The missing piece of a well advised Asia strategy has been a durable, serious and balanced strategy for Southeast Asia.

Now is the right time to focus on the development of such a national strategy. The lack of consistent US focus in the region has enabled the ascendance of Chinese power, the slow undermining of US business interests and will eventually degrade American security capabilities. In that context, a refocusing of American engagement in the region is due.

The Obama administration has indicated a strong interest in addressing this gap. President Obama has declared himself the ‘first Pacific President of the United States’ and has inaugurated a US-ASEAN Summit that includes all ten of ASEAN’s leaders. Yet while form is moving in the right direction, a substantive framework is required to support enduing American engagement in Southeast Asia based on a clear-eyed understanding of American interests in this vital region.

The approach to this effort should be based on an objective assessment of current and future US interests in Southeast Asia and engage stake holder in government and business, with expertise in business and economics, defense and security policy, human rights and cultural issues, and others.

US is building on a reservoir of strength in ASEAN

The US has significant interests and strength in ASEAN. An informed American policy will recognise and leverage these strengths and build upon them. ASEAN is currently home to far more US investment than China or India, and the region is also a bigger market for US goods and services than either of its larger neighbors. US security assets in the region have been developed over decades and need to be revitalised. The US has significant social and cultural ties with the region that range from education to the arts to people to people ties.

ASEAN is comprised of ten countries, home to over 600 million people with a collective gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately USD1.3 trillion. Together, the ASEAN countries are committed to global engagement. They are the most trade dependent formal grouping of nations in the world with trade accounting for just less than 100 per cent of their aggregate GDP. Indonesia, which anchors ASEAN as its largest member, is the fourth largest country in the world and home to the world’s largest, moderate Islamic population.

On the trade and investment front, ASEAN is home to more than USD153 billion in US investment; more than three times our USD45 billion in China and nearly 10 times our USD16 billion in India. That figure does not even count investment in the oil and gas sector, which could nearly double the total. The US is ASEAN’s largest market and ASEAN is the fourth largest US market after NAFTA, the EU and Japan.

While President Obama has alluded to the importance of trade in Asia in his State of the Union speech and during his Asia trip last November, the fact is that a coherent trade strategy is still not in place. Focusing on this important issue in the context of a broader US strategy for the region is timely and will be a catalyst for progress.

In terms of security and strategic interests, ASEAN includes two of the five US allies in Asia, the Philippines and Thailand. Singapore works very closely with the US providing key access to for military assets. Other countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam have important common interests with the US and are likely to become more engaged security and strategic partners in the coming years. In addition, some of the world’s most important shipping lanes are in Southeast Asia – the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. The region also is the source of significant natural resources including oil and gas, as well some of the richest sources of biodiversity on the planet.

Culturally, despite the fact that over the last decade some US policies have been unpopular, notably our Middle East policy and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is still considered a model for governance, civil rights, political and economic freedom. English is still the predominant language used in business and education, and a large number of ASEAN students study in the United States.

ASEAN is the keystone of a durable US strategy for Asia.

None of these US strengths in ASEAN can be sustained if US policy does not recognise and build on them. With the rising influence of China and India, there is increasing competition for markets, minds and militaries in the region. This is a competition the US should welcome given its significant leadership position.

In this sense, a comprehensive US strategy for Asia generally is incomplete without a strong, well defined core strategy for ASEAN. ASEAN is the place where the most important countries of the Asia Pacific meet and compete, and the US cannot afford to cede or underestimate its foundational interests in this vital region.

In this sense, an ASEAN strategy should account for the rise of both China and India as well as key interests with US alliances in Japan, Korea and Australia. The traditional post-colonial mind set of separating East Asia from South Asia no longer applies. India has traditional cultural, trade, and economic interests in Southeast Asia comparable to China’s. While India has been more internally focused than China in the last two decades, its policy makers, business executives, educators and movie producers have rediscovered ASEAN. The US will benefit from including India in regional architecture in Asia if for no other reason than as ballast helping to balance a fast growing and focused China.

In the area of trade and investment, ASEAN is at the center of the global free trade movement. For ASEAN, this is a matter of survival since its member countries are collectively the most trade dependent in the world. Indeed, countries like Singapore, whose trade is over three times its gross domestic product, would starve without trade and would languish if trade does not continue to expand.

On January 1, 2010 the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement took effect. ASEAN has signed a free trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand as well as an FTA with India. Versions of FTA’s are also in place with Japan and Korea. ASEAN members Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam comprise three of the founding eight members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and ASEAN members constitute one third of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s members. The US currently has a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with ASEAN, though talks are relatively inactive. A good US plan for ASEAN be based on an assessment of whether the economic and strategic value of a US-ASEAN FTA would be worth working through the impediments blocking negotiations at this time.

On the foreign policy and security front, ASEAN will be at the center of any regional architecture. ASEAN is the common member in various competing proposals emanating from Beijing, Canberra, Tokyo and other capitals. In her speech on Asian regional architecture in Hawaii earlier this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted the importance of the ‘centrality of ASEAN’ in her discussion of core principles guiding regionalism. Indeed, ASEAN has existing structures that should be considered in any serious conceptualisation of regional architecture. ASEAN is the host of the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post-Ministerial Conference. It hosts an annual ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN + 3 Summit, and ASEAN + 1 Summits with eight dialogue partner countries, including, as of 2009 the United States.

ASEAN is also a key partner on transnational global issues such as the fight against terrorism. While ASEAN’s Islamic population is overwhelmingly moderate, extremist groups have exploited weak borders and out of date police and national security structures to radicalise small groups and have struck several targets including in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. In addition, ASEAN countries are key stake holders in transnational issues such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy policy and development of sustainable renewable energy, management of disease, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

For all these reasons and more, the US must conclusively end the policy drift that has taken place since the close of the Vietnam War in Southeast Asia. American interests in ASEAN are significant. A well balanced and clearly defined strategy for ASEAN is the foundation for a realistic and enduring Asia policy. Without such an approach, US national security and the future wealth and prosperity of the country will be exposed to serious risk and an eventual downgrading of our status as a Pacific power.

This article was first published here by CSIS.

Ernest Z. Bower is Senior Adviser and Director of the Southeast Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington