For Chinese leaders, pursuing East Asian integration not only allows China to expand its influence in accordance with ‘peaceful rise’, but also allows it to develop a more coherent international position. China’s grand strategy is to gradually displace the unipolar dominance of the US. In this context, the Chinese leadership views the blueprint of an East Asian regional order as the central pillar of a new international order.

But what kind of role does China think it should play in an integrated East Asia?

As a starting point, the former Chinese ambassador in Japan, Wang Yi, has commented that relationships with neighbouring nations are important for the protection of Chinese sovereignty, and for demonstrating its role in international society.  Further, Feng Zhaogui, a specialist on Sino-Japanese relations, has argued that China must allow small and medium sized nations within East Asia to pursue peaceful development without facing the threat of a belligerent Chinese nation.

So, within the East Asian context at least, China is seeking to employ a broadly peaceful strategy.  This strategy is motivated by the domestic concerns of Chinese leaders, involves a desire to project soft, rather than hard power, and is characterised by a vague, subconscious, Confucian conception of a Chinese World Order.

First consider the domestic concerns of Chinese political leaders. In recent years, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have emphasised the notion of a harmonious society. They are acutely aware of issues that threaten this vision, such as general dissatisfaction as to potential unemployment, problems of environmental degradation, dissatisfaction among minorities and rampant nationalism amongst the country’s youth. These challenges necessitate that China develop peacefully on the global stage, although populist nationalism can sometimes push China away from prudent global action.

At the same time, at this stage of its development, China has acknowledged that it needs assistance from the global community, and East Asia in particular. China’s eager response to Japanese offers to help following the Sichuan earthquake contrasts positively with its denying assistance, in 1976, that the Tang Shan earthquake even occurred.

Secondly, China’s vision for regional integration fits neatly into its current strategy to project what is predominately ‘soft,’ rather than ‘hard’ power. In recent years China has actively courted countries outside East Asia, with India a good example. In October 2003, India’s Prime Minister visited China for the first time since 1993. Wen Jiabao subsequently visited India in 2005, and Hu Jintao visited India in 2008. During Hu’s visit, both countries confirmed that they intend to cooperate in the areas of energy, space technology and nuclear technology.

More broadly, China has sought to project soft power by offering economic assistance to developing countries. The establishment of Confucius Institutes globally illustrates a unified strategy to promote China using soft power. In December 2007, a prominent Chinese official, Chen Zhili, confirmed that China has applied to establish about 4000 Confucius Institutes in more than 61 countries.  These institutes offer Chinese language education, but also promote a Chinese Communist Party vision of Chinese traditional culture.

China has not completely forsaken the use of hard power. Chinese leaders still hold a hawkish and uncompromising attitude towards national sovereignty, an attitude typified by Tibet policy.  But, at the same time, the Chinese government has also recently attempted to tackle problems through dialogue, most prominently in the case of Taiwan. In sum, China’s most recent strategy involves a mix of hard and soft power, and warrants careful examination.

A cautionary third point about the motivations of Chinese regional integration relates to Chinese conceptions of world order. The ‘Chinese World Order’ is comprised of two basic aspects. Firstly, it is an authoritarian structure, with the son of heaven (the emperor) at the centre, bureaucrats, intellectuals and ordinary Han Chinese in the middle of the circle, and barbarians on the outside. Secondly, it is basically Confucian in nature.

This conception is problematic. It implicitly assumes that China should place itself above other states, and other nation-states are relegated to the status of ‘barbarian outsiders.’

Given these features of the Chinese polity, what does the international community need to do to facilitate China’s continued integration into both the East Asian region, and the global community more broadly?

First, both China and international society should attempt to understand China’s current challenges. A zero-sum approach will not benefit anyone.

Second, China must itself try to understand the importance of cooperation in today’s international system.

Third, China should be more open in tackling its domestic problems. It should not hide its problems and should forsake the use of coercion. Regarding Tibet, and Taiwan, China must implement substantive policies rather than relying on sensational slogans.

Fourth, China should encourage dialogue both within its borders, and outside them. Such dialogue should be based on the principle of freedom of information.  In this way, China can develop a national identity that is democratic, not hierarchical.

An awareness of China’s foreign policy challenges can only work to foster better regional and international cooperation. If the above prescriptions are followed, East Asian integration can avoid a ‘Chinese hegemony’, and can turn towards a vibrant economic and political future.

Satoshi Amako is Professor and formerly Dean of the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies at Waseda University in Tokyo.