Author: Peter Drysdale

From what one can judge from commentary of serious Chinese analysts, there is a sense of genuine optimism about the state of the Sino-American relationship. In his essay for EAF Quarterly, Jin Canrong, Professor of International Studies at Renmin University in Beijing, sets out why there may indeed be ‘Reason for Optimism in Sino-American Relations’.

In his assessment, the Obama visit at the end of last year was a significant success. Its success reflects at least two things. The first is the early and close engagement between key Chinese players and the new US administration, with Obama’s being the first US President to visit China in his first year of office. The second is the substance of American foreign policy strategy under the new President, with its cornerstone of US engagement in multilateral relationship building providing a framework within which the two powers can develop more substantial international cooperation.

China is one of the principal targets, Jin says, of America’s ‘smart power’ and even if China remains chary about sharing all the international responsibilities Washington would like it to bear, there is room enough to play. There is no instinct in Beijing, it seems, to think that time is not on China’s side as the power gap narrows, despite the huge differences in political culture and psychology that have terrible propensity to generate anxieties on both sides.

As Jin points out, though there may be numerous problems, many ‘stabilisers’ are being built into the relationship (important among them the Strategic Economic Dialogue) which provide a more and more secure basis for managing its development in the medium term. Certainly the policy rhetoric on China out of the US would appear to confirm this sense of optimism about the relationship.

Yet, this week one of America’s top officials confided privately that he was not sure whether the rhetoric was sustained by the underlying reality of what it meant for America to give ground on many issues to China. In the American political psychology on China, beneath the surface, there are undercurrents of uncertainty. It is difficult to understand the intensely critical American press on Obama’s visit to China, for example, except as a reflection of some deep American doubt. If doubt comes to dominate the conduct of the Sino-American relationship, it will be hard for America and China to share power and international responsibilities and, as Hugh White reminds us, the default will be strategic competition. In that event, there would be much less ground for optimism about the relationship.

These are questions to which we shall return again and again. They are important questions for Australia and the region. They are a critical interest in shaping strategy towards both our powerful economic and political partners. And the worry is that they are questions on which there has as yet been far too little deep or broad-based long-term thinking, certainly in this country.