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Fixing China's current account surplus

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In Brief

China’s current account surplus has been the subject of fierce debate in recent times, with politicians in the United States and Western Europe often criticising China’s rigid exchange rate regime. Their real focus, however, was probably not the exchange rate policy per se, but China’s growing trade and current account surpluses. It has been argued that, by artificially depressing the value of the renminbi (RMB), China took jobs away from its trading partners.

Recently, some American policymakers have again blamed China for helping cause the subprime crisis in the U.S; an accusation that was rejected strongly by Chinese policymakers.

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But Chinese economists and government officials have also grown uneasy about the rapidly expanding external sector imbalances. Persistent current account surpluses have meant that China, as a low-income economy, has been exporting capital to rich countries. Rising external surpluses have often worsened China’s trading relations with its major trading partners.

For the past several years at least, the Chinese government has made improving the quality of growth a top policy priority. It has made various efforts to limit export growth and narrow current account surplus, by lowering export tax rebates, liberalizing import barriers and increasing exchange rate flexibility.

Rapid growth in China’s current account surplus is, in fact, a relatively recent phenomenon. During the second half of the 1980s, China maintained persistent trade and current account deficits (see Chart 1).

The sharpest rise in current account surplus occurred after 2004. Within three years, the surpluses jumped from 3.5 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 10.8 per cent in 2007. In 2008, external demand was severely cut by the global crisis. But China’s current account surplus still stood at 9.6 per cent of GDP.

Chart 1. China’s Current Account Balances, 1986-2008 (% GDP)

Source: CEIC Data Company.

What are the fundamental factors contributing to China’s growing current account surpluses? Previous explanations may be grouped into five broad categories:

• Measurement errors: The so-called ‘hot money’ inflows disguised in forms of export revenues or income transfers probably exaggerate the current account surplus;

• Saving and investment gap: The extraordinarily high saving rate, which is determined by various economic and cultural factors, results in a large saving-investment gap and, therefore, massive current account surplus;

• Industry relocation: Relocation of industries from other East Asian economies to China in recent years also transfers trade surpluses from these economies to China;

• By-product of policies promoting growth: The government policies promoting exports and GDP growth and pursuing full employment boost domestic production and external surpluses; and

• Exchange rate distortion: An undervalued currency raises exports and depresses imports, and thus inflates China’s trade surplus.

All these explanations are helpful for understanding China’s growing external imbalance problem. However, the saving and investment gap hypothesis is really an identity. Some analysts tried to attribute the high saving ratio to Chinese cultural tradition. But the fact is that China ran current account deficits or small current account surplus in most years during the reform period.

The by-product hypothesis and the industry relocation hypothesis are sound reasons behind the changing current account position. But it is difficult to yield actionable policy prescriptions to remedy the problem based on such analysis.

And finally, the exchange rate hypothesis, while uncontroversial, doesn’t offer practical policy responses. Empirical studies have failed to confirm that current account imbalances are correlated with exchange rate regimes. Perhaps a sharp appreciation of the nominal exchange rate could ameliorate the problem, but that does not look like a feasible policy option, at least in the short term, at it is a remedy that does not go to heart of the long run structural problem behind China’s current account surpluses.

Here, we suggest an alternative hypothesis: factor market distortion and associated producer subsidy equivalent as a result of China’s asymmetric market liberalization approach is the core problem.

During the reform period, the government focused on reform of the product markets, including abandoning policy interventions in domestic markets and liberalizing trade in goods and services. Today, the prices of more than 95 per cent of products are determined in free market forces.

In contrast, factor markets remain highly distorted.

China is known for the low cost and abundance of its labour, which has been a key factor behind China’s success in labour-intensive manufacturing exports. But labour costs in China may be distorted, for two interrelated reasons – segmentation of rural and urban labour markets and under-development of social welfare systems.

Labour market segmentation has largely been a result of the household registration system (HRS) introduced in the pre-reform period, though the effectiveness of this system has weakened in recent years. Today, HRS no longer prohibits labour mobility, but it is still an important institutional discrimination against migrant workers, who normally receive only half or even one-third of what their urban cousins receive for performing the same job functions.

Distortions in capital markets exist at two levels. Domestically, the financial system remains repressed, evidenced by highly regulated interest rates and state influences on credit allocation. Externally, capital account controls are more restrictive on outflows than on inflows. The currency is likely undervalued, and has probably been so for the past 15 years.

China’s financial system, especially its banking sector, has undergone major transformation. But financial intermediation remains overly dependent on banks, especially the large state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). Despite significant reform, most large banks are still majority-owned by the state and their top executives still appointed by the government.

