Police have since revealed that the Aceh cell contained at least 40 people and they believe another 30 or so were part of the broader support network. One of those whom police are pursuing is Umar Patek, a close associate of Dulmatin and another member of the 2002 Bali bombing operation, who is thought to have been involved with the Aceh cell. Patek has a $US1million reward for his capture.

These developments are significant for a number of reasons. First, Aceh, despite its long and bloody separatist insurgency between the late 1970s and 2005, has not previously been a site of Islamist terrorism. Indeed, earlier attempts by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other jihadist groups to cultivate relations with Acehnese insurgents had been rebuffed, and the province was regarded as a hostile site for recruitment and training. The emergence of this terrorist cell in Aceh, which reportedly was formed in late 2009, represents a disturbing development in a province which has been largely peaceful since the 2005 peace agreement.

Second, police have blamed JI for the formation of this cell. The National Police Chief, Bambang Hendarso Danuri, for example, stated, ‘It [the terrorist cell] is purely Jemaah Islamiyah. The network is up to something in Aceh’. This emphatic linking of JI to the Aceh cell is surprising given that, in recent years, most terrorism analysts (and seemingly the Indonesian police, as well) have concluded that

JI itself is no longer directly engaged in terrorist activities and that all the major bombings since 2004 have been the work of a JI splinter group led by the Malaysian Noordin Mohammad Top, which is operating without the knowledge or approval of JI’s board. Moreover, sections of the media have reported that Dulmatin returned to Indonesia from his refuge in the southern Philippines in early 2009 and had been given protection by JI’s central leadership to initiate new jihadist operations in Indonesia (Jawa Pos, 11 March 2010).

So why has Aceh suddenly emerged as a terrorist site, and has JI indeed returned to active terrorism? It is too early to answer either question categorically, as information about the Aceh cell and Dulmatin’s role remains patchy and sometimes contradictory.

With regard to the ‘why Aceh and why now?’ questions, some provisional responses can be ventured. Those arrested in Aceh for involvement in this cell come from various backgrounds. Some were long-standing jihadists who had been involved in other terrorist actions. The Java-based Darul Islam-affiliated group known as the Banten Ring is one such important source of cell members. The Ring’s leader, Kang Jaja, was one of those shot dead by police in Aceh, and his brother Saptono is seen as a possible leader of the cell. The Banten Ring has for many years provided a pool of recruits for suicide bombings by JI and Noordin network members, though it remains organisationally separate from both groups. Others in the Aceh cell were disaffected local officials and former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) fighters. Their disaffection has two elements: anger at economic marginalisation and exclusion from the rewards of power that have flowed to former GAM leaders after the peace deal; and disapproval of the provincial government’s reluctance to implement comprehensively sharia law. It is likely that the hardened jihadists sought to radicalise these Acehnese and encourage them to see their struggle as part of a broader war against the enemies of Islam, particularly the thoghut (infidel-serving) governments of Aceh and Indonesia.

This combining of hardened jihadists with local radical groups to create new terrorist cells has a number of precedents in recent years, the most notable being the so-called Palembang group in South Sumatra, which had planned to bomb a café frequented by Westerners. They were eventually discovered and arrested by the police. The Palembang group comprised mainly local members of an anti-Christianisation movement who were cultivated by a few members of the Noordin network and trained in bomb-making and covert operations.

This brings us to the issue of JI’s involvement. It is clear that the Indonesian police are incorrect to state that this is a ‘purely Jemaah Islamiyah’ operation. The presence of Darul Islam jihadists and former

GAM troops proves this. But does the involvement of Dulmatin and Umar Patek, both sworn JI members, put that organisation at the heart of this terrorist operation? In other words, although the Aceh cell may not be exclusively JI’s, was that organisation central to its existence? The answer to this remains unclear at this stage. Most available evidence suggests that Dulmatin and Umar Patek had been operating outside the command structure of JI for about six years, though Umar Patek may still consider himself part of the JI community. If the JI leadership did indeed protect Dulmatin and Patek and allow them to mount terrorist operations, it would contradict much of what we know about JI’s recent attitudes to bombings and other kinds of terrorist attacks.

Since 2003, JI appears to have been led by jihadists who believe that bombings against civilians and Westerners have been counterproductive to the organisation and its central objective of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia. Hence, they have sought to prevent members from joining further Bali bombing-style attacks. This is not to rule out the possibility of JI complicity, but rather to say there are grounds for scepticism.

The indications are that Dulmatin was indeed heavily involved in this operation and he is known to have remained committed to militant jihadism while in the Philippines. He was quite capable of using non- JI jihadist networks for launching the Aceh cell. The apparent speed with which Dulmatin and his associates were able to form a lethal terrorist group in Aceh, which had the capacity to inflict such heavy casualties on the police, is further evidence that violent jihadism in Indonesia is capable of taking new forms and drawing on hitherto non-jihadi communities in mounting operations.

 

Greg Fealy is a Fellow and Senior Lecturer in the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University.