Despite China’s new openness in managing its public relations and international media, demonstrated most clearly by allowing journalists’ access to Urumqi shortly after the deadly riot, it has been far from successful in improving its international image. In fact, its campaign to smear Mrs. Kadeer backfired badly, to the extent that it has given her an undeserved legitimacy and credibility beyond her dreams. Ms Kadeer sarcastically thanked the Chinese government for the unexpected boost in her public profile at a Canberra press conference.
It seems that Beijing is suffering from the stigma associated with being an authoritarian government. Even the violent deaths of hundreds of innocent Han Chinese at the hands of Uighur mobs could not give Beijing any moral high ground. The relatively restrained anti-riot actions of the Chinese, taken with deliberate care to protect China’s tattered image after the earlier Lhasa riot, could not prevent it from being labelled as genocidal by the Turkish Prime Minister.
Beijing once again attributed the blame for the violence to a small clique of extremists. It seems that the previously obscure World Uighur Congress bore the brunt of official Chinese anger. That was done in an attempt by Beijing to find a suitable scapegoat to appease an aggrieved Chinese public clearly shocked by the scale and intensity of the violence. However, the Chinese public and especially those in Xinjiang were far from satisfied with the government response. When we responded to the marching columns of heavily armed Chinese soldiers and police officers with criticism of such heavy-handed and repressive tactics, a terrified Urumqi Han resident responded simply that ‘you have come too late and have done too little to protect us.’ Michael Sainsbury wrote in the Australian that ‘There has been large-scale discontent with the government’s handling of Xinjiang.’
Online discussion forums in China were flooded with images of dead Han Chinese with their heads smashed and blood-soaked street pavements. The story of an entire Han Chinese family including an elderly grandmother and young children being burnt to death by Uighur mobs circulated on the web like wildfire. Angry netizens heavily criticised the government’s slow and restrained actions in putting down the riots. One of the most telling and perhaps chilling remarks was if General Wang Zhen was still in charge, this could never have happened. This reference was to a hardline Chinese general who ruled Xinjiang with an iron fist during the 1950s and 60s.
Far from basking in the privileges and perks of being colonial masters in Xinjiang, many Han Chinese complain bitterly of perceived government discrimination against them. The top grievances include the exemption of Uighurs from the One Child Policy and affirmative action for Uighurs in China’s highly competitive and prized college entrance examinations. Most importantly, ethnic minorities are usually treated with leniency under China’s otherwise harsh criminal law system.
This angry response is not dissimilar from the earlier Chinese populist reaction after the Tibetan uprising, where many have judged Hu Jintao’s government to be ‘weak and cowardly’ in its response to the unrest. Angry Chinese residents decided to indulge in Old Testament style retributive actions and started to attack Uighur residents in the city through large-scale organised violence. Beijing quickly moved in to separate the two warring factions and senior Chinese leaders in Xinjiang had to personally placate the emotionally charged residents and assure them of their safety.
The recent syringe attacks in Urumqi sparked a large scale demonstration against the Xinjiang authorities for their failure to keep peace and order in the region. Two high ranking officials were sacked to appease the public as well as to protect Hu’s close political ally Wang Lequan.
This highlights the widening gulf between the current of opinion amongst the Chinese populace and Beijing over the management of China’s restive frontier province. It seems that the Chinese public is far more belligerent than Beijing in handling ethnic unrest.
The more bellicose stance taken by the Chinese public is not only a product of Beijing’s persistent efforts to foster strong nationalist credentials but also a reflection of a long-standing nationalist tradition in China since the early twentieth century. The ‘century of shame’ school of historiography is truly entrenched in the Chinese imagination just as the Anzac legend assumed its central position in modern Australian psyche. The nationalist sentiment in Xinjiang was also significantly strengthened by simmering ethnic tension after the organised Uighur violence against innocent Han residents.
Having created and fostered such a strong sentiment among the public, Beijing has to ride the tiger it has raised. On many issues, Beijing is forced by public opinion to project an image that it guards China’s sovereign and territorial interests jealously and protects the safety and well-being of its citizens—with force if necessary.
However, China’s status as a rising superpower and ‘responsible international stakeholder’ complicate this otherwise simple equation. On the one hand, Beijing must cater for the nationalist sensibilities at home and, on the other, it must also simultaneously project a more benign and humane image abroad. It seems that Beijing’s recent action in Urumqi satisfied neither side.
Interesting, though I think there is something missing from the conclusion:
“On the one hand, Beijing must cater for the nationalist sensibilities at home and, on the other, it must also simultaneously project a more benign and humane image abroad.”
Where do the Uighur fit into Beijing’s thinking?
Is the Chinese government caution really a response to the Western gaze, or does it perhaps also have something with not wanting to escalate the violence by undertaking hardline repression, as the extremist Uighur surely want them to?
Whether or not an elected government would be more belligerent toward the Uighur is a tough question. On the one hand, there would be the public opinion pressures mentioned in the post. On the other hand, it’s difficult to see the issues behind the violence being resolved without some kind of open and meaningful dialog.
While it is difficult enough for the Chinese government to maintain appropriate balance between pleasing both domestic and international audiences, at stake is whether there is justice in China.
Many of China’s policies are discriminative, such as the family planning, religions, and household registration system, etc. The discriminations generally fall on Han people and people living in rural areas.
Chinese government can make its life easier by eliminating discriminations in its system.
It should improve its skills in dealing with both domestic and international people. There is nothing wrong in upholding justice and against violence, irrespective who are against the law.
It is true that a highly charged nationalism is found more and more in China. This is arguably because this is one of the few outlets for expression of public opinion in China. Were China to become a full blown liberal democracy, a corrollory should be many more outlets and perhaps more informed process of forming public opinion. If the argument is that a democratic China would be full of hyper-nationalists, the same would be the case for every liberal democracy. While the US, India and other democracies may have their fair share of hyper-nationalists, this forms only one part of public opinion and by no means the most important.