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Xi Jinping, factionalism, merit, and dealing with China's political leadership

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Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is currently in the middle of a two-week trip to Bangladesh, Laos, Australia and New Zealand, has been doing a lot of traveling recently. Who is Xi Jinping, and what does his rise say about China’s political system and how to engage with it?

The answers to these questions lie in Xi Jinping’s domestic factional ties, his experience in Chinese government, his merit and their impact on his rise to the top.

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The factional ties of top Chinese politicians receive relatively little attention, but they play an important role in shaping Chinese domestic and foreign policy. At the time of his 2009 appointment to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, China’s chief decision-making body, Xi Jinping was widely regarded by observers of Chinese politics as aligned with the ‘Shanghai faction’ and the ‘princeling faction.’ His membership of both of these groupings played an important role in his advancement.

The ‘Shanghai faction’ is headed by former Chinese President Jiang Zemin. In the past, the Shanghai faction has advocated economic liberalism and pushed development of China’s eastern coastal provinces. Thus, while serving as Prime Minister, Shanghai faction member Zhu Rongji energetically promoted China’s accession to the WTO, and President Jiang Zemin pushed the development of Shanghai. Yet the Shanghai faction is neither overtly politically conservative or overtly reformist.

As to Xi Jinping’s ties to the Shanghai faction, in China’s Rulers – The Secret Files, Bruce Gilley and Andrew Nathan reveal that Xi Jinping was added to the Central Committee of the CCP as an over-quota member, relying upon the support of Jiang Zemin. As the Standing Committee of the Politburo is drawn from the ranks of the Central Committee, this patronage was important in giving Xi Jinping his start. Moreover, immediately prior to his elevation to the Standing Committee, Xi Jinping served as Shanghai party chief.

The ‘princeling faction’ comprises the sons of officials previously influential within the Communist Party. Cheng Li identifies this faction as a major sub-part of the ‘elitist’ faction within the CCP. The faction is generally identified with pragmatic, non-ideological decision-making, and receives support from within the middle class.

Xi Jinping is a princeling because his father, Xi Zhongxun, was the influential founder of a Chinese guerilla army based in the Northwest of China during the period leading up to the CCP’s capture of power in 1949. Xi Zhongxun subsequently served as governor of Guangdong province. Xi Zhongxun strongly opposed Tiananmen in 1989 and Xi Jinping still visits Hu Yaobang’s home every spring festival.

Despite this pedigree and legendary heritage, Xi Jinping’s early life was hardly privileged – he had to work hard to move up the political ladder. Xi Zhongxun was purged during the Cultural Revolution, and Xi Jinping and his siblings were sent to the country-side, where they grew up in straitened circumstances. Xi overcame these circumstances to qualify for entry to Tsinghua University in the early 1980’s.

Xi’s princeling connections have worked in his favour in two ways. Most obviously, the fact that his father was a prominent party official assisted him when he was making his way up the CCP’s ranks. But Xi’s father’s demotion and exile during the Cultural Revolution also had their benefits. Through his experience as a young man, Xi has cultivated a common touch, which has enhanced his popularity amongst ordinary Chinese citizens.

In addition to his factional memberships, Xi Jinping served as the governor of Fujian and Zhejiang provinces. Xi developed a reputation as an extremely successful governor in each province.

This brief sketch of Xi Jinping’s factional ties and experience in Chinese government highlights three conclusions.

First, factional membership is more fluid now than it was at the beginning of China’s reform period in 1978. Rather than simply being associated with a ‘reformist’ or ‘conservative’ coalition, Xi is a prominent member of two factions, one based upon a shared heritage, and another based largely upon political geography. Factionalism, in part reflecting the decentralised nature of Chinese politics, is increasingly layered and separate from the centre of Chinese politics in Beijing.

Second, merit, and popular appeal, plays a much larger role in the promotion of CCP politicians today than it used to. Xi’s successful governorships of Fujian and Zhejiang, as well as his appeal to ordinary Chinese citizens, were key to his advancement.

Finally, Xi Jinping’s rise bears out Andrew Nathan’s thesis that Chinese elite domestic politics is growing more stable and systematic – there are signs of ‘authoritarian resilience’ with Chinese characteristics. Xi rose to power because he attended one of China’s top universities, allied himself with a powerful cross-section of interests within the CCP, and performed well as governor of two important provinces. Similarly, Li Keqiang, the putative successor to Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, advanced because he was allied to the Communist Youth League Faction, and served with distinction as a provincial governor.

Xi Jinping’s progression through the Chinese political system demonstrates that China is neither monolithic nor simply authoritarian where promotion is driven solely by loyalty to overriding authoritarian imperatives. Although fealty to CCP rule is important, promotion through the ranks in Chinese politics is driven by a dynamic mix of merit, factionalism, and experience.

China’s political system is evolving rapidly but remains on a stable course; it is increasingly contestable; and its policy outcomes have a large measure of predictability if the care is taken to analyse it and engage with it. This is the key message for the international community.

Xi Jinping’s travels abroad are an aspect of China’s evolving political engagement with the international community. They are an important formal step on his way towards the top of the Chinese political system. They are also an important and new opportunity for the international community to engage with the political system in China. Although this engagement is unlikely to change the way Chinese politics works today, it could well shape the way it works down the track.

6 responses to “Xi Jinping, factionalism, merit, and dealing with China’s political leadership”

  1. An interesting piece, although perhaps there is not enough evidence to make any of the conclusions you do. To wit:

    Xi overcame these circumstances to qualify for entry to Tsinghua University in the early 1980’s.
    To begin, his bio seems to indicate he first became a party secretary in 1981, and I always thought that he went to Tsinghua in the 70s. But more importantly, what, exactly, did he “overcome” to get into Tsinghua? Reference? Any piece of evidence to back this up? It seems disingenuous to claim he is both a princeling and somehow “overcame” hardship. He undoubtedly went through great personal hardship, as did many CHinese people, during the CR. But you simultaneously big up his father’s influence in the 80s (he “opposed Tiananmen”/ you imply that he was incredibly tight with HYB), but then act as if Xi “overcame” hardship to get into the best Uni in China?

    Given that this is part of the reason you claim his rise shows “his merit”, this is a fairly significant point.

    Xi has cultivated a common touch, which has enhanced his popularity amongst ordinary Chinese citizens.
    What do you mean by common touch? What makes him different from any other taizideng member? This reads like something from the China Daily bio section, and doesn’t explore at all the nature of factionalism- surely you need to specify how Xi’s common touch works and how it is different from other princelings?

    Moreover, your article reads like you are attributing this vague “common touch” to his experiences during the CR- surely every princeling, by definition, went through a pretty rough time during the CR!

    Xi developed a reputation as an extremely successful governor in each province.
    How? What did he do? Growth rates/accomplishments? And what about the corruption/smuggling scandals in his earlier period in Fujian? Indeed, you talk about Nathan’s book later on- surely you saw the part in the same book where they talked about how he had to be rescued by the SH clique because he was so badly tarred from his early time in FJ? Xi is occasionally pitched as a bit of a lightweight due to these reasons- it seems a bit insulting to the reader to just say he was “extremely successful”. I think the reader will need you to convince them of his accomplishments rather than taking as given that they exist, particularly as you base almost all of your conclusions on this “fact”.

    Factionalism, in part reflecting the decentralised nature of Chinese politics, is increasingly layered and separate from the centre of Chinese politics in Beijing.
    This didn’t make sense- what do you mean by “separate”? As in factionalism is now less important to governing? If so, how? And what led to that shift? Given that you seem to also argue for the seminal nature of factionalism in China, this sentence didn’t really make sense to me.

    Second, merit, and popular appeal, plays a much larger role in the promotion of CCP politicians today than it used to. Xi’s successful governorships of Fujian and Zhejiang, as well as his appeal to ordinary Chinese citizens, were key to his advancement.
    See my comments on this above- I really don’t think you have made this case anywhere near well enough earlier on to be drawing on it as a “conclusion”. Where’s the proof of his merit or popular appeal? Evidence?

    Finally, Xi Jinping’s rise bears out Andrew Nathan’s thesis that Chinese elite domestic politics is growing more stable and systematic – there are signs of ‘authoritarian resilience’ with Chinese characteristics.
    I am not sure that having a rise through factional ranks links with authoritarian resilience. It shows authoritarian entrenchment, in that he is well established in the party (also highlighted by his work as head of the Central Party School). Yet authoritarian resilience as a concept involves the CCP’s legitimacy growing through acceptance of its authoritarian rule by the people (usually argued as being reversed from Huntington’s ideas due to the middle class having far greater benefits from growth).

    So, what about Xi’s rise says anything at all about the legitimacy of the CCP? Surely the rise of XJP hurts the legitimacy of the CCP- corruption? Nepotism? Reaction of the middle class to this? Authoritarian resilience is not just about the resilience of factions within the CCP; it is about the reaction of the polity and the people to the governance of the CCP, and their reaction to perceptions of the legitimacy of the CCP. It’s a bit trite to say that just because the CCP likes XJP (which is sort of teleological anyway) CHina is becoming more stable- surely you need to take account of the wishes of the people

    China’s political system is evolving rapidly but remains on a stable course; it is increasingly contestable; and its policy outcomes have a large measure of predictability if the care is taken to analyse it and engage with it.
    So, a rich kid with an incredibly famous dad, supported firstly by a formerly super-powerful faction that is now on the decline, has risen to the stage where we think he will be promoted again to become top dog, although we actually aren’t totally sure because he didn’t get made head of the military sub-committee the same time HJT did. In addition, we know none of his policies, ideological commitments or thoughts on how he, as the paramount leader of the 5th generation, will change things from current HJT thought. In fact, we know just about nothing about him about from his personal bio, and that he likes much heftier security arrangements than the Kiwis do. And this means we have a LARGE measure of predictability about what is going to happen??!

  2. Fan,
    Thanks for your lengthy response. I’ll try to deal with the criticisms one by one:

    As an overall caveat before beginning, many of your criticisms stem from this being an 800 word article, which briefly summarizes the career of an individual politician and goes on to make some general points about the Chinese political system as a result. At times, I made the judgment that it was better to present a succinct form of the evidence rather than telling Xi Jinping’s conclusive life story. This is the nature of contributing to a shorter policy forum. But as will hopefully be made clear by the arguments below, my article is based upon further research that supports the general points made.

    First, you are correct to state that Xi Jinping attended Tsinghua University in the late 1970’s. This was an oversight, but it actually strengthens the case that Xi ‘overcame’ adversity. Dealing first with the general point, as you state, like any person sent down to the countryside during the CR, Xi would have suffered hardship, and attended educational institutions generally of weaker quality than those available in the city.

    But as Xi Jinping’s father was not a favored party official during the CR, he may have found it even more difficult to gain entry into a university. This would be particularly true in the mid-to-late 1970’s (as opposed to the early 1980’s). The mid-to-late 1970’s were a climate where Tsinghua and Beijing universities were only just recovering from the anti-intellectualism of the CR, and when Xi was attempting to gain entry, the ‘gang of four’ was still influential. As Xi Zhongxun was purged during the CR, it is fair to conclude that Xi Jinping’s ‘princeling’ connections would not necessarily have helped him to gain entrance to university at this time.

    This explanation should make it clear that it is not inconsistent, or disingenuous, to argue that, on the one hand, Xi overcame hardship in the late 1970’s, while, on the other hand, his father had a strong relationship with Hu Yaobang in the 1980’s. As I point out in the article, Xi Jinping’s heritage has been helpful at times. It was not necessarily helpful when he was trying to get into university.

    Second, as to your point about the ‘common touch,’ it may or may not read like something from the pages of the China Daily, but it remains a significant strength. In China’s rulers, the secret files,’ Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley quote an observer in Xiamen describing Xi as being ‘modest, full of ideas, hard-working, unpretentious.’ By drawing attention to this assessment, I am not attempting to ‘endorse’ Xi Jinping. But I think that these qualities are worth pointing out, and it is fair to say that they have assisted him in gaining some popularity amongst ordinary Chinese people.

