As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and others have described it, the global mean temperature is rising. As this occurs, sea levels are rising, and small island states such as Tuvalu or the Maldives could sink beneath them. If this happens, it will be the first time in history that a nation state physically disappears from the earth. In addition, we can expect more and harsher droughts, floods, typhoons and hurricanes. Changes in agricultural patterns are predicted, a loss of biological diversity and health effects such as more instances of malaria. These changes may create mass migration and refugees, which could result in conflicts. In all these ways and others as yet unforeseen, climate change will become a security issue for human society.
The reason why I think climate change is the key to determining the world order of the 21st century is not solely on this point. Another reason, which may be more appealing to political leaders, is related to the responses taken to the threat.
The primary cause of the climate change problem, of course, is the excessive use of fossil fuels. As energy has been an integral part of human development, not only economic activities but also contemporary daily life and even military activities are dependent on energy.
Beyond a world order based on fossil fuels
Since the industrial revolution, energy has mainly come from fossil fuels such as oil, coal and natural gas. Therefore, political leaders have directed national interests to obtaining and utilising fossil fuels. Energy security has been critical to determining the international order in modern times. To avoid shortages to energy supplies, especially oil, nation states have used oil reserves, exploration, conservation, diplomacy and other means. Beginning in the 19th century, an adequate and secure supply of fossil fuels has played a major role in the balance of power among nations.
With emerging recognition by policy makers and political leaders of the seriousness of climate change, it gradually has become clear that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as CO2, which enter the atmosphere as unintended ‘outputs’ of unchecked energy use, are causing major damage to our planet. And this, in return, has become a constraint on the ‘inputs’ side. Therefore, unlike in the past, energy security is now ’constrained’ by climate change policy, not just ‘related’ to it. Our response will depend on the directions we choose to take in the use of energy and resources. Those who can secure as-yet unexploited resources such as renewable energy and low-carbon resources on the input side will end up as leading powers in the international politics of the next generation. This may not be a single-nation hegemony, since renewable resources are diffuse in origin, not centralised as with oil fields or coal mines.
Another major departure from the past is that instead of using military power or the threat of military force to control another country, domestic policies will be strongly linked to international politics. This is because new technologies for both conservation and renewable energy will be needed globally for a long time into the future. National policies that develop, deploy and promote sound environmental technologies will be crucial to an international institutional framework that will allow new ideas and methods to be applied broadly to other countries. These policies will be directly connected to securing economic profit and markets. For developed countries and emerging economies, it is also about securing markets in developing countries.
Converging interests
Despite its stagnant outcome, the December 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen was a symbol of converging interests, as it was supposed to serve as the first step to determine this new international system. The heads of state of about 120 countries participated — including the US, France and Japan — when normally a cabinet member in charge of the environment would attend such a gathering. The convergence of political interests on the issue goes even to the level of working group negotiations. This makes compromise even more difficult, and led to an extension of working group negotiations for another year. One notable case is the United States. The chief negotiator appointed by the administration of President Barack Obama, Todd Stern, played a key role in bringing top-level political will down to the working group level. The US, which rejected the Kyoto Protocol and until recently exhibited a retrograde approach to climate change responses, has made numerous proposals at the working group sessions.
Washington is making proposals regarding measurement of emissions reduction efforts, reporting, evaluation and verification methodologies and coordination of funding sources from developed countries to developing countries. Even though the US had not yet announced clear emissions targets (largely due to a cumbersome legislative process) its influence was heavily felt on technological topics. In the end, the Copenhagen Accord was very much driven by the US position, which is not ready for legally binding targets due to domestic political constraints.
Although green growth strategies seem a domestic issue at a first glance, they are deeply linked to the international community and the growing political will to create a low-carbon society. One sign of this is that prior to Copenhagen many Asian countries, most of which are developing countries, pledged mid-term emission reduction targets.
Asian nations step forward
In Asia and among emerging nations, Indonesia established the first mid-term emissions targets for 2020, even before China and India, as it seeks a leadership role on the climate issue. It is reminiscent of the leading role taken by Sukarno in the non-aligned movement that began with the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Indonesia’s ambitious promise was followed by other developing nations in Asia as if it was a competition of target pledges in the period before Copenhagen. Singapore, which is among the most advanced developing nations, announced an ambitious target, and Maldives, one of the most vulnerable island states, pledges to be carbon neutral by 2019.
South Korea, a largely developed middle power, announced a 30 per cent emission reduction target for 2020 from what is called the business-as-usual scenario (BAU), which represents a four per cent reduction from 2005 levels. This announcement is in line with Seoul’s low-carbon and green-growth policy package announced in 2008. Taking advantage of being a developing country under UN climate rules and also a member of the OECD, Seoul seems to be seeking leadership as a ‘bridge-builder’ in multilateral negotiations.
A key player in climate negotiations due to both its economic power and its new distinction as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China followed, and its target is to reduce emissions as a per cent of GDP by 40-45 per cent from 2005 levels by 2030. Finally, India announced a 20-25 per cent reduction of emissions as a per cent of GDP by 2020, and a 37 per cent cut by 2030.
On the one hand, these numbers show that politicians are finally listening to the scientific evidence and taking steps toward a low-carbon earth. Although primary responsibility for ongoing climate change lies in developed countries, their efforts alone cannot solve the problem. Projections show that dangerous climate change cannot be avoided unless the responsibility to reduce emissions is shared with developing countries, even though the level of responsibility should be differentiated. These first steps to mitigation on the side of developing countries should be regarded as a positive response to the climate problem.
On the other hand, these numbers can also be seen as a competition for leadership in the new world order of the 21st century. If the structure of the world has to be changed due to global warming, and if alternative energy sources and technology are still being sought, the chances to leap-frog the existing order and take the lead in the next generation of international politics is greater for developing countries. It should be in this context that green growth strategies are viewed.
A co-benefit strategy
In this regard, a co-benefit approach will be attractive for Asia. In many Asian countries, air and water pollution are often seen as more pressing environmental issues than longer-term climate change. Pollution issues have to be dealt with urgently. At the same time, mounting global interest will provide more funding opportunities for climate change measures. Of course, many substances that cause environmental pollution overlap with ones causing climate change. For example, emissions from coal-fired power plants cause urban air pollution as well as climate change. Thus, improving energy efficiency can impact on both problems. Currently, traditional overseas development assistance (ODA) can be used for projects targeting air pollution abatement, while the clean development mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol can assist on the climate change side. However, technically complicated problems exist between the two financial mechanisms. One is that a CDM project has to be an add-on to ODA, because conventional ODA is decreased if ODA funding is used for CDM. Another technical difficulty with CDM is that the amount of emissions reduced by a given project has to be ‘reasonable’ and proven, a process widely recognised as both time and cost consuming, even though it is important.
A co-benefit approach has great potential to be an important part of green growth in Asia, but these institutional problems must be solved. There are two strategic projects launched by the Japanese government in 2009 dealing with issues related to co-benefit. One is the Global Environmental Research Fund of the ministry of environment that looks into ways to realise a low-carbon Asia. Another approaches the issue from the air pollution side using the same research framework. Ironically, the two are not merged into one, but the good news is that they are both strategic research projects, which means that policy-makers are strongly interested and involved.
One possibility is to create an institutional approach that fits the pollution issue into a regional framework. Such a framework may function better if it takes a decentralised approach, as recent work on institutions suggests that decentralisation works better in solving problems, especially in developing countries. I know from my own experience as a government representative to negotiations for the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), the most advanced environmental problem-solving institution in the region, that lack of negotiating capacity is also a serious problem for multilateral talks. Solving problems starts with finding a common language, as only a couple of countries are native to English. In addition, professional diplomats, especially from smaller countries, may be too busy to be engaged in technical talks. Decentralisation could make a positive difference. So, starting with top-level political agreement to create a decentralised mechanism involving multiple actors may be more effective in Asia to realise a low-carbon future than time-consuming incremental expansion of various kinds of centralised technical agreements.
We are at a moment in history in which the rules have changed, and the climate crisis will require creative thinking and a possible realignment of the international order. For Asia, this presents an opportunity to assert a greater leadership role on the world stage in terms of emissions targets, technology and regional cooperation. The future will belong to those nations who understand and seize the moment to build a green future.
This article was first published here at Global Asia.
Norichika Kanie is an Associate Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology, and Visiting Professor, Sciences Po university, Paris.