If anything, the military regime looks even more secure than ever, having conducted a dubious referendum in May 2008 to bring its new constitution into effect, having managed its cyclone recovery reasonably well despite a poor start, considerable international criticism and receiving much less international assistance than hoped for, and having successfully defended itself from further attack in the 2008 UN General Assembly. This is not to say it enjoys any more support than it had before; indeed, the opposite is probably the case, as ordinary people remain angry at the regime’s treatment of Buddhist monks in last year’s protests and of the poor who were the main victims in this year’s cyclone. Indeed, Burma’s citizenry are more cynical than ever about their government.
Right now, the military regime is conducting a delayed crack-down against its political opponents, whose actions are mostly confined to peaceful protests. As a result, the United Nations estimates the number of political prisoners has reached more than 2,100, the highest figure ever, despite occasional amnesties by the regime. Such repression of political activity hardly implies that the elections scheduled for 2010 will be open, free or fair, but simply dismissing them as a sham is to miss an opportunity and may make matters worse.
The military regime remains committed to its “road map” towards political reconciliation, even though this means the army imposing its views to retain de facto power. The process involves no negotiations, no meaningful consultations, and no substantive participation by other groups, despite the United Nations, ASEAN and even China calling for this. More divided than ever, the United Nations is now being undermined by democracy movement supporters and seems unsure which way to turn. A mooted second visit to Burma (Myanmar) by the UN Secretary-General, which would normally offer some movement towards a political settlement, it now being described as unwise. Indeed, given that the military regime now is increasingly ignoring UN agencies that try to effect change there, Ban Ki Moon’s caution about visiting again is understandable.
It is no surprise also that greater efforts have not been made to engage the regime on what it needs to hand over power. The regime itself refuses to see any need for mediation, including by the UN, so traditional conflict resolutions processes tried by UN Special Envoys in the past, have not worked. But perhaps the time has come to sit down with the generals and find some compromise solutions.