Comments on: Japan eventually gets its wish on NK missile launch http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/05/japan-eventually-gets-its-wish-on-nk-missile-launch/ Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific Sun, 12 Feb 2012 22:50:38 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 By: Aurelia George Mulganhttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/05/japan-eventually-gets-its-wish-on-nk-missile-launch/comment-page-1/#comment-18926 Aurelia George Mulgan Sun, 05 Apr 2009 23:48:58 +0000 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=3334#comment-18926 It seems that in the 'wake' of NK's missile/rocket launch, the main deficiencies have shown up in Japan's crisis management system (as Tobias says in his posting), not in its MD system, which was not deployed. The idea of launching an MD system to defend against bits of debris always struck one as massive overkill. Although the Aso government could not be seen to be taking the nation's security lightly, particularly given public concerns about the NKorean threat (ramped up in recent days by NK's hostile rhetoric), a lot of the preparations, particularly of the weapons systems, had overtones of political posturing for domestic consumption, as Tobias points out. In this particular encounter, I think it's North Korea 1, Japan nil. In terms of the NKorean and Japanese governments' achieving their particular international political objectives, it also seems that NK has scored points against Japan. NK has made Japan and its allies look impotent ('action' has amounted to UNSC discussions only), while NK's allies have 'passively' defended its action, by failing to condemn it. Moreover, the Chinese government is calling for restraint on all sides, which applies just as much to Japan and the US, as it does to NK. It seems that in the ‘wake’ of NK’s missile/rocket launch, the main deficiencies have shown up in Japan’s crisis management system (as Tobias says in his posting), not in its MD system, which was not deployed. The idea of launching an MD system to defend against bits of debris always struck one as massive overkill. Although the Aso government could not be seen to be taking the nation’s security lightly, particularly given public concerns about the NKorean threat (ramped up in recent days by NK’s hostile rhetoric), a lot of the preparations, particularly of the weapons systems, had overtones of political posturing for domestic consumption, as Tobias points out.

In this particular encounter, I think it’s North Korea 1, Japan nil. In terms of the NKorean and Japanese governments’ achieving their particular international political objectives, it also seems that NK has scored points against Japan. NK has made Japan and its allies look impotent (‘action’ has amounted to UNSC discussions only), while NK’s allies have ‘passively’ defended its action, by failing to condemn it. Moreover, the Chinese government is calling for restraint on all sides, which applies just as much to Japan and the US, as it does to NK.

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