Comments on: Obama’s North Korea policy and the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration

By: Lincoln Fung

Lincoln Fung — Wed, 08 Jul 2009 01:52:19 +0000

If what Richard Broinowski says is true and I don’t have any reasons not to assume so, then it is disturbing to see three of the six party members (presumably in addition to whatever the North has done) to have contributed to the failures of the international efforts.

While the US, Japan and the South have tended to say that China has been too soft to the North, they perhaps need to reflect on their own strategies and their effects. The six party members all need to work together realistically and effectively, with well defined and clear objectives. No members should “violate” reached agreements.

It seems there are lessons for all members.

By: Richard Broinowski

Richard Broinowski — Tue, 07 Jul 2009 23:47:57 +0000

The 1994 ‘horse purchase’ was in essence crueled by Jesse Helms, who put a block on proceeding with the reactors. (‘We mustn’t reward bad behaviour’). Clinton didn’t stand up to him. Meanwhile, Pyongyang complied with the Framework for six years during which time US inspectors were allowed into Yongpyon and much good work was carried out in safeguarding plutonium (see diary entries of US nuclear scientists on the spot in contemporary Bulletins of the Atomic Scientists). In the end Pyongyang ran out of patience when the US and its allies failed to fulfil their part of the deal.

The 2007 deal was stymied by the Japanese insisting on linking kidnapped Japanese into the new deal, by Lee Myung-bak’s strong anti-Kim Jong-il line, and by the Americans adding more verification procedures.

Yes, it is too late for ‘benign neglect’, but not for further active diplomacy, this time leading to a deal without the kind of unexpected add-ons that infuriate the North. Maybe Obama’s administration can pull it off, but I think there is a strong neo-conservative set of nay-sayers in Washington intent on stifling another attempt. But what is the alternative? Harsher sanctions? Interceptions of ships? Shooting down test-fired missiles? (How would the Americans react if one of their missiles was shot down?) All heighten the probability of an unintended military clash leading to awful concequences. And Japanese antagonism doesn’t help.

By: Lincoln Fung

Lincoln Fung — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 03:45:03 +0000

If the current situation is that “the deep concern is that any military escalation might not end in a conventional military conflict as North Korea nears the possession of operational nuclear weapons”, then imagine what would hold for the future if North Korea’s nuclear programs are more advanced and it becomes a full nuclear power? What could the international community do then if North Korea continues to act in the way as it has done recently?

The summit diplomacy by US, the two Koreas only is unlikely to work in the long term, but only generates short term confusions. While there have been short comings of the six party talks, that forum may be the only effective way to further progress the denuclearisation issue in the Korea peninsular, because Japan, China and Russia will also be affected by what will happen to North Korea and in the Korea peninsular.

It seems a little too early and premature to specify how the two Koreas should be unified at this moment. As the article states already, North Korea views the US stated support of unification on those conditions as a hostile move to foster regime transformation in the North and to facilitate ‘Korean reunification through absorption’ a la mode Germany. It is unlikely to accept that in the short term.

The issue of unification should be deferred until the denuclearisation issue has been resolved successfully. The unification issue should be left for the two Koreas to decide, but for the foreseeable future, the interests of the two sides need to be respected.