While the EAC idea might represent Japan’s middle power diplomacy in that it is prioritising a multilateral cooperative initiative, Japan is not likely to allow the EAC idea to be used by China to impose a China-led regional order.
Sino-Japanese rivalry centres on membership of a prospective community: China favours ASEAN+3, while Japan has in the past preferred the ASEAN+6 grouping: effectively the members of the East Asia Summit, which also includes India, Australia and New Zealand. Whether this is specifically what PM Hatoyama has in mind is not absolutely clear. He has not identified exactly who he envisages as members of his East Asian community, and there are conflicting reports in the media. In particular, it is not clear whether Australia, New Zealand and India are included.
At the recent meeting with Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on 6th October, Mr Hatoyama is reported to have agreed that the membership of the EAC should not be ‘exclusive’, implying that he would consider the United States as a prospective member.
This was in direct response to the comment by Prime Minister Lee that regional cooperation in Asia must always be in the form of ‘open regionalism’, with due recognition given to links across the Asia Pacific and the important role played by the United States as an economic partner. A day later in an address to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, Foreign Minister Okada said that the EAC should involve India, Australia and New Zealand, but Japan was not considering including the United States in the group.
What is clear is that the East Asia community idea is the centerpiece of the new DPJ government’s Asian diplomacy and is seen by the administration as an important vehicle for its engagement with Asia. The idea has had a long gestation in the party. Its 2005 election manifesto advocated building an East Asia community together with FTAs/EPAs and advances in cooperation in areas such as energy and the environment. The EAC idea might also be viewed as an attempt by the new DPJ administration to demonstrate regional diplomatic leadership independently of the United States. In this context, it could be considered as an embodiment of the DPJ’s desire for a more balanced foreign policy orientation towards Asia and the United States.
The Trilateral Summit is an inappropriate vehicle for advancing the EAC idea given that the latter must also include ASEAN. In addition, the summit already had a full agenda including tackling the economic and financial crisis, climate change, North Korea, prospects for FTAs and joint exploitation of maritime resources in contested territories amongst other issues. It is not surprising, therefore, that the EAC proposal might have taken a back seat. At most, some progress might have been envisaged in terms of greater Sino-Japanese cooperation in advancing the idea. However, this is a long-term ambition, and possibly unachievable. Sino-Japanese rivalry may ultimately stymie the idea altogether as long as both China and Japan regard their concepts in zero-sum terms and as a test of their powers of regional leadership vis-à-vis each other. It seems likely that Japan’s attempt at leading East Asian multilateralism will be blunted by China’s own ambitions to assert its dominance over the future of Asian regionalism.
In the circumstances, it might be more realistic for the new DPJ government to take incremental steps towards building greater confidence and trust amongst the Asian nations across a number of policy fronts first, rather than leading with a grand idea – an ambition to which other new administrations have succumbed. The EAC is more likely to be successful as the end point of a gradual process of embedding cooperative norms and practices in the region, rather than as the starting point. One of the most important steps in this process would be agreement on an East Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) between the East Asia Summit members.
A couple of comments.
First, it is interesting that why an East Asian community should include non-East Asian nations to begin with. If it is open regionalism, why should it be called East Asian as opposed to Asian community?
Secondly, from a strategic point of view, it would be interesting to see which, Japan or China, will benefit from delaying an East Asian Community. This is especially pertinent in the context of the so called G2 potentially. In that context, there is no middle powers represented.
Lincoln Fung says: “It is interesting that why an East Asian community should include non-East Asian nations to begin with” – for the same reason, I guess, that the ‘East Asia’ Summit includes India, Australia and New Zealand, none of which is geographically located in East Asia. The nomenclature has a lot to do with the original starting points of and initiatives for the formation of these groupings – in East Asian countries – and the terminology also aligns with the centrality of ASEAN to these bodies. ‘Asia-Pacific’ on the other hand usually refers to East Asia AND the United States. The question of whether the prospective EAC embodies ‘open regionalism’ (code for including the United States) remains to be seen.
China’s strategic advantages in delaying the formation of an EAC are patently obvious, but neither Japan nor China would benefit from delaying an East Asia Community economically. For Japan, the EAC is important for its domestic economic growth prospects. As a senior METI official put it, “We need to think of Asia as our ‘jun naijuu’ (semi-domestic demand/market) [courtesy of Jerry Curtis’ speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan]. The question for prospective East Asian participants in an ASEAN+3 grouping or an ASEAN+6 grouping is whether they want to participate in a ‘community’ that is dominated by China or not. One of the EU’s secrets of success is the fact that no one power dominates the group.
As for the G2, the question here is whether it actually exists as an axis of cooperation, and whether it could deal with anything more than bilateral issues without having to enlist the cooperation of other powers. Currently the G2 seems to have taken a back seat to the G20.
Interesting discussions. Linking back to what I had said, I would like to draw out some points.
Firstly, the ‘great game’, and secondly regionalism.
Great game. I had said that “movement towards an EAC must be understood as game played between the great powers, China and the US.” And, quite correctly, you have pointed out that it is a game played principally between Japan and China.
But my point is that while it is a negotiation between Japan and China about the terms on which they might jointly lead in Asia, for the purposes of predicting developments in EAC, the US factor matters. The whole EAC is essentially a response to US neglect during the Bush era, and a resurgent US in Asia under Barack might just take the wind out the sails of the EAC. Although, the current Futenma problems counts against this.
Essentially, if the US proves too difficult, then Japan will go to China and request terms.
Regarding regionalism, my specific goal was to forecast ‘no change’ for the EAC – despite the unusually specific talk of EAC at the trilateral summit. Now, some might think that the Trilateral Summit is an inappropriate place for East Asian Regionalism to begin, because ASEAN and others should be involved in the process from outset.
But if we look at how real regionalism is actually conducted, there is normally a core of strong states who cooperate first. Their leadership brings others in. For East Asia, the strong states to be the core are China and Japan (lesser extent Korea, which would be inexorably drawn in almost regardless) – who meet sub-regionally at this Trilateral Summit. If deep East Asian regionalism is going to occur, I imagine the Trilateral Summit will play that leading role – regardless of what ASEAN thinks.