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China and climate change in the post-Copenhagen era

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In Brief

The problem of anthropogenic climate change has become increasingly evident. The IPCC’s Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report shows the global surface temperature increased 0.74 °C in the past 100 years (1906-2005), mostly because of the impact of greenhouse gas emissions. More drastically, China's National Assessment Report on Climate Change predicts that average temperatures in China will rise by 2-3 °C over the next 50-80 years if no action is taken. Even if one is not completely convinced by the science, the likelihood of climate change occurring means that the most prudent course is to take action. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit illustrates, most nation-states have already begun to take action.

An examination of China’s response to climate change shows that such action has had, and will continue to have, many serious consequences, both domestically and internationally.

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It is first necessary to state that climate change is not just an environmental issue but an economic and political one impacting on the domestic and foreign affairs of all nations. International climate negotiations aim primarily to combat the climate crisis and enhance global environment protection. But the negotiations are also related to international competition in energy innovation and economic development, and, on a deeper level, involve the distribution and transfer of power within the international system. Ongoing negotiations may even herald the creation of a new international system. The great powers have already started to adjust their national strategies so as to attempt to full advantage of these circumstances.

For China, the negotiations are a complex event, with numerous advantages and disadvantages. Optimistically speaking, climate change is an opportunity for China to accelerate its economic development by developing low-carbon technology and investing in the existing renewable energy market. Further, the climate negotiations offer China the chance to convey its values to other nations by constructing a responsible power image.

But the recent Copenhagen summit has also left China with numerous internal and external challenges.

At the domestic level, finding the proper equilibrium between economic growth and tackling climate change remains a significant issue. As the world’s largest developing country with a population of 1.3 billion, development is still China’s foremost priority. At the same time, emissions reduction necessarily means slower economic growth because China lacks funds, low-carbon technology, and managerial expertise. Prior to the Copenhagen summit, the Chinese government voluntarily announced that, by 2020, it would reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP to 40-45 per cent of 2005 levels. This is a planned reduction of approximately 1.5 billion tons that would necessarily be detrimental for the speed of China’s domestic development.

Having made this commitment, China faces great pressure to upgrade its existing industries and obtain a new energy supply. From the perspective of enterprise, meeting the national emission reduction standards means that those plants with high levels of production output and high energy consumption must allocate special funds to emissions reduction. This involves higher production costs, which may in turn erode competitiveness. In sum, reducing emissions necessitates nothing short of a massive economic and social transformation of the Chinese state.

At the international level, China’s rise has been challenged not only by some industrialised countries with sophisticated low-carbon technologies, but also by developing countries with eco-environmental vulnerability. As a developing country with high carbon emissions, China upholds the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. Unhappy with this response, some developed countries have attempted to impose extra obligations, such as emission verification, on China which in turn triggered many diplomatic problems. The Copenhagen summit is only the beginning of these problems: there will be much more uncertainty affecting China’s international relations in the future.

All in all, if China actually fulfills its commitments, the Copenhagen summit could be seen as a turning point of great significance. China may ultimately gain more if it is active in the fight against climate change, but this activity presents many short-term and long-term challenges. In rising to these challenges, it is vital that China exerts great efforts to build an industrial system and consumption pattern with low carbon emissions, and cooperates closely with all developed and developing countries.

Xiujun Xu is Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Institute of World Economics and Politics at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

his article was as an entry in the recent EAF Emerging Scholars competition.

5 responses to “China and climate change in the post-Copenhagen era”

  1. Copenhagen has generated many interesting claims, debates and results.

    For example, we all know that Australia has just got a new Prime Minister. Some analysts attribute the starting point of the demise of the previous Prime Minister to Copenhagen.

    Clearly the Copenhagen outcome was a blow to the former Prime Minister Mr Kevin Rudd, already struggled and unable to get his domestic CPRS legislation passed the senate.

    No wonder it was reported he had foul words for China.

    Back to China, what really occurred and what was China’s stance then at Copenhagen?

    It was reported that China even didn’t want the developed world to agree or set reduction targets, why?

    If China sets a target or reduction in energy intensity by 40-45% by 2020 from 2005, why did and does it not want or agree that to be verified, if other countries are to be under the same verification regime?

    What does the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ really mean and how to implement it in practice?

    Why hasn’t China adopted the principle of equal per capita of emission right and a proper international compensation regime based on that principle in its approach in its international climate change policy and negotiations?

    Under that regime, the net costs to China may be just its own action to meet its own international obligation, while industrialised countries will need pay most low emission developing countries for emissions above the allowed or agreed per capita average global level.

    In that way, a simple, objective and reasonably fair framework can be achieved.

  2. Funny that Australia’s new PM has promised not change any of the current policy. And no matter she decides to change or not, it has no relationship with China’s climate protection princeples. China has it’s own reason to upgrade it’s industral structure, among which, accpeting the “reduction targets schedule” is the most dangerous one. The US and Europe has benefited enough from the second industry during 20th centry, but 1.5 billion Chinese have to rely on it, an urgent stop of these not-so-advanced plants may cause the half country lose their jobs, then a much severer crisis will strike the world. If anyone what China to take the obligation of saving the world, he or she should bear in mind that China has to feed it’s own people first, the climate factor is very important, but not the formost.

  3. Lincoln, you just hope that China can do more, but what do you think of what developed countries have contributed to the negotiations? Have they done enough? Combating against climate change is a common cause and it needs all parties, especially the developed ones to participate.
    To promote the success of the Copenhagen Conference, China not only made great commitments, but has also undertaken many measures to realise them. At Copenhagen, contrary to the UK Climate Secretary Ed Miliband’s claim that China ‘hijacked’ the conference, the later made great concessions and tried to preserve the dual tracks of the post-2012 negotiation, which enables a broad participation of countries such as US in the negotiating process and is one of the basis for the successful constructons of future climate regime.
    The only lesson we got from the Copenhangen Conference is that we cannot give up the Protocol and establish a new, single and legally-binging agreement, and the Copenhagen Accord cannot be regarded as a great step because it has no positions in the UNFCCC process.
    As to the MRV, how many deveopled parties have their promises MRV, How could you expect that China should? Under what grounds?

  4. You sometimes hear it said that environmental concerns will lead us to a new era of international cooperation. That prophecy never seemed very plausible, and post-Copenhagen, it looks less plausible than ever.

    Now the next concern: if Europe moves to carbon restrictions today – and China or even the United States opt not to follow, or to follow at a slower pace – will carbon tariffs follow tomorrow?

    Complying with carbon restrictions will be costly, and those countries that impose such restrictions on their industries or farmers will wonder why non-compliers should gain a competitive advantage in this way. Environmental disagreement could thus lead to trade conflict.

    Meanwhile, an increasingly self-confident China may use its new creditor clout to defy international pressures – or possibly to bend the whole international order to its own will. China remains a surprisingly isolated country. The quoted story makes clear that Sudan was one of China’s main mouthpieces at Copenhagen, a sorry statement in itself. You’d think money could buy China a better class of friend. But that may be only a matter of time and accumulation.

  5. First to address Davis Gao’s points, I am afraid you probably missed and misunderstood my point. I did not say or argue that I hope China does more than it has said it would do and I don’t know how you got that impression. Further my point is about a simple and fair principle and framework that can be used to get an international agreement on global actions on climate change and that does not disadvantage any countries including China which may act alone in advance irrespective other countries act or not. My framework is totally consistent with the principle of “common differentiated responsibilities” that, I understood, is China’s public stance.

    Second, while I have sympathy for the thrust of admin city’s main argument, I think China can and should take actions together with all other countries based on a practical, pragmatic and effective application of the principle of “common differentiated responsibilities”, rather than arguing for that principle without an effective and fair framework to make that principle stronger to argue and to implement. Again, I think my framework should provide the necessary ingredients for any and every reasonable country, rich or poor to accept.

    Third, Mariyas’ speculation appears to ignore and to be contradictory to the fact that China has announced an ambitious action plan of reducing its energy intensity by 40-45% by 2020 from the 2005 level unilaterally even though its stage of economic development (if based on past experiences) requires much higher energy intensity now and its per capita emissions are much lower than most industrialised countries, especially the US. As in my first comments, I asked the question what had occurred at Copenhagen. Your further speculation does not seem to be helpful and is more confusing and misleading. Frankly speaking, that is not the right way to advance the climate change cause.

    However, I do agree with countries taking actions in reducing emissions should not be punished. But we should also realise and acknowledge that without actions now it’s the industrialised countries that are emitting much more per capita CO2 into the atmosphere every day and every moment. That itself is not fair, is it?

    We need and should be fair to everyone. To achieve that, we must adopt a fair framework to avoid unnecessary and distorted arguments.

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