The disappointment from certain circles in Japan is palpable. Komori Yoshihisa, Sankei‘s editor-at-large in Washington, lists the accomplishments of previous ambasssadors and concludes that all Roos has achieved is ‘collecting funds for Obama’s election.’ Naturally he compares the selection of Roos with the appointment of Utah Governor Jon Huntsman to be ambassador to China — a selection that the Economist’s Banyan blog rightly calls “brilliant” — and finds Roos wanting. Asahi looks at Roos’s background and reports blank next to ‘foreign languages,’ obviously calling to mind the Mandarin-speaking Huntsman.
Japanese are not the only ones questioning the Roos appointment. Jonathan Adler, blogging at the website of the conservative National Review, calls the news ‘interesting (if disturbing),’ relaying the opinion of a nameless correspondent who calls the appointment a ‘slap-in-the-face’ [sic].
A big part of the problem is that the Japanese media jumped the gun in its reporting on the ambassadorial sweepstakes. Recall that Asahi, surveying Obama’s likely Asia policy team, pegged Joseph Nye as ambassador before Obama had even taken the oath of office. After no further news was forthcoming, Yomiuri suggested the same later in January (which prompted me to write an open letter to Nye). In hindsight, it appears that both newspapers were running with rumors, hoping for the scoop.
While the story of how close Nye was to be named as ambassador has yet to be told, it appears that the Japanese newspapers were talking to the wrong people in Washington. In short, it is fine if Japan’s elites feel disappointed, but they should assign the blame where it belongs, with the newspapers that rushed their reports and gave Nye an air of inevitability as the president’s choice for ambassador.
And what about Roos? I do not think this is something about which to hyperventilate. Nor do I think it is a slap in the face for Japan. This is normal. While Japanese elites worry that the alliance is adrift or in crisis, the Obama administration clearly does not feel the same. The attitude appears to be, every alliance has problems and the US-Japan alliance’s problems are no more severe than the problems with any other alliance. While it is natural to compare the administration’s China and Japan appointments, this strikes me as a mistake. The appointments say nothing about the countries’ ranks in the administration’s eyes and everything about the intensity of the problems in the bilateral relationship. Obama picked a Mandarin-speaking rising star with foreign policy experience for the Beijing job because it is a job that demands a Mandarin-speaking rising star with foreign policy experience. The task of coaxing China’s path to becoming a ‘responsible stakeholder’ requires an ambassador with sufficient clout on the ground in China.
What problems in the US-Japan relationship require the same class of appointment? Is a Harvard professorship or fluency in Japanese necessary to go stand on the beach in Niigata and look out to sea? It would be one thing if Japan was ready for a serious bilateral discussion on the future of the alliance, but given the response Ozawa Ichiro’s musings on the subject, Japan’s leaders are not even ready to have such a discussion amongst themselves. (Speaking in Okinawa on Saturday, Ozawa revisited his remarks and said that his reference to the Seventh Fleet was ‘symbolic,’ which I presume means that he does not want the US presence reduced literally to the Seventh Fleet, but the Seventh Fleet would be the core?)
As useful as Nye would have been as ambassador, his time would likely have been frustrating. Japan is simply too preoccupied with fixing its institutions to commit to make a major bilateral initiative on the alliance worthwhile. At this point it will be a major achievement if the realignment of US forces in Japan goes forward as scheduled, something that could become even more difficult should the DPJ take power later this year.
Japan’s preoccupation with a domestic concerns is not meant as a criticism of Japan — it is what it is. Japan does have a lot on the agenda, what is not helped by political uncertainty. Readers will know that I do not think that the ‘twisted’ Diet is anything to panic about, but rather that I expect that the present turbulence is natural as Japan transitions to more ‘normal’ politics. The fact that Japan can slight its foreign and security policy is a testament to the success of the alliance.
Would Nye’s presence have made a difference in hastening the realignment process or fixing the obstacle that is Futenma? Will Roos fare any better or worse? It is unfair to Roos to treat his appointment as an insult to Japan without considering what exactly is the problem. I expect that Roos will be fine. I am sure that he is a quick study and in James Zumwalt, the deputy chief of mission, he has a first-class Japan specialist. (Indeed, the staff of the US Embassy in Tokyo rarely gets enough credit for the work they do managing the alliance.) As ambassador Roos will also carry a lighter burden than ambassadors to other countries because so much of the bilateral relationship is handled by the department of defense and US Forces Japan. And, in the event of a major crisis, Roos will have the president’s ear.
