With Japan re-established in economic leadership of the region, the Governor of Tokyo advocated saying ‘No’ to the West, and this was echoed by Mahathir in Malaysia and by nationalist writers in China. The ASEAN countries, rather than allow APEC to overshadow their organization, expanded its membership to ten, and led by a resurgent China, ASEAN+3 (Northeast Asians) began to anticipate becoming an EAC. The ASEANs had discussed this in ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) since the early 1990s. Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia had called the process The Asian Renaissance in 1996, and Kishore Mahbubani in Singapore proclaimed The New Asian Hemisphere in 2008.
Another reason is political. Whether Australia, New Zealand, and India are invited to join an EAC or not, three things are certain: China will not cede its hard-won leadership of the process to the United States, even in a concert of powers; entry of any country to it will be by invitation; and the decision on that will be by consensus. Japan, South Korea and the Philippines may wish the US were in, but they won’t fall out with the region over it. Prime Minister Fukuda’s dream of the Pacific Ocean becoming an ‘Inland Sea’ faded even before he did, and his successor has not publicly tackled the contention it left in Tokyo. Even those who credit the US seventh fleet for keeping regional peace for three decades know the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation has done the same. The US, even under Obama, will not sign it.
Certainly, the East Asian Summit (ASEAN + 3 + Australia, New Zealand, and India) has had a shaky start, being transferred or postponed or cancelled several times and meeting as planned only once. Bound by the consensus rule, it has not shown itself able to deal with Burma, refugees, pollution, pandemics or other threats to regional security. Mr Rudd is right to point to the need for better coordination and more action. But what he has proposed amounts to a politico-strategic APEC. He wants what Australian leaders have wanted for a century, to ensure that the Americans will protect us. Against what? The unspoken answer lies in the contradictory attitudes to China and Indonesia that fuel Australia’s current defence debate.
Alison Broinowski is a Visiting Fellow at ANU and a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Wollongong.