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What the new Hatoyama government means for the US-Japan alliance

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In Brief

At the heart of the US-Japan alliance has always been a grand bargain. The United States has provided defence protection for Japan under Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty, while Japan has provided bases for the US military under Article 6. Although not strictly under any treaty obligations, Japan has made greater military commitments to the alliance both regionally and internationally in order to compensate for the imbalance in security burdens.

The new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government led by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is tampering with this grand bargain.

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It is challenging arrangements under Article 6 (the provision of bases), as well as winding back military support for US forces internationally.

The DPJ government wants to renegotiate a US base realignment agreement concluded by the previous government in order to reduce the footprint of US forces in Japan, especially in Okinawa where a large proportion of the 47,000 US troops are located. The thorniest issue is the relocation of US Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station in the densely populated Okinawan city of Ginowan to a coastal area in the northern city of Nago. The DPJ’s 2008 ‘Okinawa Vision’ called for the relocation of the base out of Okinawa or even out of Japan.

Prime Minister Hatoyama told US Secretary of Defence Gates in mid-October that it would be difficult to implement the existing relocation plan at an early date. His government has resisted US pressure to resolve the issue by the time of President Obama’s visit to Japan this week. It has also declined to renew the legislative mandate authorising the Japanese navy to provide fuel to US and other coalition ships in the Indian Ocean supporting anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. The legislation is due to expire next January.

The Hatoyama-led government is taking this action without compensating the United States in other aspects of alliance. Although one of the mantras of the new government is ‘a close and equal alliance’, equality could be interpreted to mean that Japan needs to do more, not less, in an alliance military context.

But the new Japanese administration interprets ‘equal’ to mean ‘less deferential’ to the United States in both internal alliance management and foreign policy. It has explicitly stated that it will decide future deployments of the Japanese military overseas not on the basis of US requests but strictly from the point of view of Japan’s own national interests.

The Hatoyama government is effectively creating an entirely new policy framework within which the US-Japan alliance functions. The changes are subtle but significant.

The administration’s emphasis on Asian diplomacy and closer ties with Asian countries is an important new variable in US-Japan relations. The change will encompass a shift from single-track alliance bilateralism to more diversified Japanese diplomatic and economic multilateralism in Asia – a context in which Japan can operate independently of the United States. Japan’s pro-Asia perspective will inevitably moderate its pro-US perspective. Stronger economic and political relations with Asian countries will come, to a certain extent, at America’s cost, particularly if it is excluded from multilateral arrangements such as the proposed East Asia Community. This may mean that United States exerts less influence over developments in East Asia.

Perhaps even more significant for its potential to reshape the alliance is Japan’s newfound reluctance to participate in US-led multilateral coalitions geared primarily to promoting US regional and global strategic interests. There will be no more push from Japan to make itself the ‘indispensable ally’ through international military cooperation. A reluctance to become entangled in US global strategy appears to outweigh any Japanese concerns about the United States abandoning its commitments to the defence of Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty.

The new DPJ government may also reconsider the policy of ‘bilateral fusion’, which has entailed expansion of operational cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries. Although ostensibly for the defence of Japan, the latent strategic objective has been to facilitate greater US-Japan military cooperation for the maintenance of regional peace and security. In recent years, the two militaries have enhanced their joint training, intelligence sharing and interoperability. Alliance cooperation has also been expanded more than ever before through base facility sharing and command and control level cooperation.

In particular ballistic missile defence has been the cutting edge of US-Japan operational integration as well as opening up the potential for Japan to engage in collective self-defence, a key prospective shift in its security posture. The DPJ’s policy on missile defence remains an open question. The deputy minister of defence in the former DPJ shadow cabinet was quoted as saying that ‘the missile defence system is ‘useless’, and he called for a Hatoyama cabinet to consider cutting the budget for the program. As for a change in policy allowing Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defence, the new administration is committed to the status quo for the time being. This will confine the military engagement of Japanese forces to the defence of Japan only.

Although the Hatoyama government has signalled that it has no intention of replacing the alliance as the foundation of Japan’s security policy, the question that needs to be asked is whether a more independent Japan will pursue a realist defence policy by seeking to acquire a stronger, independent military deterrent. Current indications are that it will not. Given the idealist tenor of the rhetoric coming out of the new administration, it will, in all likelihood, seek to buttress its security by relying more on strengthened multilateral relations in the region, and by pursuing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The risk is that, from an American perspective, the alliance will under-perform even more.

One response to “What the new Hatoyama government means for the US-Japan alliance”

  1. I wonder if the Hatoyama Government is really creating ‘an entirely new policy framework’ in terms of alliance policy. Whether the government stresses Japan’s own national interest or not, reaching the common conclusion, that the US alliance is the cornerstone for Japanese security, is unavoidable so long as Japan cannot become an ‘independent’ military power, and so long as Japan has potential enemies in the region. Thus it is highly unlikely that the DPJ will maintain its controversial ‘independent’ posture in the years to come, although it could make some minor changes in some cases such as the Futenma issue. This is particularly the case at a time when people are increasingly concerned about North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the rise of China. Multilateralism is fine. But it cannot be pursued without a military guarantee in case it fails.

    In this sense, the current Hatoyama Government reminds me of Australia’s Keating Government from 1991 to 1996. Like Hatoyama, Keating (and his Foreign Minister Gareth Evans) pursued a ‘regional engagement policy’ and multilateral, rather than bilateral, diplomacy. They also insisted that Australia should seek a more independent foreign and defence policy from the US. It seemed, however, that the more Keating spent time as a Prime Minister, the more he realised that Australia’s regional engagement aspirations could not be achieved without the backbone of the US’s military or strategic presence in this part of the world. It will be very interesting see whether the DPJ government will follow the same path or not.

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