The NPR devotes an entire chapter to ‘Reducing the Role of US Nuclear Weapons’ and highlights this effort as one of the five ‘key objectives’ of the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policies and posture. It also states unequivocally that the US ‘will not develop new nuclear warheads’ and ‘will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.’

The 2010 NPR lists ‘preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism’ as the first of its five key objectives, based on the understanding that nuclear terrorism is ‘today’s most immediate and extreme danger’ and the least susceptible to traditional deterrence. This raises the importance of countering nuclear proliferation.

‘Reducing the role of nuclear weapons’ was listed as the second key objective in the NPR. It was here that the disarmament community’s hopes were the highest (and its disappointment most loudly expressed). Many were hoping for a ‘no first use’ declaration; a clear statement that nuclear weapons would only be used in response to a nuclear attack by others. Instead, the NPR promised to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, with the objective of making ‘deterrence… the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons.’ In the meantime, the US would only consider their use ‘in extreme circumstances.’

The NPR also demonstrated the administration’s willingness to strengthen its negative security assurance: ‘The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.’ Note the important caveat here: these assurances specifically do not apply to Tehran or Pyongyang unless they come into full compliance with the NPT.

The third objective calls for ‘maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels,’ while calling attention to the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) arms control agreement with Russia. To satisfy a potentially reluctant Congress – two-thirds of the Senate must agree if the New START agreement is to be ratified – the treaty ‘does not constrain US missile defenses, and allows the United States to pursue conventional global strike systems.’

It also calls for high-level dialogue with Beijing aimed at promoting more stable and transparent strategic relationship. While China was a ‘contingency’ in the last NPR, here its primary role is as a partner with whom Washington wants to work to promote future stability. Beijing does not get a total free pass, however. The NPR, early on, notes that the US and China’s Asian neighbours remain concerned about Beijing’s military modernisation efforts, ‘including its qualitative and quantitative modernisation of its nuclear force.’

These concerns lead to the fourth objective: ‘strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of US allies and partners.’ Again dashing some hopes, the NPR states that forward-deployed nuclear weapons will remain in Europe and that US extended deterrence in Asia will remain ‘credible and effective.’ The bottom line: ‘As long as regional nuclear threats to our forces, allies, and partners remain, deterrence will require a nuclear component.’

This is something well understood and applauded by security specialists and alliance managers in Seoul and Tokyo. General publics, and in the case of Japan perhaps even some senior political leaders, are less persuaded. In Korea, public opinion seems to run in favor of developing an indigenous nuclear capability. In Japan, many seem to believe that the nuclear dimension of extended deterrence can and should be eliminated. This underscores the need for continued dialogue, not just with the powers that be, but with broader domestic audiences as well.

The final NPR objective deals with ‘sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.’ Most significant here is a pledge not to conduct nuclear tests and to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), although one wonders when the administration will feel prepared to take on this task, especially when confronted first and foremost with getting the New START agreement ratified.

For Asian allies, the NPR represents a reaffirmation of US extended deterrence, including but not limited to its nuclear dimension, for as long as nuclear threats exist. While it de facto offers negative security assurances to Pyongyang if it chooses to come back into the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, it is likely to have little effect – positively or negatively – on the Korean Peninsula denuclearisation effort. It remains to be seen if Beijing will step up to the plate and enter into the comprehensive nuclear dialogue being offered by the Obama administration, or if it will continue to sit on the sidelines and wait for still deeper cuts in the US and Russian inventories before joining the game.

The NPR ends with a reaffirmation that ‘the long-term goal of US policy is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.’ But it recognises that this is a long journey and one that must be undertaken deliberately and carefully, given the nuclear dangers that still exist in the world.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal.