Reflexively, I responded: ‘Of course they are competing,’ I said. ‘In Japan, it comes down to a battle between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan. Like the United States, Japan has free elections.’

However, I soon caught myself pondering the issue more deeply as I began to realize that it was not entirely obvious what it is that the LDP and the DPJ are competing over.

What, in fact, are the choices that are being presented to the Japanese public?

Is it a case of making a choice after reading and comparing the campaign manifestoes of the two parties? Or is the decision made after carefully comparing the persona of the party leaders? Or is it a choice between the character and personality of the parties?

However, if there is little difference between the parties, what should voters do? Or, should elections be regarded as a stick to be used to punish governing parties for poor governance as well as a carrot to convince opposition parties to present alternatives?

There are other questions facing Japan right now. Will it have a two-party system like the United States? Is such a system even desirable? Will the Lower House election on August 30 be a choice between promoting that trend or not?

Five years down the road, has the time finally come when I can proudly respond to that taxi driver’s question?

This summer’s Lower House election comes in the wake of 20 years of crisis following the end of the Cold War.

The curtain has been raised on a stormy political season.

Scrutinizing the policies presented in the campaign manifestoes of the LDP and the DPJ, there is a blurring of the differences because the LDP appears to have come up with measures that simulate those of the DPJ in areas such as child-rearing support and education policy.

In addition, the record-level economic stimulation measures taken to address the global economic crisis have led to a confrontation between ‘big government’ and ‘big government.’

While fiscal stimulus measures may be unavoidable in a time of economic emergency, such free spending cannot continue indefinitely, especially given the weight of the fiscal deficit.

In their hearts, both parties realize there has to be an increase in the consumption tax rate, but they are playing a game of fiscal hide-and-seek. The LDP says it will not raise tax over the next three years, while the DPJ has pledged no tax hike over the next four years.

What is equally lacking from both parties is a medium- and long-term growth strategy that could produce a brighter future.

To meet key issues head-on, such as the declining population, the fatigued farming sector, the ‘Lost Generation’ and the hollowing out of the idea that everyone belongs to the middle class, this country needs not only growth, but higher quality growth.

A redistribution of income will only go so far.

New frontiers for a growth strategy must be explored in sectors such as the environment and agriculture, marine and forestry resources, culture and local communities, elderly care and medical services, human resource development and foreigners living in Japan, as well as Japan’s links with Asia and newly emerging nations.

While the DPJ is proposing a 25 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over 1990 levels by 2020 as well as working toward free-trade agreements with South Korea and the United States, what is vital is for those proposals to be positioned as part of a growth strategy.

Companies, communities and families have provided societal bonds, helped each other out and served as a safety valve, but those functions have all weakened.

The political sector is being called on to play an even greater role as the linchpin to resolve the various problems facing society. The public will also have to participate more directly in politics.

Major changes have already taken place on the political frontlines. Long-standing support groups for the LDP, such as farmers’ groups, medical associations, post office chiefs, local merchants’ groups and the construction industry have weakened in their support for the LDP, and substantial portions of those groups have switched their support to the DPJ.

As an influential LDP heavyweight bluntly said to me recently, ‘They only supported the LDP because it was the governing party.’

It appears as though two major conservative parties in the form of the LDP and the DPJ are emerging, while both are going after the same conservative support base.

That is one reason the Süddeutsche Zeitung reported in its July 14 issue: ‘The LDP is a power monopoly of the political elite and does not represent specific social classes such as the political parties of Western Europe. The DPJ, on the other hand, is exactly like the LDP in its ideological diversity.’

At the same time, in an age of globalization, diversity in society and ideology will likely continue in both Western Europe and Japan, and political parties will inevitably and increasingly reflect those dynamics.

The DPJ is proposing greater transparency in criminal interrogations and early implementation of a law to allow married couples to use different surnames. It is also promoting the role of so-called NPO banks, alternative financial institutions designed to make positive contributions to society. These proposals should be considered as an attempt to construct a liberal core that reflects in policy the diverseness in society and the multifaceted values that exist there.

If the LDP is considered a Cold War party, then the DPJ is a post-Cold War party.

The DPJ should make a greater effort to clearly define its image of itself as a political entity.

It would be problematic to have the DPJ convert to a pork barrel-style conservative party that makes inroads into the support bases of the LDP.

Instead, what the DPJ should do is extend open arms to allow for participation in politics by unaligned voters, in particular, the younger generation, who now do not have a political forum or arena to make their voices heard.

If an age of two-party politics is to emerge in Japan, it should be one that pits a conservative force against a liberal one.

However, it remains to be seen if a two-party system in which both parties are capable of handling government will actually emerge.

In 1955, when the two major parties, the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), were formed, many Japanese held out hopes that Japan’s parliamentary politics would start working along Westminster, British-style lines.

The following year, Masamichi Inoki, a professor of political science at Kyoto University, edited a book about Japan’s two major parties in which he warned about ‘a lack of trust’ between the two parties. Inoki asked: ‘How can parliamentary politics of persuasion and compromise emerge? Japan’s parliamentary politics will be in danger unless the two parties divide up the task of absorbing the frustrations of the Japanese public.’

As Inoki feared, no two-party system emerged in Japan. While both sides had their problems, a fatal drawback was the inability of the JSP to come up with realistic alternatives that would have allowed it to take government.

The classic example of that failure was the party’s rigid and dogmatic foreign and national security policy.

Now, the DPJ has come up with alternatives on the global environment and nuclear disarmament in its foreign and national security policy. It has taken a more pragmatic approach in its relations with the United States.

While that flexible stance should be welcome, what is being sought is a more flexible way of thinking.

This opportunity should be utilized to erase ideological slants from Japan’s foreign and national security policy. If policy measures are created after pragmatic public policy discussions, this would lead to progress toward a ‘parliamentary politics of persuasion and compromise.’ If that is achieved, the alternatives presented will be much more nuanced than at present.

A DPJ that is exactly like the LDP, or vice versa, will not serve as an attractive choice to voters. Of greater concern would be a further decline in the minor parties as a result.

The range of alternatives before the public will only expand if opposition parties present counterproposals to policies presented by the ruling party, and if the ruling camp subsequently presents even more counterproposals.

There can be no choice without alternatives. Alternatives must involve decisions on what should be changed as well as what should not be changed.

One reason for the current confusion in Japan is its failure as a nation to respond to questions such as whether it wants to continue to depend on exports or move toward a domestic demand-based economy, whether the environment and the economy are mutually exclusive, whether it seeks to become a multiethnic society and whether it will push reform or return to square one.

In addressing the last question, the issue to be pondered is if the conditions that led to that starting point still exist.

The only way to respond to these questions is to establish a new design for the nation.

This essay was adapted from an article that first appeared in the Asahi Shimbun 12 August 2009.