I do not disagree that Murata has a number of affiliations that strongly suggest his political leanings. The Shokun! article cited in the initial post — Shokun! obviously triggers various red flags — uses a number of conservative code words, ‘pride,’ ‘independent country,’ and the like. A subsequent post includes a translation of an op-ed by Okazaki Hisahiko, the notoriously hawkish Foreign Ministry OB who was once known as ‘Abe’s brain,’ defending Murata’s actions. (Available in Japanese here.)
But so what? Why should it matter that Murata is a conservative nationalist? And why should it matter why he decided to reveal the secret agreement (or why Okazaki has defended him)? After watching the Abe government blow up, it is hard to muster up the same concern about the influence of the conservatives. The author writes that of how Murata’s remarks will be used by those ‘who want to use any means to repeal Article 9 and advance Japan’s rearmament.’ Events seem to have taken care of both causes. As I have written previously, the economic crisis has greatly diminished the power of the conservatives even within the LDP, to the point that constitution revision might not even be included in the LDP’s manifesto this year (if the LDP ever gets around to writing one).
Is Article 9 really at risk? Even in the best of times, it was unlikely that the conservatives would get what they wanted on Article 9. Oh sure, they could get the article revised, but the need to assemble two-thirds of the members of both houses plus fifty percent plus one of the Japanese public would guarantee that the article would be amended but not abandoned. Revision would likely shift the yardsticks, ratifying changes that have been made that appear to depart from the letter of the law, without removing all limitations on Japanese security policy. And, incidentally, I see no problems with revision of this sort. No document drafted by human hands is beyond revision. My problem is with those obsessed with revision, like Abe Shinzō, not revision itself.
In any case, with the LDP in its death throes, it bears mentioning that constitution revision is even less likely under a DPJ-led government in coalition with the SDPJ. A DPJ government is likely to take its cue from public opinion polls that show the percentage of respondents interested in constitution to be under five percent. Raising constitution revision would only serve to weaken the coalition and sow dissent within the LDP, while strengthening an opposition LDP.
The same goes for ‘rearmament,’ the second concern voiced by the author of Armchair Asia. The conservatives have been ascendant for roughly the same period that Japan has let its defense spending stagnate, which suggests, of course, that for all their rhetorical might their reach exceeds their grasp. Their reach will only decline further should the LDP lose power this year. They have allies in the DPJ, but if the DPJ is able to deliver on its plans for a government that unifies cabinet and party, conservatives like Maehara Seiji will find themselves straitjacketed by government service. And there is no chance that a DPJ government elected on a platform of Seikatsu dai-ichi would, upon taking power, proceed to channel significant sums of money into defense spending. Elected on a platform stressing butter, butter, butter and facing skyrocketing pensions costs, it is highly unlikely that the DPJ will decide to invest in guns once in office.
There may be more to rearmament than defense spending, but as with some limited form of constitution revision, what is the problem with Japan doing incrementally more without drastically increasing its spending?
To conclude a discussion that has run longer than I intended, the conservatives should be challenged but their strength and influence should not be exaggerated. And if Ambassador Okazaki wants an open debate, then someone in Japan ought to give him his debate.
Meanwhile, as I wrote in my original post on Murata, I think that whatever his motive, it is good that the Japanese government will be forced to address the role of nuclear weapons in the US-Japan relationship openly. It is entirely possible that the Japanese public — with a nuclear North Korea next door — will recognize a revision of the non-nuclear principles that explicitly permits the US to do what it has been doing all along will strengthen Japan’s security. Despite the wishes of the conservatives, the public isn’t exactly pressing for Japanese nuclear weapons as a substitute for US nuclear weapons.
It is encouraging that the two governments will hold a working-level meeting this month to discuss the nuclear umbrella, a discussion that is long overdue. One meeting will not resolve the paradox of Japan’s trying to be the world’s conscience on nuclear weapons while being defended by US nuclear weapons but it will at least help call attention to the paradox and force the Japanese public and their representatives to address it. The US should not be forced into a position where it would have to use nukes to defend Japan (at the behest of its elites) even as the Japanese public condemns the US. Explicitly permitting US nuclear weapons in Japan would certainly help make both countries responsible.
I agree with Tobias that there’s a tendency to overestimate the strength of the right-wing nationalists in Japan. They don’t represent the mainstream of the Japanese public (as Abe found out to his cost), although they are closer to the mainstream of the LDP, whose death Tobias may have prematurely forecast. The right-wingers constantly pop up with this or that pronouncement or treatise. They make sure that they are in the forefront of the media on a regular basis. In other words, they are good at keeping the cause alive, with periodic help from the North Koreans and sometimes China.
I wonder how Tobias read the results of the Tokyo election last Sunday? It seemed to me that the DPJ was good, but not good enough (10 seats short of a majority). Could this be repeated in the general election? Good, but not good enough? Hatoyama is still a bit shaky on ‘dead persons’ donations’. We should not forget either that he has strongly supported constitutional revision in the past – although I would agree with Tobias’ assessment that a DPJ government is going to have its hands full without opening this particular Pandora’s box. Whatever level of defence spending is finally agreed under a possible DPJ government (which will be spraying money over the entire electorate), you can be sure that the campaign to obtain the F-22s from the United States will not go away. From a Japanese perspective, it is vital that that maintain military superiority over China in key areas of their defence.
While North Korea’s nuclear program poses a threat to every country in the East Asia region, why does it improve Japan’s security by having US nuclear weapons in Japan, given that Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella?
It should be noted that the 1960 secret agreement was made during the cold war era, obviously. It reminds people of the Cuba missiles crisis in 1962, not too long after 1960. If it were not a secret agreement, the Cuba missiles crisis may have had been different.
How did the US take the missiles in Cuba then? Why didn’t it allow them to stay there? What are the implications of having US nuclear weapons in Japan for other countries in the region? How China and Russia will react, given that the way the US reacted to the Cuba missiles? Will it be a stabilising or destabilising to the regional security?
While it is important to prevent nuclear proliferation, to have US nuclear weapons in Japan would hardly contribute to that cause.
It would be a much more serious regional security issue than just that of a reaction to the North Korea’s nuclear program and would have much wider implications. If that happens, it would have the potential to shift the focus away from North Korea to a whole new issue.