Comments on: The LDP’s loose lips http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/14/the-ldps-loose-lips/ Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific Sun, 12 Feb 2012 22:50:38 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 By: Aurelia George Mulganhttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/14/the-ldps-loose-lips/comment-page-1/#comment-21503 Aurelia George Mulgan Wed, 15 Apr 2009 08:38:42 +0000 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=3642#comment-21503 Just a short footnote on the above - it's very interesting to see how the US played the role of key mediator between Japan and China in the final stages of deciding the wording of the UNSC President's statement on the NKorean launch. The US did not align 100 per cent with the Japanese position: it sought a wording that China was prepared to go along with, much to Japan's disappointment/fury. I can't help thinking that this is just more evidence of America's paying equal if not more attention to China's standpoint on NE Asian (and other?) security issues than to Japan's. A harbinger of the future? Just a short footnote on the above – it’s very interesting to see how the US played the role of key mediator between Japan and China in the final stages of deciding the wording of the UNSC President’s statement on the NKorean launch. The US did not align 100 per cent with the Japanese position: it sought a wording that China was prepared to go along with, much to Japan’s disappointment/fury. I can’t help thinking that this is just more evidence of America’s paying equal if not more attention to China’s standpoint on NE Asian (and other?) security issues than to Japan’s. A harbinger of the future?

]]> By: Aurelia George Mulganhttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/14/the-ldps-loose-lips/comment-page-1/#comment-21268 Aurelia George Mulgan Tue, 14 Apr 2009 09:28:17 +0000 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=3642#comment-21268 To be provocative, it might be worth questioning the premise on which much of the policy discussion by those politicians identified by Tobias is taking place. Why is the alliance even relevant to this discussion? After all, what was supposed to be 'deterred' here? A satellite launch by a North Korean rocket? OK, it might double as a long-range BM test, but who's the target in this case? The United States, not Japan. If NK had been directly threatening Japan with ballistic missile attack, then the Japanese government might have been in a position to question the Obama administration's response as well as the reliability of the alliance. But the main risk to Japan from this test launch was debris falling out of the sky. I hardly call this a test of the alliance in which it was shown to be wanting. Is the alliance supposed to deter North Korean satellite launches/BM tests? It never has in the past (under the Clinton and Bush administrations), so why should it now? It's interesting that the Japanese media uniformly described the NK rocket as a 'missile', whereas in other media, it was usually called a 'rocket'. NHK showed the launch at least a dozen times (ad nauseam). Add all of this to the pronouncements by the Japanese government before and since, and to the assertions of the LDP politicians/groups that Tobias discusses, and you get a beat-up for their own policy purposes. The Japanese public's sense of threat from NK is being shamelessly manipulated by these groups. Part of the right-wing's agenda is also to question the value of alliance deterrence. How else can they justify Japan's acquiring its own independent offensive capabilities and beefed-up military capabilities? The bottom line is that the US alliance is there to deter a BM attack by NK against Japan, not BM test launches. What is more, I think Susan Rice did a pretty good job at arguing the US-Japan case against NK in the UNSC - which was the entirely appropriate response from the United States in the circumstances. The Japanese Ambassador arguing this case alone would have been much weaker. To be provocative, it might be worth questioning the premise on which much of the policy discussion by those politicians identified by Tobias is taking place. Why is the alliance even relevant to this discussion? After all, what was supposed to be ‘deterred’ here? A satellite launch by a North Korean rocket? OK, it might double as a long-range BM test, but who’s the target in this case? The United States, not Japan. If NK had been directly threatening Japan with ballistic missile attack, then the Japanese government might have been in a position to question the Obama administration’s response as well as the reliability of the alliance. But the main risk to Japan from this test launch was debris falling out of the sky. I hardly call this a test of the alliance in which it was shown to be wanting. Is the alliance supposed to deter North Korean satellite launches/BM tests? It never has in the past (under the Clinton and Bush administrations), so why should it now?

It’s interesting that the Japanese media uniformly described the NK rocket as a ‘missile’, whereas in other media, it was usually called a ‘rocket’. NHK showed the launch at least a dozen times (ad nauseam). Add all of this to the pronouncements by the Japanese government before and since, and to the assertions of the LDP politicians/groups that Tobias discusses, and you get a beat-up for their own policy purposes. The Japanese public’s sense of threat from NK is being shamelessly manipulated by these groups. Part of the right-wing’s agenda is also to question the value of alliance deterrence. How else can they justify Japan’s acquiring its own independent offensive capabilities and beefed-up military capabilities? The bottom line is that the US alliance is there to deter a BM attack by NK against Japan, not BM test launches. What is more, I think Susan Rice did a pretty good job at arguing the US-Japan case against NK in the UNSC – which was the entirely appropriate response from the United States in the circumstances. The Japanese Ambassador arguing this case alone would have been much weaker.

]]>