Okada Katsuya, the new DPJ secretary-general, echoed the government’s sentiments. Japanese conservatives used the test to advance their argument for a more robust Japanese security posture. Abe Shinzo, continuing his comeback effort, demanded firmer sanctions against North Korea, especially against North Korean counterfeiting activities, called for preemptive strike capabilities, and was vaguely supportive of a debate about acquiring nuclear weapons (‘A debate on matters of national security ought to be conducted freely’).
Komori Yoshihisa said that the test illustrates the limits of the multilateral management of the North Korean problem and argued that Japan, doing whatever it needs to do defend itself, should reopen the debate on a nuclear deterrent. A Sankei ‘news’ article informs readers that North Korea has the power of life and death over Japan, based strictly on the range of the missiles it possesses.
In other words, much like last month’s rocket launch, the responses of Japanese political actors to North Korea’s second nuclear test have followed wholly predictable patterns — and show just how powerless Japan is to stop or reverse North Korea’s nuclear program.
Of note is that Japan’s conservatives once again have responded as if the US-Japan alliance and its nuclear umbrella does not exist. Indeed, it is remarkable how cavalier the conservatives are in their disregard for the nuclear umbrella. This is now the standard conservative argument: play up the North Korean threat, play down the US ability to meet that threat, and let a vicious cycle of fear and doubt take over.
Do the vast deterrent capabilities of the US really count for nothing in the face of North Korea’s piddling (and shrinking) arsenal? North Korea may be able to deter a first strike aimed at toppling the Kim regime, but is the US somehow incapable of deterring North Korea from launching a suicidal strike against Japan? Of course, back North Korea into a corner to the point where the regime has nothing to lose and then I too may question the ability of the US or anyone else to deter North Korea from doing something like firing a Rodong in Japan’s direction.
Which is why the response of the conservatives is the height of folly. Threatening the very survival of the regime is a good way to make North Korea undeterrable. It’s an unpleasant task, but North Korea’s neighbors are responsible for talking (or buying) North Korea down from the ledge. To wit, criticism of the ‘talk over pressure’ approach is equally foolish. If the goal of negotiations is to halt and reverse North Korea’s nuclear program, then yes, it is an abject failure.
But if the purpose of multilateral diplomacy is to keep talking North Korea down from the ledge and to buy time for its neighbors to plan for regime collapse and to push for gradual opening of the north (however halting), then ‘jaw-jaw’ is essential and must continue, despite the nuclear test. I for one think there is no alternative to the latter.
Hence the distinction between capabilities and power. The US is unquestionably capable of deterring a nuclear strike against Japan, but it takes compellent power over North Korea’s actions. Being unable to make a credible threat of regime change and visibly dependent on Beijing to pressure Pyongyang, Washington has little power other than its deterrent power. Japan, even with a nuclear arsenal of its own, would have even less power over North Korea.
This is the unanswered question in the conservative response to every act of provocation by North Korea. If the US is unable to guarantee Japanese security through its immense nuclear arsenal — again, the unstated (or occasionally stated) basis of the argument for a Japanese arsenal — how would a Japanese deterrent be any more powerful?
I understand that they could argue that the problem isn’t US capabilities but US commitment, but I have yet to see a convincing demonstration that the US commitment to defend Japan from attack is flagging to the point that Japan would require its own nuclear weapons. I do not think the Japanese public is convinced either.
So given that North Korea has successfully deterred the US and others from initiating regime change, what choice do the participants in the six-party talks but to turn to the UN to condemn the test and then try once again to engage North Korea via the talks? Meanwhile, the governments of the region should continue to treat every day that Kim Jong-il lives as another day for them to plan for regime collapse.
And as for the ongoing effort by Japanese conservatives to undermine the nuclear umbrella? Mr. Roos, you have your work cut out for you.
One of the problems the U.S. has is that other nations take note of how they respond to North Korea’s provocations.
I agree that the most pragmatic, and perhaps only, solution is continued dialogue with increasing support from China.
But one thing just about everyone agrees on is that North Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons is about regime survival. As you’ve noted Tobias, any usage of those weapons against Japan is dramatically counterintuitive to that objective.
Yet if countries like Iran, who’s goal is regional hegemony, see that the international community is impotent to meet breakout capacity with real action then they are more likely to pursue such weapons themselves.
It is already very bad to see a nuclear proliferation by the North Korea regime. It would be much worse to see another one by Japan. It is unthinkable. It also indicates the urgency to bring the North Korea regime to the road of denuclearisation as quickly as possible. The six party members must act together resolutely and effectively.
Anyone, Japan included, should not use the recent test by the North Korea as an excuse to pursue nuclear proliferation. Someone’s violation of international laws does not make it right for any other one to violate them. Any violation is intolerable and should be dealt with accordingly and effectively.
The international community needs to enforce international laws in a meaningful, just and effective way. The international war crimes courts should be focused more on what is happening now, rather than being used as a tool of which hunt for some past events in an unjust and unbalanced way. The court should establish its credibility and should become more effective deterrence for future offenders.
The UN Security Council should have the power to intervene to make the court accountable to the international community through the UN representation system.
In politics, timing is everything.
With regard to North Korea, it is already simply too late. The cost to disarm the North Korean regime by force is too high, and naturally (correctly?) the US and S. Korea are not willing to pre-empt N Korea. So we must wait for the North Koreans. Eventually, for whatever domestic reasons, they will either present an opportunity to disarm peacefully (which must be taken), or they will launch a devestating and suicidal attack. In the short term, there is little that external pressure can actually do now, whether Japanese, Chinese, or US.
Returning to the article, Japanese powerlessness, as Tobias discusses, is therefore par for the course. Our cards, and Japan’s, are already on the table. And to the comments, Crsipin notes that the interest of the North Korea is regime survival, but how that interest translates into actual state behavior is not so clear. But what is important to recognise is the limits of external factors in how this scenario plays out this time.
I will be in Korea next week, so perhaps my own timing leaves something to be desired.
As Tobias points out, the pro-nuclear group amongst Japanese conservatives (Abe, Nakagawa et al.) are opportunists, making the most out of every NK test (whether a nuclear device or missiles) to call for reopening the debate on Japan’s pursuing the nuclear weapons option. This was to be expected. Tobias is also right in revealing that these calls implicitly question the reliability of US extended deterrence (willingness, not capability). It has always struck me as illogical that the Japanese conservatives were willing to rely on the US nuclear umbrella to protect them against the (vast) Soviet nuclear threat, while calling into question the reliability of extended deterrence when it came to the ‘piddling’ NK threat. What could explain this? One answer might be: the Soviet threat to Japan only arose in the context of a US-USSR global confrontation in which Japan was indirectly caught up as a forward base for US forces. There was no question mark that arose in this situation over whether US forces would be deployed to defend Japan. But the situation with NK is potentially very different: here the primary military confrontation is between NK and Japan itself (and of course, between NK and SK). In other words, Japanese doubts arise about whether the US would come to the assistance of an ally in a military conflict in which it was not necessarily directly engaged itself. Condoleezza Rice understood this. In the final year of the Bush administration, she went out of her way to emphasize the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella directly to the Japanese. She realised that the best way to silence the nuclear advocates in Japan was to reassure the Japanese government of the US commitment to Japanese security. What makes such a blanket reassurance difficult, however, is the much bigger potential problem of a one-on-one Japan-China confrontation (e.g. over maritime territory). This might certainly give America pause. In other words, the Americans mightn’t necessarily want to give the Japanese a blank cheque.