Comments on: North Korea: after the launch http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/08/north-korea-after-the-launch/ Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific Sun, 12 Feb 2012 19:28:35 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 By: Aurelia George Mulganhttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/08/north-korea-after-the-launch/comment-page-1/#comment-19477 Aurelia George Mulgan Wed, 08 Apr 2009 08:47:08 +0000 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=3379#comment-19477 I recall an official of the Defence Agency (as it was in those days) telling me in 2004 that part of the rationale for Japan's acquiring an MD capability was to deter North Korea from developing a ballistic missile capability. According to this reasoning, the North Koreans would think: 'why bother (to acquire such weapons), when Japan has the capability to defend itself against them'? It seems that this reasoning placed too much faith in the effectiveness of MD and not enough in NK's wish to possess a long-range BM capability for deterring the United States (and not just for 'attacking' Japan) as well as bargaining tools for the effective practice of extortion diplomacy (as so many commentators have pointed out). As for these recent calls by Nakagawa and Tamogami for Japan to arm itself with a nuclear weapons capability (according to the reports cited by Tobias), this opportunism is par for the course for Japan's right wing. However, Tamogami is more of a concern because of his earlier expression of open contempt for Japan's legal system and rule of law. When in April 2008, the Nagoya High Court ruled the Air Self-Defence Force's airlift mission in Iraq as unconstitutional, Tamogami brushed the ruling aside, saying: "I couldn't care less." [Hiroshi Komatsu, ‘Japan Must Not Just Follow the Strong’, Mainichi Shinbun, 18 December 2008, p. 1.] Tamogami was dismissed for his controversial essay on the origins of the Pacific War, but not before he called for the departure of US forces from Japan and for a full discussion of the nuclear option. The Tamogami case calls to mind the comments of Osamu Inagaki writing more than 30 years ago. Inagaki undertook a careful study of Japanese SDF documents, concluding that they revealed an SDF whose leaders were ‘in truth unrepentant militarists disguised as respectable modernists.’ (Osamu Ingaki, ‘The Jieitai: Military Values in a Pacifist Society’, The Japan Interpreter, Vol. X, No. 1, Summer 1975, p. 1) Nakagawa is less of a worry because of his lack of personal credibility and his contribution to Japan's loss of international face given his drunken performance at the G-20 finance ministers' meeting. Nevertheless, there is a question that this unsubtle and ill-thought-through nuclear weapons advocacy implicitly raises: even though Japan shelters under the US nuclear umbrella and benefits from US extended deterrence, to what extent could Japan rely on the alliance to defend it in a military conflict not of the US' making and which did not engage America's direct strategic interests? (and in fact, where US strategic interests might be harmed by coming to Japan's defence). To my mind, this is where the credibility of the US-Japan alliance and extended deterrence is weakest. This question, however, is never brought out into the open (not to my knowledge anyway). On the other hand, what would be fatal for Japan is acquiring nuclear weapons for all the wrong reasons (to assert its independence against the US, to reject its subordination to the US, to restore its national pride etc. etc. - the sort of reasons that motivate Tamogami, for instance). The only valid basis on which to debate the acquisition of nuclear weapons is consideration of whether they would enhance or detract from Japan's national security. I recall an official of the Defence Agency (as it was in those days) telling me in 2004 that part of the rationale for Japan’s acquiring an MD capability was to deter North Korea from developing a ballistic missile capability. According to this reasoning, the North Koreans would think: ‘why bother (to acquire such weapons), when Japan has the capability to defend itself against them’? It seems that this reasoning placed too much faith in the effectiveness of MD and not enough in NK’s wish to possess a long-range BM capability for deterring the United States (and not just for ‘attacking’ Japan) as well as bargaining tools for the effective practice of extortion diplomacy (as so many commentators have pointed out).

As for these recent calls by Nakagawa and Tamogami for Japan to arm itself with a nuclear weapons capability (according to the reports cited by Tobias), this opportunism is par for the course for Japan’s right wing. However, Tamogami is more of a concern because of his earlier expression of open contempt for Japan’s legal system and rule of law. When in April 2008, the Nagoya High Court ruled the Air Self-Defence Force’s airlift mission in Iraq as unconstitutional, Tamogami brushed the ruling aside, saying: “I couldn’t care less.” [Hiroshi Komatsu, ‘Japan Must Not Just Follow the Strong’, Mainichi Shinbun, 18 December 2008, p. 1.] Tamogami was dismissed for his controversial essay on the origins of the Pacific War, but not before he called for the departure of US forces from Japan and for a full discussion of the nuclear option. The Tamogami case calls to mind the comments of Osamu Inagaki writing more than 30 years ago. Inagaki undertook a careful study of Japanese SDF documents, concluding that they revealed an SDF whose leaders were ‘in truth unrepentant militarists disguised as respectable modernists.’ (Osamu Ingaki, ‘The Jieitai: Military Values in a Pacifist Society’, The Japan Interpreter, Vol. X, No. 1, Summer 1975, p. 1) Nakagawa is less of a worry because of his lack of personal credibility and his contribution to Japan’s loss of international face given his drunken performance at the G-20 finance ministers’ meeting.

Nevertheless, there is a question that this unsubtle and ill-thought-through nuclear weapons advocacy implicitly raises: even though Japan shelters under the US nuclear umbrella and benefits from US extended deterrence, to what extent could Japan rely on the alliance to defend it in a military conflict not of the US’ making and which did not engage America’s direct strategic interests? (and in fact, where US strategic interests might be harmed by coming to Japan’s defence). To my mind, this is where the credibility of the US-Japan alliance and extended deterrence is weakest. This question, however, is never brought out into the open (not to my knowledge anyway). On the other hand, what would be fatal for Japan is acquiring nuclear weapons for all the wrong reasons (to assert its independence against the US, to reject its subordination to the US, to restore its national pride etc. etc. – the sort of reasons that motivate Tamogami, for instance). The only valid basis on which to debate the acquisition of nuclear weapons is consideration of whether they would enhance or detract from Japan’s national security.

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