http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2008/11/18/how-america%e2%80%99s-economic-crisis-will-change-the-world/ Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific Fri, 19 Mar 2010 22:12:37 +1100 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2008/11/18/how-america%e2%80%99s-economic-crisis-will-change-the-world/comment-page-1/#comment-169 Peter Drysdale Tue, 25 Nov 2008 10:45:57 +0000 http://eastasiaforum.wordpress.com/?p=2249#comment-169 Indeed, there must be more than than the 'ending of European-American monopolization of the top jobs and..... replacing tutelage with co-operation' (the legacy of Bretton Woods without the fixed exchange rate regime) but moving on from there is what 're-inventing Bretton Woods' might mean. And the G20 meeing is an important starting point, if only that. Indeed, there must be more than than the ‘ending of European-American monopolization of the top jobs and….. replacing tutelage with co-operation’ (the legacy of Bretton Woods without the fixed exchange rate regime) but moving on from there is what ‘re-inventing Bretton Woods’ might mean. And the G20 meeing is an important starting point, if only that.

]]> http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2008/11/18/how-america%e2%80%99s-economic-crisis-will-change-the-world/comment-page-1/#comment-168 Gary Hawke Tue, 25 Nov 2008 07:15:55 +0000 http://eastasiaforum.wordpress.com/?p=2249#comment-168 Peter’s case is persuasive for both his two major points, viz. first, that we should resist any attempt to use the current situation to turn back from market instruments and insist on looking directly at the quality of both government and private sector decisions, and secondly, that we take the opportunity to promote co-operative approaches to international management. But I doubt that “re-inventing Bretton Woods” is an appropriate concept. The international financial institutions of the current world show little resemblance to the limited international bank and idea of stable exchange rates except in the face of “fundamental disequilibrium” which was the most that Harry Dexter White thought (rightly) could secure Senate approval at the end of World War II. A case can be made that in the following 25 years, the institutions evolved closer to what Keynes envisaged as a collaboration of debtor and creditor nations. There has been even more evolution in the 35 years since 1971. We should look for direct specification of what changes are desirable now. Replacing tutelage with co-operation in the Asian sense of agreed objectives and periodic discussion of progress towards their achievement, and ending European-American monopolization of top jobs are starting points, but there must be more to it than that. Peter’s case is persuasive for both his two major points, viz. first, that we should resist any attempt to use the current situation to turn back from market instruments and insist on looking directly at the quality of both government and private sector decisions, and secondly, that we take the opportunity to promote co-operative approaches to international management. But I doubt that “re-inventing Bretton Woods” is an appropriate concept. The international financial institutions of the current world show little resemblance to the limited international bank and idea of stable exchange rates except in the face of “fundamental disequilibrium” which was the most that Harry Dexter White thought (rightly) could secure Senate approval at the end of World War II. A case can be made that in the following 25 years, the institutions evolved closer to what Keynes envisaged as a collaboration of debtor and creditor nations. There has been even more evolution in the 35 years since 1971. We should look for direct specification of what changes are desirable now. Replacing tutelage with co-operation in the Asian sense of agreed objectives and periodic discussion of progress towards their achievement, and ending European-American monopolization of top jobs are starting points, but there must be more to it than that.

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