His keen interest in nuclear disarmament is evidenced by his dedication to revealing documentations uncovering a decades-long secret deal between Japan and the United States over the visits of US naval vessels with nuclear weapons to Japanese ports without prior consultation. This deal was long denied by LDP leaders, so widely viewed as one of differences in policy approaches promoted by the DPJ government.

Okada’s visit to Australia symbolised his intention to work with Australia on this issue, based on his awareness of Australia’s shared interest in nuclear disarmament. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament is co-chaired by former foreign ministers from Australia and Japan, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi (coincidentally, she was Okada’s senior at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), and the report of this Australia-Japan initiative was presented to Prime Ministers, Hatoyama and Rudd in Tokyo, last December. Okada’s visit to Australia was an important initial step in his ‘nuclear disarmament’ diplomacy.

Despite Okada’s interest, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not so enthusiastic about nuclear disarmament. Japan is shielded under the US nuclear umbrella, a source of deterrence against possible attack from North Korea, and giving the US advice on the nuclear disarmament appears to some inconsistent with Japan’s strategic situation. Yet, Okada hoped to move the agenda forward, trying to overcome bureaucratic apathy through political dialogue with his Australian counterpart, Stephen Smith. His determination was also evident in his personal letters to Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates last December, illustrating inconsistency between his preference for the reduction of US nuclear weapons and some Japanese officials’ lobbying activities to urge the US not to do so. Okada hoped to form a coalition among America’s non-nuclear allies, including Australia and Germany, to convince the United States of nuclear disarmament, and he gained support from his German counterpart, Guido Westerwelle, when they met in Tokyo last January.

Okada’s recognition of Australia as a strategic partner is rare in recent Japanese diplomatic history, so some Japanese media gave notice to his trip to Australia. The Asahi Shimbun highlighted Okada’s Australian visit in the Editorial on 23 February

Secondly, just prior to Okada’s visit, Prime Minister Rudd’s announcement of his determination to take a legal action against Japanese research whaling by this autumn, if the negotiations over the issue failed, dominated Japanese news coverage. All the main TV news in the Tokyo metropolitan area reported Rudd’s remarks widely. It is unusual for the Japanese TV news to pay attention to Australian prime ministers’ statements, but the focus of Rudd’s announcement and his subsequent cold shouldering Okada’s request to prohibit the Sea Shepherd’s access to Australian port facilities by stating there was no legal basis for that contributed to the growing Japanese impression of him as a politician with intractable views about Japan although the TV coverage pointed out that Rudd’s position was framed in the context of an upcoming general election.

Okada’s view of Australia for Japan as a partner with shared interests on key policy issues is not the first time Japanese leaders have pursued the strategy. Australia and Japan worked closely on regional institution-building in East Asia and the Pacific on PECC and APEC, and their achievement together is widely recognised throughout the region. But there are certain preconditions for the partnership to function effectively. One is the absence of other serious bilateral problems. Both leaders, in periods of strategic partnership, did not concern themselves with bilateral disputes and they were able to focus on their shared regional and strategic interests in their bilateral dealings, not the trivia of bilateral disputes. The wide coverage of the whaling problem and Rudd’s deadline for its resolution by the Japanese media played into the negative agenda in relations with Australia and helped to submerge Okada’s vision of a positive partnership with Australia on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The growing development of defence and security ties between Japan and Australia was one of the achievements of the previous LDP government post-9/11. Both nations rapidly established regular ministerial and senior official consultations and meetings over defence and security issues, including the 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC), the inaugural Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (2+2 talks), and the Action Plan based on the JDSC. Japanese Self-Defence Forces participated for the first time in the US-Australia joint exercise in June 2007 as an observer and the first trilateral P-3C exercise was held in October the same year. Australia-Japan security and defence ties evolved in response to the demands from the United States which needed to establish the coalition of the willing to keep its commitment to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as to critical security regional flashpoints such as the nuclear development in North Korea.

The DPJ government in Japan has promoted different foreign policy approach, downplaying the emphasis on shared values such as democracy, human rights or religious freedom in the foreign policy arena. Shared values were the element that politically connected the United States, Japan and Australia in security cooperation, as envisaged by the second Armitage-Nye report published in 2007. Advancing the Australia-Japan political and security partnership under the DPJ government needs re-interpretation of its core foreign policy rationale. Although an FTA with Australia is one of the few shared foreign policy objectives of both the LDP and DPJ, Japan’s entrenched agricultural protectionism, for example in the sugar market, makes it almost impossible to establish a partnership with Australia in regional market integration.

Okada tried to find a new way forward in partnership with Australia on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, while Hatoyama will be interested in working together with Australia on the climate change issue including the reduction of CO2 emissions, to which both prime ministers are committed.

Okada’s visit to Australia last month might have been the first step towards this new-type of partnership between the two countries. But his frustration, plain for all to see on his face in the Japanese TV news broadcasts of the press conference in Perth with Stephen Smith  — who showed less enthusiasm for Okada’s nuclear disarmament vision than had Germany’s foreign minister — seemed more like the harbinger of ominous clouds over the prospects for his hoped-for diplomatic dawn in the relationship with Australia.

Takashi Terada is professor in international relations in the Institute of Asian Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo.