- Hmmm… The problem cannot be resolved by “intensification of pressure” simply because no more pressure can be exerted upon North Korea. Neither the neighboring countries nor the United States have any leverage left to apply (except for a military strike). All possible sanctions have already been implemented, all links severed, all promises broken. The result is obvious – North Korea is going ahead with its nuclear and ICBM plans, paying no attention to our indignation. The country is already perfectly isolated from the rest of the world and this is another bonus to the Pyongyang regime, which can survive only if shielded by an information iron curtain.

Since the external sanctions and boycotts only contribute to the regime survival, shouldn’t we use the opposite tactics trying to soften it from inside? The recipe is old and benign — engagement and cooperation. North Korea needs to trade, to learn, to modernize, etc. Let’s help its companies earn foreign exchange legally, let’s teach its managers to trade with us; let’s open our embassies and cultural centres in Pyongyang, telling them more about our good intentions.

The ten years of Sunshine Policy (also known as Policy of Peace and Prosperity, 1998-2008), which South Korea pursued in relation to the North, created the atmosphere of trust and resulted in mutually profitable economic cooperation. Why not repeating this positive example at a regional level? Even though North Korea now has nuclear weapons it does not mean we should stop talking to it. The policy of insults, pressure and confrontation does not bring any good but can lead to conflict, a nuclear one. Instead, give Pyongyang a good reason to scrap its nuclear capability. Offer something more useful and less dangerous than ballistic missiles. Invitation to cooperation always works better than threats.

Thus, a fundamental resolution to the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program will require progressive relaxation of pressure on multiple fronts and acceleration of engagement and cooperation policies, just like it was 30 years ago in the Soviet-US relations. Surely, a mere nuclear détente will be followed by significantly more impressive results.

LP

However, the six party framework is important and Russia should be included as an important partner in the process, although some matters could be decided among if others if they only concern them.

The most important thing is to assure China that the other party members are with it in dealing with any challenges. If China’s is really resolute and the five are a united front, the denuclearisation issue should not be too difficult.