Gupta makes the observation that, ‘even during Tibet’s existence as a de facto independent state through much of the first half of the 20th century, its rough-and-ready frontiers bore no resemblance to the Greater Tibet chimera’. But this ignores the fact that Tibetan claims for autonomy across the Tibetan plateau do not refer to historic claims of an ‘independent’ Tibet. Further, as Gupta acknowledges, the Dalai Lama has renounced any claim to Tibetan independence.
The 1959 protests, which fomented the ill-fated uprising and the Dalai Lama’s subsequent escape, began in eastern Tibet, outside of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The 2008 protests were similar, with the vast proportion of activity occurring in areas outside of the TAR. Additionally, the Tibetan exile community is composed of Tibetans from across the plateau, not merely the TAR. In this respect, Hillman and Gupta’s suggestion that the Dalai Lama’s unwillingness to abandon the claims of eastern Tibetans represents political weakness is incorrect. In fact, the Dalai Lama’s position is the only stance that could be possible in the circumstances.
It seems likely that the Chinese government is nervous that establishing a new autonomous entity covering all Tibetan areas, as proposed by the Dalai Lama, may be the first step toward a push for independence for the region. This probably explains their constant suggestions that the Dalai Lama is less than genuine in his renouncement of independence. While outsiders may view this concern as overly paranoid, Tibetans must seek to demonstrate that this is in fact not the case.
For his part, the Dalai Lama has repeatedly stated that he envisions ‘genuine autonomy’ for all Tibetans. This concept is rooted in the Chinese constitution itself, which states that when minority nationalities live in compact communities, ‘organs of self- government are (to be) established for the exercise of the right of autonomy’. Taking the Chinese constitution as a starting point, we need to re-conceive how Tibet is governed in China. The current border of the TAR is an artificial one. If the goals of stability and genuine autonomy are to be realised, this border must be reviewed.
What then, should be the content of a greater Tibet?
A three-state structure of Tibetan autonomy could satisfy the demands of Tibetan exiles, whilst allowing the Chinese State to prevent the possible breakaway of Tibet as a separate nation.
The province of Qinghai roughly corresponds to the traditional Tibetan region of Amdo, and remains predominantly Tibetan. Tibetans constitute about 55 percent of the population outside of Xining (the provincial capital), and represent 90 percent of some Qinghai prefectures. This is despite massive population movement during the past half century. The remainder of the Tibetan plateau is referred to as Kham by Tibetans, and also remains predominantly Tibetan. Until 1955, this region was officially the province of Xikang, only to be divided between the TAR and Sichuan.
Genuine autonomy for all Tibetans necessarily requires that Tibetans from Amdo and Kham enjoy a similar level of autonomy to central Tibetans. But given that the exiles’ conception of a ‘Greater Tibet’ is so worrying to Beijing, why not separate the Tibetan regions, the TAR (central Tibet), Qinghai (Amdo) and Sikang (Kham) into three separate autonomous regions. This would incorporate the principle claims of the Dalai Lama, namely: respect for Tibetan language, culture and religion, access to adequate education and health services, protection of the environment, more say over the use of natural resources, economic development and trade, regulation of the military presence in Tibet and the rate of migration into Tibetan areas.
I have no experience or expertise in terms of autonomy governance.
While there is some common understanding how autonomy works, in reality it is likely to be more complex.
For example, what about the rights of non-Tibetans in any of those areas mentioned by the author and their role in the autonomy proposed or insisted by Dalai Lama?
Should they have equal rights as Tibetans, or should they have fewer rights?
I don’t know how many non-Tibetans in those areas and their share in the populations.
But it can be expected they may be significant and that can have serious implications for how the autonomy can work.
It is probably inappropriate to ignore their presence and not feasible to ask them to leave to make the region more pure in terms of ethnicity.
But unfortunately most commentators do not mention their presence and its implications in their analysis.
After all, this is not too different from the Northern Ireland situation where you have two groups that have or had different aspirations or goals.
Dear Lincoln,
thanks for your response.
I don’t think that there is any suggestion that any ethnic group should have fewer rights, let alone that they should be asked to leave for the sake of ethnice “purity”! I think we are a long way from that.
As I mentioned, Tibetans account for about 55% of Qinghai (Amdo) outside of Xining. The Han are now the second largest group at about 28% and then the Hui at about 10%.
The whole point of Autonomy is decentralisation. So other ethnic groups should expect to be more empowered, not less. The problems that need to be addressed stem from the domination of the region by the Han-dominated government, with little effort at inclusiveness. By addressing issues such as decisions about the use of natural resources, implementation of harsh policies such as nomad resettlement, and the creation of jobs and industries relevant to local communities, all local minority groups should benefit, not just one.
Huw – I’m in agreement with you that TAR-equivalent autonomy arrangement in extra-TAR Tibetan-inhabited areas is indeed do-able, and the three state/province(?) structure you lay out is interesting … so long as – I would submit – His Holiness’s extra-TAR autonomy claims are de-linked from concept of single administrative entity and attendant undertone of ethnic homogeniety.
But I would re-iterate (as I had written) that HH is going about these negotiations the wrong way around. Dealing with Beijing on these sensitive issues means he needs to get the optics right first (perhaps appeal to the shared Buddhist heritage); then the principles of settlement; and only thereafter the particulars of what constitutes ‘genuine autonomy’ for all. The question of three states/provinces or a single one might be placing the cart before the horse.
Best, Sourabh
Hi Sourabh,
thanks for your thoughts. It’s great to have the opportunity for an exchange.
I guess the point that I sought to make is to challenge the seemingly conventional wisdom in China-studies circles that the roadblock to progress in negotiations is an obstinate position from the Dalai Lama’s negotiators that is unamenable to compromise.
In fact, as discussed in my earlier exchange with Ben Hillman, the Tibetan position has changed considerably since the 1980s. Let’s not forget that it seemed as though resolution was within reach in the early reform era with Hu Yaobang driving the policy. As hardliners took over in Beijing, Dharamsala has subsequently shifted its position to a relatively moderate ask. And I would contend that, contrary to your interpretation, the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, is devoted primarily to demonstrating that Tibetan demands can be met with the bounds of the Chinese Constitution and current legislation. While you are concerned that the Memorandum asks for ‘government institutions and processes’ suited to the needs of the Tibetan people, surely this is what autonomy is all about!
The idea that there is an “on-going failure to pay obeisance – even on a token basis – to the prevailing Chinese political (and constitutional) system”, seems contradicted by a reading of the Memorandum. For instance the Memorandum notes that: “the Constitution recognises the power of autonomous administration in a number of areas (Article 117-120) as well as the power of autonomous governments to apply flexibility in implementing the laws and policies of the Central Government and higher state organs to suit the conditions of the autonomous area concerned (Article 115)”.
This was followed up recently with an explanatory note, prompted by the Chinese response. It noted that “the Memorandum explicitly states that the genuine autonomy sought by His Holiness the Dalai Lama for the Tibetan people is to be accommodated within the framework of the Constitution and its principles on autonomy, not outside of it”.
Further, I think that your vision for progress, including an “appeal to the shared Buddhist heritage”, also happens to be consistent with the Dalai Lama’s approach, having repeatedly proposed a visit to mainland China for a ‘pilgrimage’ as a confidence building measure.
You are correct that my proposal would require that “extra-TAR autonomy claims are de-linked from the concept of single administrative entity”, however this seems to me like an achievable compromise, given that it could still meet all the essential demands of Tibetan autonomy, while respecting the sub-ethnic divisions of the plateau rather than the current artificial boundaries. The aim is to allay the primary concern of the central government regarding the independence movement, while satisfying the long overdue requirements of genuine autonomy. The back and forth over the last decade or two is all very well, but I think it requires addressing these primary issues to get the horse and cart in precisely the right order.
Thanks again,
Huw.
I would suggest the writers to pull out an official Chinese government map of China. Simply trace out all areas that are Tibetan Autonomous Region, Prefecture, and Counties. You will have historical Tibet. The Chinese government already recognises all of these regions to be Tibetan Autonomous areas anyways. The notion of this Tibet is not a creation of Tibetans in exile nor something imagined. There is a clear affinity amongst the Tibetan people in all these regions to be identified as belonging to one nation.
If a resolution through Middle Way is not negotiated within the life of this Dalai Lama, I cannot see this offer ever coming back on the table from the Tibetan side. Time is running out for China, not Tibet.
I agree that either the three-states solution or a single state one is not the point. three-state solution is problematic in practise, Chinese government would never compromise to Dalai Lama let alone divide Tibet’s district. The theory makes no political value for both parties; Dalai Lama today is not any like Banchan Lama. and the power distance between Beijing and Tibetan exile gov is so significant. The Great Tibetan conception will be forgotten by majority eventually in history, just like Great Yuan
Maybe one day the Chinese government will recognise the conception but they will never give Tibetan Buddhism any political meanings, as long as China remains its dictatorship. The deteriorating relationship between Chinese government and Tibetan exile government may be improved in the next generation, but I Hope Dalai could live longer