Beijing as a policy of containment. Bush abandoned the Clinton era rhetoric describing China as a ‘strategic partner’, in favor of the more antagonizing ‘strategic competitor’.

Three weeks before Bush took office, he was described as ‘on a collision course with China’ (04/1/2001), Yan Xuetong, at that time executive director of the Institute of International Studies at CASS (China’s premier government think tank) said, ‘in the next four years, I would not rule out a possible military confrontation’ (04/1/2001). The whole of the Asia Pacific was frightened about a nuclear arms race between the US and China (25/1/2001).

Bush escalated the issue of arms to Taiwan by hinting that Taiwan would be included in the anti-missile defense umbrella (06/3/2001).

Then, on 1 April 2001 was the “spy plane incident”**. The Chinese detained the US crew on Hainan Island for 12 days. As soon as the US personnel were back in Hawaii, Bush began blaming the crisis entirely on China, dropping the diplomatic rhetoric he grudgingly adopted under duress during the stand-off (13/4/2001).

Following the spy plane incident, Bush stepped up encirclement rhetoric. On 25 April Bush said ‘he would do ‘whatever it takes’ to defend Taiwan from any China attacks’ (26/4/2001). Shortly after, he ratcheted up the rhetoric, engaging Russia on TMD plans (01/5/2001). China promptly responded that such actions ‘could lead to a possible arms race’ (02/5/2001). To celebrate the Bush administration’s first 100 days, the People’s Daily described Bush as ‘arrogant’, ’emotional”, ‘egotistic’ and ‘capricious’ and recommended Bush ‘learn from his predecessor, Bill Clinton’ (03/5/2001).

Instead, with the approach of his first meeting with President Jiang Zemin (the APEC leaders summit was held in Shanghai in October 2001; an unavoidable encounter), Bush began to preach religious tolerance to China (04/5/2001). In a move deliberately calculated to antagonize China, he met with the Dalai Lama in Washington (just 5 months before the scheduled meeting with Jiang) (23/5/2001).

On June 2, John Lewis wrote in the New York Times, ‘partly as an unintended consequence, but mostly by design, the administration’s actions have appeared to cast Beijing as America’s enemy. The expanded arms sales to Taiwan, rhetoric that enlarges the commitment to defend the island, the thinly disguised decision to make Chinese missiles a target of revised missile defense plans, the proposed shift in defense strategy from Europe to the Pacific and the call for new long-range weapons to counter China’s military power have come in stunning procession.’ (02/6/2001)

Colin Powell’s visit to Beijing late July offered a moment to breathe in Bush’s rush towards hostility (29/7/2001) but the game-changer, of course, was the terrible events of September 11. President Jiang immediately condemned the attacks and offered to share intelligence with the US and help combat terrorism (26/9/2001).

The attacks gave Bush an enemy far more proximate than China. The open-ended War on Terror had been launched and China was transformed from putative enemy into active ally. Containment and strategic competition were transformed into active engagement on this and a range of other fronts: a strategy that has been remarkably successful over the last 7 years.

It will be important for Obama to avoid the early mistakes of Bush in handling of the US-China relationship. There is no guarantee that such circumstances as eventually constrained the Bush Administration’s inclination towards hostility with China will similarly constrain the undercurrent of economic hostility in America that an Obama administration must manage in dealings with China. The risks are especially high in a time of global economic crisis.

China has already expressed hope ‘that the policy of free trade will continue to be adhered to’, and has defended its exchange rate policy, but the hostility generated by President Bush is notably absent. Xinhua’s account of the conversation between Obama and President Hu on Saturday is encouraging:

Obama said that settlement of the global financial crisis requires close cooperation by governments of all countries, expressing the hope that the United States and China will strengthen cooperation at the world economic summit planned for November 15 in Washington.

More than most things in foreign policy, Obama needs a China Policy before he takes office: one that emphasises the centrality of Sino-American cooperation on responding to climate change and coping with the financial crisis, as well as commitment to an open economy. Early signs point to Obama bearing the mantle of responsibility well. If that continues, we can expect to see more of the pragmatic, tough but fair Obama.

—

Update: Thomas Barnett offers a different spin on Bush’s legacy of engagement with China (ht: The Interpreter).

In the grand sweep of history, this is arguably George W. Bush’s greatest legacy: the encouragement of China to become a legitimate stakeholder in global security.

This sort of effort at grooming a great power for a greater role in international affairs is a careful balancing act, and the Bush team sounded most of the right notes, from reassuring nervous allies in Asia, to avoiding the temptation of trade retaliation while simultaneously pressuring Beijing for more economic liberalization, to drawing China into the dynamics of great power negotiation over compelling regional issues like the nuclear programs in both North Korea and Iran.

Clearly I think this gives more credit than credit due.

—

** CORRECTION:

It was earlier stated in this post that “on 1 April 2001 a US spy plane crashed in Chinese waters.” This is not true. A loyal reader provides a correction:

A U.S. Navy EP-3, flying in international airspace, was clipped by a Chinese fighter jet.  The damaged U.S. plane flew to the island of Hainan, where it landed at a military airfield.  As per regulations, the crew methodically destroyed the equipment on the inside of the aircraft, then exited.

—

See also:
Obama and Asia
What Obama means for Asia
Keeping up with Asia
Japan assesses the next US presidency