I think any such measures are likely to be a combination of a number of different sub-indicators. Potential sub-indicators might include: economic indicators such as GDP, trade; demographic indicators such as population and man power indicators; wealth indicators such as financial and physical assets; natural endowment indicators such as land and mineral reserves; social stability indicators; military and intelligence indicators; and so on. One could also develop some dynamic indicators. In the end, one may not necessarily need so many sub-indicators, maybe a handful will serve most purposes.

I remember some people in China in the past (maybe still now) used the term comprehensive/composite national power, although I don’t know what they meant and what they included in that.

Figures and numbers can be very misleading when misapplied or interpreted, irrespective when intentions their users might have. Now we have one of the most highly regarded authority figures in statistics shows us how easily that can happen.

Greg Sheridan should be one of the leading commentators on defence and security issues in Australia, probably well regarded and respected among certain circles. It is fascinating that he could be so wrong in using and interpreting statistics, especially in his area of expertise, military power and security.

One would wonder how some experts can show such shallow depth of understanding in their own areas of expertise. The precursor leading to the Iraq war and the pre-empty invasion by the coalitions of willing will always serve as a stark reminder on what costs could be if the so called experts in defence and security got their understanding of the very facts terribly wrong.