    In an article with limited space, it is difficult to analyze in great detail how this ‘common touch’ differentiates him from other possible princeling leadership candidates, if at all. Probably all princelings went through a hard time during the CR. But this is not the point – they are not the putative successor to Hu Jintao. In any political system, a variety of factors will cause a particular person to be politically successful. I am not saying that Xi’s personal style is the only factor aiding his ascension to the top. But Xi Jinping’s relatively unpretentious style has certainly helped him to become successful in a system where a leader’s ability to ’emote’ and reflect the wishes of ordinary citizens is increasingly important. (witness Wen Jiabao’s popularity compared to Hu Jintao after the Sichuan earthquakes).

    Third, your point about ‘success’ is a valid one. I should have made more clear that in China’s political system success or merit is not defined in the same way as in democracies, where voters have the chance to turf out leaders they do not agree with. In China, merit means being able obtain strong growth to obtain the acquiescence of ordinary citizens while ensuring that the party retains its grip upon power.

    Using this expanded definition, one part of Xi Jinping’s success was that he was able to maintain strong growth in the coastal provinces. But another part was that he was able to keep his nose relatively clean from the Xiamen corruption scandal. The first aspect of his success relates to his achievements for ‘ordinary citizens’. The second relates to his achievements for the party. So Xi was indeed successful, and this success enabled him to advance. But ‘success’ is not the same as praiseworthy behaviour.

    In my defence, I don’t think that this failure to define success detracts from the overall point of the article, which is that China’s political system is becoming more predictable and stable. Predictability and stability do not necessarily mean that you have to agree with the way that success is measured in the system. It just means that you can identify it, and so identify one of the metrics for the promotion of elite politicians. Indeed, in his article setting up the descriptive theory of authoritarian resilience, Nathan makes it clear that the authoritarian resilience is not a welcome development from the point of view of someone interested in developing Chinese civil and political rights.

    Fourth, as to your point about the ‘separate’ factionalism sentence, my argument is that factionalism is not about the personalities at the top of the Chinese political tree in Beijing. Xi Jinping belongs to the Shanghai faction, which is a faction based upon location, and the princeling faction, which is a faction based upon heritage. These factions will continue to exist at some level regardless of who is in power. Thus, factionalism in China is decentralized, and separate from Beijing. This is not an argument that factionalism is any less important.

    I have answered the point about merit above.

    As to the point about ‘authoritarian resilience,’ you have misstated the idea of authoritarian resilience. It is a specific idea of Professor Andrew Nathan’s, which is why I have linked to his submission to the US House of Representatives. As explained Nathan in his article in the Journal of Democracy (2003) 14(1), the idea of authoritarian resilience involves norm-bound succession politics, an increase in merit as opposed to factionalism in promotion, the functional specialization of institutions within China, and an increase in grass-roots political participation. So authoritarian resilience does not involve “the CCP’s legitimacy growing through acceptance of its authoritarian rule by the people.” Instead, in short, it involves a mixture of internal CCP stability, and external acceptance of CCP by the people.

    Xi Jinping has risen broadly because he has maintained the confidence of the CCP, and he has maintained the confidence of the people. His factional alliances have been important. But so has his record as governor. In addition, his personal style has helped him.

    Obviously, the question of further grass-roots participation by ordinary citizens is not germane to this article, which pertains to elite politics, not local politics. Village Elections, for example, are a dimension of China’s institutional development which Nathan argues further legitimizes the CCP in the eyes of the public. Elite politics, by contrast, only indirectly involves the grass-roots participation of ordinary citizens (i.e. in Xi Jinping’s case – he kept the citizens of Zhejiang and Fujian relatively happy by maintaining strong growth).

    But Xi Jinping’s rise broadly bears out the aspects of Andrew Nathan’s thesis relevant to elite politics – the relative importance of merit v factionalism, and norm-bound succession. To forestall another objection, Nathan does not argue that authoritarian resilience means the death of factionalism, and Xi Jinping’s rise is evidence that factionalism is still important. But as Cheng Li has pointed out, factionalism within the CCP is now more constrained than in previous years. And as made clear above, it is not as dependent upon individual personalities in Beijing.

    It is fair to object, as I presume you are doing, that there may not be a ‘large’ amount of policy predictability as a result of this analysis. But Xi Jinping’s career can be seen as something of a microcosm of the factors driving the promotion of elite Chinese politicians. As argued above, promotion involves merit, experience, and factional membership. My argument is that if we are able to examine the interaction of these forces, and the experience of individual politicians, we will be better able to predict the policy preferences of these individuals, and, by extension, the Chinese State.

    Thanks,
    Dom

  3. Hi,

    So, I will just quickly go through your response, and then after that I can bore you offline perhaps.

    Your points one and two remain unproven (“his heritage may have…”), and this is the crux of my problem with those two points: there isn’t really any evidence. I am not saying that this is due to a lack of research, I am more saying that in the absence of evidence, it seems a bit rich to base conclusions like yours of “merit, and popular appeal, plays a much larger role in the promotion of CCP politicians today”. If you are going to argue that merit and popular appeal “play a larger role”, then there is the expectation that this is based on some empirical evidence, and in this case, not only is there none, but in the case of his academic record, as I argued already, what you had didn’t seem right. Indeed, everything we seem to have is a bit sketchy (continuing the education theme, the random story of how his Master’s suddenly magically became a Doctorate for example), and thus it is very hard to draw the conclusions you do. I am sure this evidence exists within his file in the Organisation Dept. (and indeed, evidence from said file is the only thing you cite in defence of any of your claims, and we only know that tidbit thanks to Nathan and Gilley being leaked the secret files 10 years ago). The problem is that in the absence of other evidence your entire argument becomes tautological- How do we know XJP has merit? He was promoted. How do we know that the CCP will be more predictable in its policies? Because they promote according to merit. How do we know they promote according to merit? Look at XJP!

    Secondly, I note that you now have broadened your idea of merit to now being “In China, merit means being able obtain strong growth to obtain the acquiescence of ordinary citizens while ensuring that the party retains its grip upon power.” Yet your article argues that “China’s political system is evolving rapidly… is increasingly contestable; and its policy outcomes have a large measure of predictability”. The need to obtain growth whilst still ensuring the maintenance of power is in and of itself anathemic to contestability and predictability. This is the crux of my problem with your use of Nathan’s framework to then draw broader claims- you are trying to use a model of elite politics to make claims of growing contestability and predictability in the system without any real evidence backing it up. It’s fine to use Nathan’s model to show that ascension to the top of the leadership remains relatively pre-ordained and predictable. You can, at a pinch, argue that the growth in non-personality based factions may be leading to more contestation of political matters at the elite level, although it is a pretty short straw given the lack of information we have about contestation at the elite level (personally, I think it seems ridiculous to argue it is more contestable, but my argument would be based on things lower down in the system than Zhongnanhai level). But to then claim that this makes the “policy outcomes” more predictable- huh? We don’t have access to the elite debates. We don’t know how people are promoted, and we barely even know what promotion is based on (for example, Zhu Shukai’s accounts of the points system used by the Org Dept. don’t totally line up with Edin’s, whose don’t totally line up with Whiting’s). We don’t know (indeed, the CCP probably doesn’t know- there just isn’t the homogeneity across China one imagines) the thoughts of the populace in reaction to the greater entrenchment of CCP rule. “Policy outcomes” involve an interaction with the populace, no matter which way you cut them, as you acknowledge in your response, and predicting them requires a far more synthesised framework than one of authoritarian adaptation to change (or, if you use Nathan’s formulation its “resilience”).

    Indeed, I note also that your response concludes with your claim that “my argument is that if we are able to examine the interaction of these forces, and the experience of individual politicians, we will be better able to predict the policy preferences of these individuals, and, by extension, the Chinese State.” I think that the key word there is “if”. But that “if” is surely far too big, particularly to make claims about policy outcomes as you do. We don’t know the experiences, nor the interactions, nor the information enough to give us any form of policy predictions. We can make some brief systemic claims of what we know about the CCP’s entrenchment in the system, and some claims about their ability to confront challenges of modernity and growth whilst still maintaining the system as it is, but apart from that…? Even those claims are difficult to make with any form of consequence, based as they are on proxy indicators and differing historical interpretations. How have you shown how any of these forces interact? How can you?

    Finally, you note this as a problem of a cutdown piece- my problem is not that there is not enough space for details. I am also not trying to say that a blog is meant to be perfect (http://xkcd.com/386/). My point is rather that no-one really knows what’s going on very well, there is an enormous lack of evidence and thus, based on the frameworks you are using, the conclusions you are drawing are far too broad and unproven. I concur that greater examination of these forces would be optimal, and it is great that you wrote something about it. Moreover, yes, the ascension of Xi Jinping highlights that ascension from being the chosen one to then being at the top in elite Chinese politics is relatively predictable. I just find it inconceivable that the take home message for the international community could possibly be that policy outcomes are predictable.

    Cheers

  4. Fan,
    You make two main points; that there is not enough evidence for the conclusions drawn, and that it is hard to argue for increased policy predictability by only concentrating on elite politics.

    I think the evidence provided in the piece, and the supplementary reply, sustains the argument that Xi Jinping’s rise to the top involved a combination of merit and factionalism. To suggest that it is ‘sketchy’ by reference to the fact that Xi Jinping’s education was internally assessed ignores other aspects discussed. On your suggestion that my argument is circular, merit and factionalism also played in to Li Keqiang’s career, as others have argued (see for example Lynne White on Li’s rise to power). I looked at the case of Xi: the point of the piece is generally applicable.

    Clearly elite politics is not the only factor driving policy outcomes in China. But the way in which elite politicians are promoted and the choices that they make along the way nonetheless shapes their choices in power. Even if you take the position that policy outcomes in China largely originate from the bottom of the system rather than from the top, you cannot deny the influence of elite politicians. The point of this piece, and where I differ from you, is that if attention is paid to the process by which these politicians are promoted, which has become more predictable, the international community will be better able to predict the outcomes of decisions that are to be made by these leaders.

    Happy to continue to debate/discuss this offline.

    Dominic

  5. The comment of Dominic on Xi Jiping is really interesting.

    I would agree definitely with his inclusion in the Princelings faction and the connections with the Shanghai faction that ease its way to the top. It seems that Mr Jiang Zemin is still active in the back-stage of Chinese politics and maneuvering its own men, an influence that some commentators presumed already vanished by Mr. Hu Jintao staunch leadership.

    If this is confirmed, we may have a remake of Deng Xiaoping succession we told in Zhao Ziyang biography “Prisoner of State” – a circle of senior leaders monitoring the ascent of the new generation of leaders. Although consensual and benign, Mr Xi profile is hardly divorced from a traditional communist leader appointed to functions of leadership.

    In the Leninist tradition it is the collective (the Politburo) who directs and defines the strategy and the path, as we might have in a Board of Management of any Multinational Corporation. But for what we can guess by his international profile and maneuvering, Mr. Xi is still hiding his ambitions and plans because the decision process is not yet decided and in two years (till the 18th Congress) a lot of things can happen.

    How fond he is to the ideological line of the party that after so many years he is returning to the scene? How does he match in the notorious ambitions of a Chinese leadership of the space of Marxism coming increasingly from internal documents of the CCP?

  6. An excellent article. The point-counterpoint nature of the comments provided additional information of a nature not usually found in the media. I have nothing to add, but wanted to take a brief moment to thank the author, Fan and Mr. Goncalves for your insights. It is very unfortunate that such insightful information, provided in a respectful tone, is not more readily available. I will definitely be visiting the East Asia Forum more often. My thanks to the three of you.

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