Unease over the Roos appointment is ultimately the product of asymmetrical dependence. Given the importance of the US-Japan alliance for Japan, it is natural for Japanese officials to worry about every signal from Washington (like this signal, which will undoubtedly be another source of discomfort in Tokyo). But the Roos appointment should not be treated as Japan’s being downgraded but as Japan’s not being a problem for Washington. I have previously written about this administration’s tendency to approach foreign policy as problems to be solved. Japan, not being the source of major problems for the US, naturally does not require a high-profile troubleshooter as ambassador. And thus it continues to look as if the Obama administration has opted for benign neglect towards Japan.
This will no doubt continue to be the case in the US-Japan relationship for years to come. Japan’s dependence on the US will continue, and even intensify, over the coming years as falling defense spending will make it harder for Japan to countenance life outside of the alliance; a crowded foreign policy agenda will lead Washington to focus on fixing problems rather than tinkering with alliances; and Japan will be judged on how it contributes to fixing problems rather than how loyal an ally it declares itself to be (through ‘showing the flag’ and the like).
There is, however, a lesson in all this for Washington. The political appointment of ambassadors should cease (or be scaled back from the thirty percent or so of ambassadors who are political appointees). US allies should not be reduced to guessing their worth by the quality of the ambassador sent by the US. Ambassadors should be career foreign service officers, preferably with knowledge of the country’s language and earlier time spent working in country. It seems like a fairly simple idea that might actually make for better American diplomacy on the whole.
While Obama continues to focus on blaming and prosecuting prior administration officials over terrorists, N. Korea is testing nuclear bombs under his and Secr. Clinton’s noses. Abject failure. Letting down their asian allies like Japan. What an incompetent administration.
Mark, you talk as if this was the first test by the North and you ignore that it was the Bush administration’s failed policies that have brought us to where we are today.
You comment sort of ignores the entire past and history on the issue, ignores facts and ignores reality.
Letting down Japan? Japan has done that itself by linking the abductee issue with the denuclearisation so closely – Japan played itself out of the game by not focusing on the larger strategic objective.
I think the members of the six parties may all have failed on the NK nuclear issue.
The world must be tired of being held as hostage by the current NK leadership. The carrot era is gone and now stick must be used. Many have been so frustrated by its missile tests, now the second and more powerful nuclear test, after it was supposed to have dismantled its facility.
China must realise that the NK cannot be accommodated in any other way except that all parties must act together and be prepared to use all measures, including the last resort, to denuclearise the Korea peninsular, and to prevent any further proliferation. China must prepare itself for the worst that it may have to open its borders with NK for receiving many millions of refuges, and other countries, especially the US, Japan and Russia must be prepared to help China and Korea if that ever happens.
The UN Security Council should decide three things now. The first is to authorise the six parties for any measures they decide are appropriate to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korea peninsular, so there is no need for any future delay. The second is a call for sanctions against NK, except basic humanitarian aid. The six party members should immediately enforce the sanctions.
Lastly, the UN and the six party members should be prepared for the worst that there might be a need for a regime change, if NK were to continue its reckless provocations.
I should add the following to my earlier comments, because it is essential for a viable and permanent solution to the peace and stability of the region.
An important part to the solution of NK nuclear issue lies in a peace agreement for the region acceptable to all the members of the region. The US, China, Russia and the two Koreas must establish such a new arrangement for the peace and stability of the Korea peninsular. Some key components of such a new peace agreement need to include the collective guarantee by the US, China and Russia, of the security of the two Koreas, if that is what the two sides want and the consequential withdrawal of the US forces from the peninsular. The withdrawal of the US forces is premised on the security guarrantee of the South side from the agreement. Only this will create a long lasting peace and stability in the North East Asia region. How the two Koreas achieve their unification is a matter for them to sort out.
I don’t see that Roos is any different from Schieffer (another rich backer – except, in his case, it was for the other side). Why should Japan hope for more? It should understand the way the American political system works – you donate big, you get rewarded big.
On the issue raised by Lincoln Fung, I wonder if China welcomes a troublesome North Korea so long as it does not become troublesome for China.
I can’t answer the question that Aurelia George Mulgan asked of me. That is a question for China. What I’d like to say is that why don’t the international community use the international court system to induct the leaders of the current NK regime, if they have violated internatinal laws, as US president Obama has said? I think the security council should authorise the international prosecutors to do that and put pressures on the current NK leaderships.
I think this might be a good way to enforce international laws. In a case involving head of government or state, it should be authorised by the security council before any inductment being made.
I am sorry that I misspelled the word indict to induct. So I’d like to correct those two words in my reply to Mulgan. You would excuse me for my poor English – my second language.
Also I’d like to add the following to that reply:
That approach will make sure both that any significant breaches of international laws can be prosecuted and that the system of international court is not abused by any individual country. What are those laws for? They are there for countries and people to abide. If any one does not, then there should be a workable mechanism to enforce those international laws. That is the point I want to make.
