Its formalization last year as a stand alone event signifies the extent of interdependence between the Northeast Asian powers in spite of sometimes rocky political relations.
In spite of this new found prominence however, the Trilateral Summit has in fact hardly been a locomotive of East Asian regionalism. Indeed, at the 2008 Summit the three leaders re-affirmed the centrality of ASEAN for regional cooperation. This reflected the continuing inability of the big three to agree on a vision for an East Asian Community (EAC).
It seems unlikely that they will reach a common position this time.
Firstly, at the global level, movement towards an EAC must be understood as game played between the great powers, China and the US. Japan and Korea are better understood as middle powers, allied with the US but with an option to exit in favor of a China-led regional order under the EAC. With the US demonstrating a greater desire to take Asia seriously and on its own terms (signing of the TAC), it seems unlikely that Japan and Korea will do any more than explore with China the ‘exit’ option.
Additionally, movements towards reform of the global economic institutions, such as representation for Asia at the IMF and the emergence of the G20, should reduce pressure on Asia to build-up its own regional institutions, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and an East Asian Free Trade Area.
Secondly, at the regional level, the Trilateral Summit looks inward, rather than outward, focusing on coordination and cooperation amongst themselves rather than joint-leadership of a wider East Asia, and, even here, successes have been shallow. Agreements reached at the Summit thus far have been in the fields of environmental protection, health and cultural exchange – i.e. of a ‘low-hanging fruit’ variety. Whereas agreement on substantive matters such as deeper economic integration has so far been elusive, with the three-party Free Trade Agreement proposed, studied (then studied again) but resulting in no further action.
Thirdly, domestic forces within at least two of the three parties still conspire against a ‘European moment in East Asia’.
On the Japanese domestic political side, if we consider the problems that the DPJ had with the proposed Japan-US FTA during the election, the likelihood that Hatoyama will risk himself politically to drive through either a bilateral FTA with China or a trilateral agreement including Korea seems very slight indeed. In fact, given popular concerns about China, signing such an FTA could well cost the DJP government in the future.
Additionally, according to some sources, Hatoyama has not discussed his ideas with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Okada has also tried to lower expectations surrounding the summit, noting that details for an EAC had yet to be worked out. It seems that Hatoyama is ahead of Japanese popular sentiment, and without a domestic consensus (nemawashi) will not be in a position to close a deal. Australians have seen this before.
In fact, despite its own rhetoric, Korea’s position is very similar to Japan – regional community is a limited interest at best. Of course, being sandwiched between China and the US severely curtails Korea’s options. But, more importantly in the short term, President Lee (after being beaten to within an inch of his political life over the KORUS) would be hesitant to move forward with another FTA, especially with major economies like Japan and China. Specifically, given the stalling of Japan-Korea and China-Korea FTAs, it seems unlikely that there is any bureaucratic momentum (if such a thing exists) that might overcome the politics of the day.
China however seems more genuinely positive towards an EAC, with Foreign Minister Yang personally approving it at the Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ meeting. For China, apart from the obvious global political benefits, an EAC would help China economically – especially if it were accompanied by an EAFTA. With the US market depressed in general (and perhaps spiteful towards China in particular), better access to regional markets will help to ease a transition to internally driven growth, perhaps limiting a potentially destabilizing rise of unemployment – with obvious benefits for the CCP’s regime security. But given the hesitance of its two potential partners, it seems unlikely that China will be able to realize this interest.
Taken together, these factors at the global, regional and domestic levels suggest that, despite the rhetoric, an East Asian Community is still some time away.
From the article one gets a sense that although the processes are slow, it is progressing and it will not be surprising that East Asia Community comes to shape in the not too distant future, although the author appears to be pessimistic and dismissive.
Let’s look at the three reasons Rathus used for the pessimism.
“Firstly, at the global level, movement towards an EAC must be understood as game played between the great powers, China and the US. Japan and Korea are better understood as middle powers, allied with the US but with an option to exit in favour of a China-led regional order under the EAC. With the US demonstrating a greater desire to take Asia seriously and on its own terms (signing of the TAC), it seems unlikely that Japan and Korea will do any more than explore with China the ‘exit’ option.”
It is noted that China is half of the G2 and is more willing to endorse the EAC. So the picture is really different from what Rathus sees.
“Secondly, at the regional level, the Trilateral Summit looks inward, rather than outward, focusing on coordination and cooperation amongst themselves rather than joint-leadership of a wider East Asia, and, even here, successes have been shallow. Agreements reached at the Summit thus far have been in the fields of environmental protection, health and cultural exchange – i.e. of a ‘low-hanging fruit’ variety. Whereas agreement on substantive matters such as deeper economic integration has so far been elusive, with the three-party Free Trade Agreement proposed, studied (then studied again) but resulting in no further action.”
It is a natural process for the big three among the potential EAC members to be in sync themselves before they can launch a bigger community, isn’t it? That is not necessarily “inward looking”. So the implications are also different from what Rathus got.
“Thirdly, domestic forces within at least two of the three parties still conspire against a ‘European moment in East Asia’.”
Let’s talk about Japan first. Rathus sees A FTA with China may present a problem at the moment. But the question is that is a Japan-China FTA a precondition for an EAC? It is likely to be not. Second, an EAC is broader than the three themselves, and EAC integration does not necessarily mean an immediate FTA. So there is no implication of FTA for the EAC, at least at the moment if that is what Rathus is concerned with. What Rathus sees as obstacles is in fact no obstacle at all.
Now let’s turn to Korea, the other member that Rathus mention. Rathus says: “In fact, despite its own rhetoric, Korea’s position is very similar to Japan – regional community is a limited interest at best.” We have shown that it is not a problem for Japan, so naturally it will not be a problem for Korea either.
To conclude, the same facts, there are quite different implications that can be drawn. I have derived quite different implications based on Rathus’ argued reasons.
I won’t cast a judgement whose are correct, for now.