Comments on: Pyongyang strikes back http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/pyongyang-strikes-back/ Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific Sun, 12 Feb 2012 22:50:38 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 By: mlkhttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/pyongyang-strikes-back/comment-page-1/#comment-42081 mlk Thu, 16 Jul 2009 12:09:49 +0000 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=5717#comment-42081 This is a good piece but I have problems with some of it - almost everything Andrei states about the importance of the DPRK in China's foreign aid program and DPRK foreign trade is incorrect (DPRK is not taking 40% of China's external aid - it's closer to 10%; and the bilateral trade upsurge more recently has been closely connected with Chinese resource based investments in the DPRK - the opening this year of more (Chinese) cargo transit and tourism routes in North Hamgyong Province (Chongjin) will spur on this trade and investment. Secondly, statement setting out scenarios of a Southern takeover (northern collapse and unification caused by sanctions, strangulation, malign neglect and internal struggle) are for those in fantasyland (eg. all the important positions in the new economy will undoubtedly be taken by people from South Korea-people with capital, education, experience, and perhaps even political support). If any "takeover" (in its many forms) takes place in the coming two generations, it will be from north of the Korean border. This is a good piece but I have problems with some of it – almost everything Andrei states about the importance of the DPRK in China’s foreign aid program and DPRK foreign trade is incorrect (DPRK is not taking 40% of China’s external aid – it’s closer to 10%; and the bilateral trade upsurge more recently has been closely connected with Chinese resource based investments in the DPRK – the opening this year of more (Chinese) cargo transit and tourism routes in North Hamgyong Province (Chongjin) will spur on this trade and investment.

Secondly, statement setting out scenarios of a Southern takeover (northern collapse and unification caused by sanctions, strangulation, malign neglect and internal struggle) are for those in fantasyland (eg. all the important positions in the new economy will undoubtedly be taken by people from South Korea-people with capital, education, experience, and perhaps even political support). If any “takeover” (in its many forms) takes place in the coming two generations, it will be from north of the Korean border.

]]> By: Lincoln Funghttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/15/pyongyang-strikes-back/comment-page-1/#comment-42073 Lincoln Fung Thu, 16 Jul 2009 11:34:54 +0000 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=5717#comment-42073 While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea's changing behaviour in the recent past. It appears that there are still some unanswered questions. I had thought it was the fault of the North's political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments). The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place? Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever? While the arguments in this article are seemingly logic, I wonder whether there could be other explanations or reasons behind the North Korea’s changing behaviour in the recent past.

It appears that there are still some unanswered questions.

I had thought it was the fault of the North’s political leaderships that caused all this, but then I encountered the comments by Richard Broinowski that shed some different light, suggesting that some other parties also contributed to that (see http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/05/obamas-north-korea-policy-and-the-june-15-south-north-joint-declaration/#comments).

The fear of the potential destabilisation of a rich South on the North sounds attractive. But didn’t the leadership think about that during the relatively relaxed period in the first place?

Further, how the North leaderships think strategically about the future of the North? Do they really think they can hide the different realities between the two Koreas forever?

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