This was because China was aware that, although these rumours were accepted as fact by many Japanese, this was actually a story dreamt up by the French. As the recent conclusion of joint historical research by China and Japan reveals, major differences still remain in relation to the official interpretation of events. It seems unlikely that Hatoyama would visit Nanjing when the basic question of how many were killed still remains unsettled.
Secondly, on the issue of trade, Hatoyama is little different to the LDP and is moving slowly on the issue. For example, Hatoyama has proposed further research be conducted into a Japan-China-Korea trilateral free trade agreement. And while this time it is official government-level research, there are no promises on the Japanese side and not much enthusiasm. Undoubtedly, a part of the reason this research has been elevated to official level is the fact that the academics responsible for informal research since 2001 have simply run out of areas to study.
It should be no surprise, then, that even now Hatoyama appears to be looking for wiggle room by suggesting an investment treaty (although a quick look at the way in which Hatoyama is handling Futenma suggests that wiggling is Hatoyama’s natural state). Indeed, post-LDP, Japan’s real interests remain served by an investment protection pact that is signed either in addition to, or even instead of, an FTA with China.
In any discussion of a Japanese FTA the agricultural issue is also important – and here too the Ministry of Agriculture, Farming and Fishery has hardly changed its position. The MAFF is continuing to oppose any deal with China that includes agriculture. With China being Japan’s second largest supplier of food import, this rather nixes a deal unless the PM comes out clearly in favour. Of course, the establishment within MOFA of a new FTA promotion facility is viewed generally an attack on the influence of the MAFF in relation to FTA policy making (with the MAFF already on the backfoot) – but the target of any new FTA is more likely to be Australia than China, at least for the time being.
Thirdly, in the field of security, Hatoyama has made no major changes. The issue of natural resource exploration by China in the East China Sea remains problematic. Foreign Minister Okada has raised Japan’s concerns with his counterpart Yang Jiechi twice already, most recently on January 17th, at which time Okada stated that ‘he would like to enter into negotiations to conclude international agreements promptly, and expressed desire for Minister Yang’s cooperation and for him [Jiechi] to issue instructions to enable substantive progress to be made going forward, in contrast with the lack of progress so far.’
From the perspective of MOFA, this reflects a continuation of the China policy originally set out by the LDP in 2008 under ‘the Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’ Joint Statement. Under this Joint Statement, a commitment was made to resolve, or at least ameliorate, the political problems caused by Chinese exploration in East China Sea. Of course, the DPJ is still keen for military exchanges and the like to continue, but Japan’s posture on these core national interests has hardly softened.
Thus, in the areas of historical record, trade and security, Hatayoma has changed little in Japan’s policy towards China.
This article also appears here on Joel’s blog ‘Eris in Asia‘.