To add a brief touch of levity: when I first saw the title ‘Roos to Japan’, I immediately thought that Australia had found a new export market for kangaroo meat in Japan – about as likely as Japan finding a new export for whalemeat in Australia.
Aurelia, that would be a very interesting trade between Ausstralia and Japan, at the expense of the Greens and the RSPCA, perhaps. Not sure how much the total trade values could be, though, probably very small.
@Shiro – it could just as well be argued, and in my opinion better argued, that it was the US that dropped the ball by focusing on the nuclear issue to the exclusion of all else. The US originally went after the DPRK for:
Counterfeiting US currency on a massive scale
Drug-running
Exporting WMDs
Supporting and conducting terrorism (which includes the Japanese abduction issue)
Building nuclear weapons
DPRK assets were frozen. Their ships were subject to search on the high seas. The US had them designated as a State Supporter of Terrorism . The US had a lot of cards to play, and what did it do? It focused on the nuclear issue, an important issue to be sure but just one of many, and frittered away what leverage it had. It gave the DPRK their money back. Delisted them as a sponsor of terrorism. Japan also made a mistake – not listening to what the US was saying. Celebrating a US statement that they would support Japan’s position on the abduction issue, while ignoring the qualifier Armitage himself uttered: “as best we can”. Not “unequivocally”, but “We got your back – until we decide it is better to do something else.” Now, I expect no less of diplomats and bureaucrats, and I certainly don’t expect any nation to support another nation’s interests at the expense of its own, but it was a bit ridiculous to hear the US side chastise Japan for “not seeing the big picture” and “focusing on one issue” while they themselves were ignoring every other issue except the nuclear one, and bending over backwards to give the DPRK whatever it wanted so long as they promised (yet again) to dismantle their nuclear program.
Mark, THAT is what we call an “incompetent administration”.
To take the discussion back to China’s role in relation to North Korea: I think everyone is agreed that China is the only country that is in a position to exercise real leverage over North Korea. But what does it do? It props up the Kim Jong Il regime on the pretext of preventing an influx of NKorean refugees across its border. In so doing, China connives with the North in imprisoning the North Koreans in their own country – as potential victims of a regime that is guilty of genocide. It seems to me that it is China that should be bearing the brunt of international pressure over NKorean behaviour, rather than the NKoreans. The position that China has cleverly positioned itself into, however, is quite the reverse – as a judicious mediator and presider over the six-party talks where the Japanese, South Koreans and Americans are the supplicants and the North Koreans are the supplicated i.e. it is the referee maintaining the status quo. Pretty good job if you can get it.
@Aurelia – I am no fan of the DPRK, but sorry – “genocide”? What ethnic or religious group has the DPRK been systematically attempting to exterminate? “Murder” or “mass-murder” I would agree with you on. But “genocide”?
Still, your basic point is valid, although I would say that BOTH China AND the DPRK should be facing pressure – with perhaps a bit thrown in on the Russians as well. But since China makes all the cheap stuff the world apparently needs to survive nowadays, I wouldn’t count on them facing pressure any time soon.
More from Tobias on this at http://www.observingjapan.com/2009/05/more-on-roos-appointment.html
Considering the appointment of John Roos and other Obama donors to ambassadorial posts, David Rothkopf makes a strong argument against the relevance of ambassadorships in the first place:
I think the one mistake Rothkopf makes is overstating the significance of the ambassador’s post in Tokyo. As I argued earlier this week, Roos is going to Japan precisely because it is the kind of post that does not demand “a special breed of highly empowered, highly experienced people,” especially now given Japan’s domestic “difficulties.” The challenges facing Roos are of a wholly different nature from the challenges facing Roemer and Huntsman in New Delhi and Beijing respectively. If China and India jobs involve smoothing out problems stemming from the emergence of two colossal powers, the Japan job is the flip side of the coin: constantly reassuring Japan that despite its relative decline, the US-Japan relationship is still important. That is not to say that Roos is not highly empowered — indeed, it appears that he was also in consideration for domestic policy jobs — but that he is high-powered in a different sense from someone like Huntsman who has extensive foreign experience. But Roos should have no problem performing his two most important tasks.
Roos’s number one task is reassuring Japan’s elites that the US will meet its obligations to come to Japan’s defense. That message ultimately has less to do with the messenger than the messenger’s persistence, and the extent to which the messenger has the backing of the administration.
Roos actually may be uniquely capable of managing what could be the other important task of his ambassadorship, welcoming a DPJ-led government into power. As someone removed from the circle of US-Japan alliance insiders, Roos presumably will arrive in Tokyo free of LDP leanings and more open to forging a relationship with the potential governing party. Even if the DPJ does not win this year, it is increasingly a force to be reckoned with in Japanese politics. I hope and trust that Roos will make building a relationship with the DPJ a top priority of his ambassadorship.