China still maintains interest rate regulation. Despite numerous reforms, giving banks more flexibility in determining the actual rates, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) still maintains floors for lending rates and ceilings for deposit rates.

The larger gap between nominal GDP growth potential and long-term government bond yields in China, relative to the gaps in other Asian economies, also suggest that China’s capital is far too cheap. Compared with other Asian economies, China’s nominal growth potential is among the highest, but its Treasury yield is among the lowest.

The price of key energy products, such as oil, gas and electricity, are also regulated by the state. Often when international energy prices grow rapidly, domestic prices would lag significantly in order to avoid shocks to domestic production and consumption. For instance, oil prices peaked at nearly $150 per barrel in 2008, the corresponding domestic prices were only around $80.

China has introduced a series of environmental laws and regulations. However, they have not been well-enforced, and environmental degradation in China has contributed to global climate change, as well as regular droughts in Northern China and frequent floods in Southern China.

According to a joint study by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the State Agency for Environmental Protection (SAEP), an incomplete count of costs of environmental damage amounted to about 3.05 per cent of GDP in 2004.

Cost distortions in the above five categories add up to RMB2,138 billion in 2008, or 7.2 per cent of GDP. Clearly, the environment and capital are by far the largest areas of cost distortions. Leaving year-to-year variations aside, it is clear that producers in China receive significant ‘subsidies’ from the rest of the economy, equivalent to about 7 per cent of GDP or 15 per cent of industrial GDP.

Such producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) lowers input costs, increases production profits, raises investment returns and improves international competitiveness of the Chinese exports. It therefore makes China growth very strong, averaging 10 per cent a year during the past thirty years. But it makes investment and exports even stronger. This is the fundamental cause of the imbalance problems facing China: too much investment and too much export.

Meanwhile, the PSE depresses household income. Total labour compensation dropped from 52 per cent of GDP in 1997 to only 40 per cent in 2007. This was the fundamental cause of sluggish consumption: if household income share of GDP declines over time, consumption growth would not be able to keep up pace with GDP growth.

Too much exports and too weak consumption were probably the most important factors behind China’s large current account surpluses. Therefore, while exchange rate policy is important, it is not the only or perhaps the most important part of the story. Exclusive focus on exchange rate policy issue is not likely to be productive in terms of dealing with the imbalance problem, economically or politically.

The factor market distortion hypothesis not only satisfactorily explains the imbalance but also provides a clear set of policies for remedying the problem: liberalizing the factor markets. These should include the abolition of the HRS, better enforcement of employers’ social welfare contribution, the introduction of market-based interest rates, an increase in exchange rate flexibility (only as one of the measures), the liberalization of both land and energy markets, and the rigorous implementation of environmental protection policies.

China’s large external sector imbalance is a product of incomplete economic reform. The best way to reduce the imbalance is to finish the task of economic reform. The growing risks, including large current account surpluses, suggest that liberalizing factor markets should now be placed at the top of Chinese policymakers’ agenda.

Yiping Huang is professor in the Chinese Center for Economic Research at Peking University and in the China Economy Program at the ANU.

3 responses to “Fixing China’s current account surplus”

  1. Yiping argues that it is China’s internal issues, mainly factor subsidies especially capital and energy subsidies, that are the fundamental causes of China’s contribution to international imbalances and advocates further liberalisation of factor markets.

    If that argument is correct, then what about the different experiences of trade deficits and surplus over the last 30 years? Are the directions of the causes and effects positively related as the way Huang argues?

  2. Exactly whom does Prof. Huang think is obsessed with currency misalignment to the exclusion of other issues relating to China’s rebalancing?

    It is Chinese leaders, not trading partners, who consistently misstate this issue. The exchange rate is the legitimate concern of trading partners. If China were a responsible trading partner it would recognize this, acknowledge its international obligations until IMF Art. 4, and take remedial steps.

    The other steps that must be taken to rebalance the Chinese economy – strengthening the social safety net, investing in education, rural development, etc – are of course China’s internal choices. But exchange rates – and other subsidies to exports – can never be a matter of internal choices.

    No one should be criticized for standing up for his legal rights, and no one should be excused from fulfilling his legal obligations.

  3. Fung and ChinaWatcher, thanks for your comments. This is obviously a complicated issue deserving a lot more debates. Here are my quick responses.
    As for Fung’s question, we are doing a follow-up study looking at the time series estimation of Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSEs). Although the numbers need to be finalised, the conclusion is clear. PSEs were relatively insignificant in the early days, as a share of GDP, but also because of restrictions on both international trade and domestic markets. These changed significantly after China joined the WTO in late 2001.

