Author: Tobias Harris
If and when Ozawa Ichiro becomes prime minister — still not a done deal, despite the Aso government’s
latest misstep — his will likely be the most highly anticipated premiership in decades, if not ever. I do not mean anticipated in the sense of public hopes for his government, but simply in the sense that Ozawa has been a possible premier for nearly twenty years. To some he is the great disappointer for having failed to destroy the LDP when he drove it into opposition in 1993. To others (including, not surprisingly, many in the LDP) he is the politician they love to hate: dictatorial, secretive, treacherous, the true heir to the great
kuromaku Tanaka Kakuei. But however one sees him, the past twenty years may one day be remembered as the age of Ozawa.
It is little wonder that as an Ozawa government becomes more likely, debate over Ozawa’s fitness to govern has grown in kind. Ozawa has helped stoke controversy — surely he knew that his remarks on the future of US forces in Japan would prompt criticism — but the speculation about how Ozawa would govern goes far beyond responding anything Ozawa has said. If anything, it is a response to the perceived vacuum surrounding how Ozawa plans to govern. Read more…
Author: Gary Hawke
No part of the world economy is exempt from a global crisis. Asia is strongly integrated with the world economy, and therefore will be significantly affected.
However, “crisis” needs to be unpackaged. It has several components.
Asian economies have been only modest participants in the consumer exuberance based on credit which has characterized some economies. Asian banks have been minor participants in exploiting new credit instruments whose valuation has proved to be more problematic than expected by rating agencies and investors. Consequently, Asian economies are less plagued by over-valued assets and bank losses than are some other economies, notably the US and in Europe.
Asia’s current economic problems stem from collapse of confidence and from declining export markets. These are not new problems.
Read more…
Author: Tobias Harris
The Aso government won a small victory on Friday when the lower house passed the 2009 budget, ensuring that even if the upper house does not act on it the budget will pass into law before the start of the new fiscal year.
The discussion will now unavoidably shift to the timing of the general election. Aso Taro will try to shift the discussion to a new economic stimulus package, but I wonder whether the LDP has the energy left to pass yet another round of economic stimulus. Yamaoka Kenji, the head of the DPJ’s parliamentary affairs committee, saw the link between further economic stimulus and the government’s desire to prolong its life, and not surprisingly rejected it. The DPJ has a point.
Why should a government on its last legs be given license to spend even more public money in a desperate bid to stave off an economic crisis and electoral defeat? At this point, will it make much difference in overcoming the crisis if the political system takes one month off to contest an election?
Read more…
Author: Nicholas Farrelly
With the release of Melbourne man Harry Nicolaides from his Bangkok prison cell Thai authorities no doubt hope an archaic French legal term will fade from Australian memories. Lèse majesté—the crime of insulting the monarch—has given the tourist-friendly “Land of Smiles” unusually bad press.
In recent months images of a forlorn Nicolaides, manacled and pale, have been broadcast into millions of Australian living rooms. His crime was so petty and his punishment so draconian that many have asked: what is this law and why is it enforced?
The answer is not simple. Lèse majesté is a political crime. It is in place because Thailand’s royal family—supposedly above the political fray—does not want to defend itself from scurrilous public attention or offence. In theory the law should quietly protect the king and the dignity of his family.
In practice things are very different. Accusations of lèse majesté are regularly made against political opponents and some parts of the Thai bureaucracy see fit to challenge dissenters with the charge. It is not just obscure Australian authors who fall foul of it.
Read more…
Author: Stephen Howes
Global mitigation was never going to be easy, but the course of action to date has made it more difficult rather than less. In 1992 (under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), in 1995 (under the so-called Berlin Mandate) and again in 1997 (under the Kyoto Protocol), the world agreed that the developed countries would be the first to reduce their emissions.
Achievement of the Kyoto Protocol’s 2012 targets would by itself have done little to slow growth in global emissions, but it would have been a sensible first step, and laid the foundations for more comprehensive global mitigation. Unfortunately, the United States and Australia walked away from the Protocol, and emissions have grown this decade in most developed countries. It is not surprising that negotiations to shape the post-2012 climate change architecture are making slow progress. Developed countries continue to call on developing countries to do more, but developing countries respond that they are still waiting for developed countries to take that first step they promised some 17 years ago.
The current impasse has given rise to a proliferation of academic proposals for the post-Kyoto global architecture. Yet, the international system shows enormous inertia. It is easy to critique the existing framework, but far more difficult to find consensus on an alternative. If there is to be a deal done, it will still likely be within the existing framework.
Read more…