Significantly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted that economic and other sanctions had failed, but acknowledged that lifting sanctions now would send the wrong message. Rather, Clinton argued that sanctions needed to be applied with a mix of policy responses, and that the U.S. Government was proposing to explore policy options that would be pursued alongside sanctions.

Sanctions against Burma have never been endorsed by the United Nations, but have been imposed unilaterally by Washington, and in some cases applied in concert with other Western countries – including Australia. They include the so-called ‘smart’ sanctions adopted by the United States and Australia after the regime’s crackdown against peaceful demonstrations in 2007, even though evidence indicates their direct impact is negligible with collateral damage for ordinary Burmese people being considerable.

Under its new policy approach, Washington has for the first time committed itself to direct discussions with the military regime about reforms that might enable sanctions to be eased. State Department spokespersons say they have detected more signs of readiness by the regime to engage in such discussions than for a long time. (Interestingly, the early years of the first George W. Bush Administration briefly saw a similar approach tried, and senior Burmese military officers even visited Washington for discussions on Capitol Hill, but influential members of Congress refused to support the Bush Administration policy.) U.S. policy could have pursued this strategy at any time in the past 20 years, but such is the beguiling effect of sanctions that governments imposing them have generally not sought to design more sophisticated measures to achieve policy change, if not regime change.

It was easier for Washington to unveil the new U.S. policy after Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi had herself indicated publicly in early September that she was prepared to ‘cooperate with’ the military regime to find a way forward to deal with sanctions. This conveniently left little gap between the U.S. Administration and Suu Kyi. It also helped soon afterwards when the U.S. Charge d’Affaires was among the first diplomats allowed to meet Suu Kyi despite her current house arrest.

The National League for Democracy spokesman also welcomed the new U.S. policy, although not in fulsome terms. Similarly, the expatriate Burmese democracy movement also did not object to the new U.S. policy, having recently openly recognised the need for new policy approaches. While they take their lead from Suu Kyi, they are not always  attuned to her thinking, sometimes failing to understand the constraints she faces. They can be expected to monitor U.S. policy sharply, looking for early evidence that it is not working.

However, Washington’s change of approach towards Burma has been especially welcomed in Asia. ASEAN had long been discomforted by U.S. policy under Condoleezza Rice of often not attending ASEAN meetings but aggressively confronting the Burmese regime, and George Bush’s public friendship with enemies of the generals. Not unexpectedly, ASEAN countries led by the current ASEAN chair, Thailand, were united in applauding the shift in U.S. policy.

Is it likely that the regime will accede to US wishes, or moderate its policies in any significant way? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer to this is a qualified ‘maybe’. Regime resentment is directed not only against U.S. sanctions, but especially against Washington blocking lending to Burma by the international financial institution. So we can expect the generals to look for ways to please Washington. Along with other UN ‘Friends of Burma’, including China and Australia, Washington needs to press for specific but realistic reforms, relating for example to the treatment of political prisoners or the conduct of Burma’s 2010 elections, for which arrangements have still not been announced.

Overall, results may not be quick in coming, will probably not involve major regime concessions to Washington, and may include gestures whose substance remains open to question. These responses may not entirely satisfy Washington, and will almost certainly require more patience than Western political constituencies prefer. Internationally, the pro-democracy movement will not be easily persuaded to give full support to the new U.S. policy, which challenges the democracy movement’s very role. Yet this strategy is probably the only to achieve real and lasting, if gradual, reform.