    As for ChinaWatcher’s comments, let me say at the front that I do think exchange rate policy is an important part of the global imbalance problem. But I think the structural problems, especially those in China and the US, are more fundamental. Therefore, it would be much more effective attacking the problem directly, with exchange rate policy reform being a part of the reform package. Finger-pointing at renminbi (RMB) exchange rate policy is neither good politics nor good economics.

    But let us first take a step back. What are the so-called “legal” rights or obligations. The IMF “laws” do not have any specific requirement with regard to exchange rate regimes, unless we are talking about something else here. Under the Bretton Wood System (BWS), all member countries were required to state par values of their currencies against gold (or effectively against US dollar) and then defend them. Obviously this was typical fixing exchange rate regime. IMF only amended its articles in 1976 to allow member countries to adopt flexible exchange rate regimes, after delinking of US dollar from gold in 1971 and most industrial countries switched to floating rates in 1973. But in the wide world today, there is no “legal” form of exchange rate. There are all sorts of exchange rate regimes, from complete fixing (dollarisation, monetary union, pegging) to complete floating, with most somewhere in between of these two extremes. They are all legal.
(POINT NUMBER ONE: PEGGING IS NOT EXACTLY ILLEGAL)

    IMF article IV is about current account, NOT about capital account or exchange rate regime. China realised current account convertibility in 1996. Of course it can be debatable how rigorously China implemented its policies during the past decade or so, but it is not the key concern here. IMF ALLOW countries to adopt capital account control measures when needed, although recently it is more encouraging on free capital flows.

    Many IMF staff and ex-staff have done empirical analyses trying to nail down the correlation between exchange rate regimes and current account imbalances. Their findings? Nothing whatsoever! There is no strong evidence that flexible exchange rate regime is associated with more balanced current accounts or even faster adjustment of the current account imbalances.

    The issue of currency misalignment is even more controversial. There are generally three approaches applied for estimation of RMB misalignment: purchasing power parity (PPP), Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) and Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER). FEER is not insightful. Essentially it is calculated from current account surplus or deficits using some import and export elasticity estimates. So by definition, if you have current account surplus, your currency is undervalued. BEER uses world average relationship between exchange rate and structural variables to infer a currency’s misalignment. Obviously if a country is not a world average, then the estimation results may be questionable. And finally PPP method looks at the actual purchasing power. Studies based on this method used to suggest 20-50% undervaluation of RMB. But since the World Bank revised down China’s PPP-based GDP by 40% a couple of years ago, the estimated undervaluation disappeared immediately.
(POINT NUMBER TWO: NOBODY KNOWS HOW MUCH RMB IS UNDERVALUED)

    Of course, if the old club (such as G7) is able to engineer another “Plaza Accord” like it did to Japanese yen and European currencies more than 20 years ago, then China’s current account surplus might disappear (assuming RMB rise by 50-100 per cent within three years). But that would really hurt the Chinese economy. As an emerging market economy China will need time to prepare its system to be able to withstand large shocks like those. Like policymakers in the US or Europe, Chinese policymakers have to pay very close attention to domestic economic and political conditions as well as international factors.

    But even if China successfully eliminated its current account surplus, would that reduce America’s current account deficits? Not likely. If China lost competitiveness due to sharp appreciation, other emerging economies like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc, would step in to fill the vacuum. US trade and current account deficits are not likely to narrow significantly, unless it also pursues its own reform agenda, but its main partners would change. In short, US is simply not competitive enough to rebuild those consumer goods industries that are already big and competitive in the emerging world. Between mid-2005 and mid-2008, China’s RMB appreciated by 23% against the dollar and by 17% on real effective terms, both China’s surplus and America’s deficits widened during the same period. 
(POINT NUMBER THREE: MODEST RMB APPRECIATION DOES NOT GUARANTEE REDUCTION OF IMBALANCES)

    I think the more fundamental solution to the problem lies in structural reforms in both surplus and deficit countries. In China, factor market liberalisation shall be critical in solving both internal and external imbalances. Exchange rate policy should be a part of the package. But the US also faces big structural reform tasks. Simply pointing fingers at the others is not going to solve America’s own imbalance problem fundamentally. Did sharp rise of Japanese yen in the late 1980s cure America’s imbalances? No. IMF made lots of mistakes during the past decades. But one biggest mistake was that it never advised the US on structural reforms. IMF spent so much time around the world advising more than 100 member countries on structural reforms. But one of the biggest structural problem slipped away under its eyes. It was a true tragedy. And now we are all in this mess.
(POINT NUMBER FOUR: STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN BOTH CHINA AND US OFFER MORE FUNDAMENTAL AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL IMBALANCE PROBLEM)

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