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New thinking about foreign policy strategy in Japan

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In Brief

In the first hundred days under the new administration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and its coalition partners, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and People's New Party (PNP), criticism of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's foreign policy stance by domestic and American political commentators has continued to mount. The Hatoyama government's approval rating among Japanese voters has also dropped significantly, though past administrations have also commonly experienced severe declines in popularity within their first three months.

The criticism seems to have reinforced a public impression of Hatoyama's lack of leadership and strategic vision.

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Voters are responding negatively to the political chaos in which powerful ministers and the coalition’s party leaders seem to speak for themselves whilst the prime minister allows them free rein without efforts to build a foreign policy consensus. At the centre of the storm that is developing over Japan’s foreign policy is the U.S. Futenma Air Force base. The DJP, in the popular view, seems determined to stick to its commitment to review the previous government’s 2006 plan, simply to keep the coalition.

But is the need to hold the coalition, with two small parties, together all that prevents the DPJ from reverting to the foreign and security policies of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of the past? If so, victory in the Upper House election next summer (though now less certain than it once appeared) would see Japan return to traditional foreign and security policies, a retreat from the ‘East Asian community’ proposal and deepening relations with China. Or is the reality that the thinking associated with Hatoyama’s contrarianism on foreign policy is actually a sign of a shift in Japanese strategic thinking on foreign policy direction?

There are many reasons for predicting that Japan will return to its diplomatic past. Mainstream strategy in post-war Japan has been heavily dependence on the U.S. alliance for deterrence, and as the gateway for re-entry to world politics as an economic power. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have not yet acquired sufficient military capability to alone defend the national territory against massive attacks. Moreover, Japan, as a non-nuclear power, has to rely on extended deterrence by the U.S. through both conventional and nuclear means. New security challenges have been met via security declarations with allies and friends of the U.S., notably Australia and India, marking a new phase in the established security relationship.

A primary question in foreign and military policy planning has always been how Washington might respond to policy change. U.S. power and its military, economic, and technological benefits have been so crucial to Japan that alliance considerations have prevailed in the resolution of tensions over any part of the bilateral agenda.

Yet the international environment surrounding Japan has changed significantly. The ‘rise of the rest’, to borrow the words of Fareed Zakaria, has led some Japanese foreign policy thinkers to formulate alternative strategies – alternative strategies that have the potential to transform Japanese relations with the US.

Alternative conceptions of Japan’s foreign policy interests are grounded on two assumptions. First, economic dependence and social interaction within Asia is on the rise. An aging Japanese society needs the strength of Asia’s growth to underpin its future welfare. Second, policies for military protection against the uncertainty in the regional security environment can be separated from other policy agendas, since, unlike during the Cold War period, economic and social interdependence in the region are now deepening. These assumptions lead to a Japanese diplomacy based on strategic hedging — maintaining the alliance with the U.S. and simultaneously increasing efforts to nest into the growth of China and Asia.

The idea of strategic hedging is reminiscent of the idea defined by Evelyn Goh to explain the Southeast Asian nations’ diplomatic dilemma. The dilemma that Japan like other regional states suffer is that now it cannot easily take sides, simultaneously relying upon U.S. military and Chinese economic roles in the region.

In this conception of Japan’s strategic interests, Japan has no preference for leading the band-wagon to China. Realistically Japan would maintain its security partnership with the U.S. while building closer relationships with China. The latter, for example, would involve conceding a larger role and stronger voice to Beijing in the regional and international order and institutions in the years ahead. It may also involve more separation of Japanese policy to integrate itself economically and socially into Asia from Japanese security policy. A priority would be avoiding political rivalry in the course of Asia’s growth and concentrating limited diplomatic resources on Asia’s integration and development. This strategy is based on a self-conception that accepts the limits of Japan’s power and rates the promise of Asia and China highly. This reflects a considerable shift in thinking and a marked difference from the LDP thinking during Koizumi’s tenure, when Japan embarked upon its own the community-building proposals.

These ideas contrast starkly with those based on the notion that Japan, as the second largest economy in the world, should seek preserve its rank and prestige over China in the world political affairs. The importance of international status, as well as protecting national interests, has been an important motivator behind Japan’s post-war diplomacy. Those still guided by traditional thinking are still inclined to believe in the nexus between foreign policy and security policy and to prefer to back-down on economic or other issues to protect the U.S. security relationship. They also put emphasis on Japan’s global contributions and the achievement of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

This is the new polarity in Japanese foreign policy thinking — the ‘alliance-first’ camp and the new ‘Asian-ism without discarding the alliance’. Though this polarity exaggerates the difference between the two camps, consensus will not be achieved so easily between them. If military confrontations with neighbors were to become high and clear, the alliance-first camp would gain power again, while the new foreign policy thinking should gain popular support during peacetime.

What are the implications for the Japan-US alliance and relations given Japan’s new political situation?

First, the U.S. should understand that Japan’s self-image in foreign affairs has experienced a sea-change. Japan’s connection and proximity to growing and dynamic Asia needs to be seen as an asset and in a more positive light. This is no zero-sum game and the U.S. rightly criticised Japan when its relations with China were frozen under Prime Minister Koizumi. If Japan’s new school of foreign policy thinking prevails,in the challenge of integrating China into the regional and international economic order, Japan can serve as a ‘stabiliser’ between the US and China and Japan can also accept a stronger relationship between Washington and Beijing than in the past.

Second, Japan has no choice but to pursue economic integration with Asia, and in the long term, it is in America’s interests to see Japan well-integrated in Asia. There is little to be gained by the U.S. pushing Japan over economic issues, or using current political tensions in the relationship as leverage on the economic front. Japan’s move towards Asia will also see Japan working more closely with South Korea and other Asian powers such as India, which is a potential asset to the US in various ways.

Third, the U.S. does not need to worry unduly about the state of the security partnership, since Japan has no alternative security partners. For both camps, the Japan-US security partnership is vital to dealing with traditional security challenges and the new security agenda, such as securing sea lines of communication (SLOC). At the quadrennial review of Japan’s Defense Program Guidelines, it is important for both the United and Japans to set appropriate common security objectives and their regional scope.

Ryo Sahashi is assistant professor at the University of Tokyo.

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