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The domestic politics of Japan's foreign bases

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In Brief

Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio returned home to Japan Wednesday after attending the Nuclear summit in Washington hosted by US President Barack Obama. Whatever significance the summit had for Obama's diplomatic agenda, as far as US-Japan relations are concerned it was overshadowed by Futenma. Hatoyama's self-imposed deadline of resolving the dispute by May is approaching, and there are few signs that his government will be able to reach a conclusion that satisfies the US and local communities in Okinawa by the end of next month. Indeed, on the eve of Hatoyama's trip the government announced that it would be holding off on opening working-level talks with the US because it did not yet have a plan to present.

It is safe to say in terms of the process, the Hatoyama government's approach to Futenma has failed. What explains the Hatoyama government's disastrous performance on the Futenma issue?

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The Prime Minister: On Futenma, the buck has to stop with Hatoyama, something that Josh Rogin identifies as a major source of dissatisfaction in Washington. Despite the importance of this issue – despite Hatoyama’s willingness to invoke the Japanese set phrase (‘I’m risking my political life’) to signal this issue’s importance for his government – Hatoyama has been wholly absent from this debate. There is no excuse. Even if Hatoyama wanted to respect the policymaking process by letting his cabinet ministers debate the matter, on an issue as thorny as Futenma Hatoyama ought to have been taking the lead.

As I’ve argued before, I think that the DPJ’s divisions are an issue to the extent that Hatoyama has created a void at the head of the government. Hatoyama does not appear to have concrete preferences about any policy area, not just Futenma. He has shown little command of policy specifics, and has not yet moved past speaking in bland generalities.

When the Hatoyama government is no more, ‘Trust Me’ may well be the epitaph on its tombstone.

 

Coalition politics: Hatoyama is indecisive, this argument goes, because he is trying to keep his coalition partners – especially the Social Democrats – in the government. I am inclined, however, to see the coalition explanation as one of the least significant when it comes to explaining the Hatoyama government’s behaviour.

First, there is enough dissatisfaction with the 2006 roadmap within the DPJ to suggest that even without the SDPJ being in government the Hatoyama government would still have tried to find an alternative plan.

Second, while some point to the SDPJ’s threat of pulling out of the government should the air base stay in Okinawa, there is considerable reason to doubt the SDPJ’s ability to follow through on a threat to withdraw from the government. The fact is that the SDPJ gains little from abandoning its seat inside the Hatoyama cabinet, and party members know it.

The DPJ: Even if Hatoyama can safely ignore the SDPJ, has he been hindered by divisions within his own party? I have never been convinced that the DPJ is any more divided than the LDP was during the height of its power – and I am convinced that it is less divided than the LDP today.

To the extent that there is a division between government and party over Futenma, it is the role played by Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro that matters. Throughout the process, Ozawa has been consistent with the party’s old ‘Okinawa Vision’ paper, which called for moving the base first out of the prefecture, then out of Japan entirely.

Yet, even if Ozawa was on the same page as the government, Hatoyama’s Cabinet would have struggled to develop an alternative.

Ideology: claiming the dispute is a result of reflexive anti-Americanism on the part of the Hatoyama government.

As I see it, this argument is patently false. That the Hatoyama government is searching so hard for alternatives – including alternatives within Okinawa – is evidence of its desire to maintain a constructive relationship with the US.

Double-edged diplomacy: At the heart of the matter is the relationship between the central government, the Okinawan government and local communities, all in the shadow of the alliance with the US.

It is necessary to acknowledge that the Hatoyama government inherited a mess from the LDP, who sought agreement with the US first, and local communities later. According to the Okinawa Times, mayors of thirty-four of the prefectures forty-one municipalities will be participating in a mass public meeting on 25 April to oppose relocation inside Okinawa.
The US government has been equally inflexible when it comes to the 2006 roadmap, bearing some responsibility for ‘upping the stakes’ on Futenma. By leaning hard on the Hatoyama government from its first weeks in office, Washington trapped the Hatoyama government between its perceived promises to the Okinawan people and its need to be seen as a responsible steward of Japan’s most important bilateral relationship.

These arguments suggest while some tension over Futenma may have been unavoidable, both the Hatoyama government and the Obama administration could have taken steps to minimize the damage. Had the Hatoyama government established a coherent, insulated policy review process from the beginning and communicated to the US the modesty of its aims (while trying to lower the expectations of the Okinawan people) and had the US government recognized the Hatoyama government’s good faith, the tension in the US-Japan relationship could have been avoided.

As it stands, the Hatoyama government is trapped. If it accepts the current agreement unchanged after months of posturing, it will undoubtedly face considerable opposition from the public. If it presents a plan featuring an alternative location in Okinawa, it risks outrage in Okinawa and rejection by the US. The Hatoyama government’s best option may be presenting the US with an alternative plan featuring a site outside of Okinawa, which would both appease the Okinawan public and force the US to vote up or down. This perverse plan seems the only option open to the Hatoyama government as it tries to escape a trap of its own making.

This is an abridged version of a piece that originally appeared here on the author’s blog, Observing Japan.

One response to “The domestic politics of Japan’s foreign bases”

  1. Your article’s “Double-edged diplomacy” … is an inflection point for both Japan and the US.
    Japan is faced with a conundrum because its national interests remain the same but its geopolitical environment has changed.
    Unfortunately, the US will enter into a “Japanese recession driven by need for the private sector to liquidate debts in the face of depreciating real estate assets and weak consumer demand.

    China and Asia represent new markets and developing Chinese military capabilities as well as domestic politics forces Japan to re-calibrate its relationship with the US.

    The US military bases in Okinawa made sense before China entered the top four largest economies in the world.
    Japan the creditor nation has reached an inflexion point in its relationship with a US debtor nation and former patron.

    US insistence on the status quo is irrational and cannot be sustained because the world has changed.
    The US needs to cognitively accept its limits as a former hegemon and feel comfortable with its new role as peer rather than patron to Japan.

    It can be argued the UK is still adjusting to its diminished role in light of its support for US foreign policy.

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