A majority of Japanese still want a closer, ‘warmer’ political relationship with their largest neighbour.

In response to the question, ‘Should the (Japanese) PM visit the Yasukuni shrine on August 15 [Remembrance Day]’, again half of respondents said they agreed. Despite the fact that China has made it very clear that improvement in the political relationship is dependent on the PM not setting foot in the Shrine, half of the Japanese polled still put priority on the PM’s ceremonial role as mourner -in-chief at Yasukuni Shrine

In response to the question, ‘Should a separate facility be created to allow for formal mourning of the war dead?’, (that is, should the Yasukuni Shrine lose its monopoly on war bereavement and the division of state from religion be restored?) 58 per cent of those polled said no. Most Japanese view the Yasukuni Shrine itself, in and of itself, as special –  the solution of separating Yasukuni from a national shrine of remembrance, proposed after the troubles over PM Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, appears not to be favoured by a significant majority of Japanese.

PM Hatoyama clearly is trying to take the Japan-China relationship to the next, new level. This can be seen in the symbolism of his pronouncements in various international forums, the recent 600-man Ozawa-led delegation to China and, more recently, rumours that Hatoyama himself might go to Nanjing – the scene of Japanese wartime atrocities. If that occurred it would likely involve a formal apology and the possible beginnings of real reconciliation between Japan and China.

While all will be aware that Hatoyama will not be visiting Yasukuni in any formal capacity (he has promised this much) – the sentiments in the Japanese public about the Shrine, as revealed in this poll, will continue to complicate any efforts at reconciliation with China that the Hatoyama administration might attempt. Thus, the trajectory towards Japan-China rapprochement seems less straightforward than the current political rhetoric might suggest.