Considering the appointment of John Roos and other Obama donors to ambassadorial posts, David Rothkopf makes a strong argument against the relevance of ambassadorships in the first place:

For really important relationships, we need permanent high-level representation. But those relationships are comparatively few and in those cases, we need a special breed of highly empowered, highly experienced people…people who look more like Tom Shannon or perhaps Tim Roemer or Jon Huntsman…and not the others. A good rule of thumb might be: If you think a job can go to someone with no regional, diplomatic or relevant national security experience, then perhaps we ought to really be thinking about whether we need the job rather than who should fill it.

I think the one mistake Rothkopf makes is overstating the significance of the ambassador’s post in Tokyo. As I argued earlier this week, Roos is going to Japan precisely because it is the kind of post that does not demand “a special breed of highly empowered, highly experienced people,” especially now given Japan’s domestic “difficulties.” The challenges facing Roos are of a wholly different nature from the challenges facing Roemer and Huntsman in New Delhi and Beijing respectively. If China and India jobs involve smoothing out problems stemming from the emergence of two colossal powers, the Japan job is the flip side of the coin: constantly reassuring Japan that despite its relative decline, the US-Japan relationship is still important. That is not to say that Roos is not highly empowered — indeed, it appears that he was also in consideration for domestic policy jobs — but that he is high-powered in a different sense from someone like Huntsman who has extensive foreign experience. But Roos should have no problem performing his two most important tasks.

Roos’s number one task is reassuring Japan’s elites that the US will meet its obligations to come to Japan’s defense. That message ultimately has less to do with the messenger than the messenger’s persistence, and the extent to which the messenger has the backing of the administration.

Roos actually may be uniquely capable of managing what could be the other important task of his ambassadorship, welcoming a DPJ-led government into power. As someone removed from the circle of US-Japan alliance insiders, Roos presumably will arrive in Tokyo free of LDP leanings and more open to forging a relationship with the potential governing party. Even if the DPJ does not win this year, it is increasingly a force to be reckoned with in Japanese politics. I hope and trust that Roos will make building a relationship with the DPJ a top priority of his ambassadorship.

Still, your basic point is valid, although I would say that BOTH China AND the DPRK should be facing pressure – with perhaps a bit thrown in on the Russians as well. But since China makes all the cheap stuff the world apparently needs to survive nowadays, I wouldn’t count on them facing pressure any time soon.

DPRK assets were frozen. Their ships were subject to search on the high seas. The US had them designated as a State Supporter of Terrorism . The US had a lot of cards to play, and what did it do? It focused on the nuclear issue, an important issue to be sure but just one of many, and frittered away what leverage it had. It gave the DPRK their money back. Delisted them as a sponsor of terrorism. Japan also made a mistake – not listening to what the US was saying. Celebrating a US statement that they would support Japan’s position on the abduction issue, while ignoring the qualifier Armitage himself uttered: “as best we can”. Not “unequivocally”, but “We got your back – until we decide it is better to do something else.” Now, I expect no less of diplomats and bureaucrats, and I certainly don’t expect any nation to support another nation’s interests at the expense of its own, but it was a bit ridiculous to hear the US side chastise Japan for “not seeing the big picture” and “focusing on one issue” while they themselves were ignoring every other issue except the nuclear one, and bending over backwards to give the DPRK whatever it wanted so long as they promised (yet again) to dismantle their nuclear program.

Mark, THAT is what we call an “incompetent administration”.

Also I’d like to add the following to that reply:

That approach will make sure both that any significant breaches of international laws can be prosecuted and that the system of international court is not abused by any individual country. What are those laws for? They are there for countries and people to abide. If any one does not, then there should be a workable mechanism to enforce those international laws. That is the point I want to make.

I think this might be a good way to enforce international laws. In a case involving head of government or state, it should be authorised by the security council before any inductment being made.

On the issue raised by Lincoln Fung, I wonder if China welcomes a troublesome North Korea so long as it does not become troublesome for China.

An important part to the solution of NK nuclear issue lies in a peace agreement for the region acceptable to all the members of the region. The US, China, Russia and the two Koreas must establish such a new arrangement for the peace and stability of the Korea peninsular. Some key components of such a new peace agreement need to include the collective guarantee by the US, China and Russia, of the security of the two Koreas, if that is what the two sides want and the consequential withdrawal of the US forces from the peninsular. The withdrawal of the US forces is premised on the security guarrantee of the South side from the agreement. Only this will create a long lasting peace and stability in the North East Asia region. How the two Koreas achieve their unification is a matter for them to sort out.