He swiftly moved to have Australia sign the Kyoto Protocol. And Rudd, among all global leaders, had a surer grasp of Chinese affairs than any major political leader outside China, when that is a political commodity in drastic short supply at a time of great need. In dealings with China he communicated with dignity and uniquely in the Chinese language. He had the correct strategic sense of how urgent it was to begin re-crafting arrangements in Asia and the Pacific to provide greater opportunity for dialogue on political as well as economic affairs in a way that comprehends the huge transformation of economic and political power that is taking place in our region.
These were impressive international political assets, and unquestionably huge assets for Australia. And, at home, he brought leadership to reconciliation with indigenous Australians and set in motion a substantial social and reform agenda. Rudd’s achievements in his short tenure in office were undoubtedly considerable.
Objective analysis suggests that Rudd was poised to win the next election, due within the next six months or so, despite a big drop in popular support driven by gaffs in the implementation of expansionary spending programs, a reversal of course on climate policy and questions of leadership style and process. The truth is that these questions provided the opening for factional powerbrokers within the governing Labor Party, in which Rudd had no permanent factional base, to settle scores. And amid the political uncertainties a sudden fracture of trust between Rudd and his Deputy led her to seize the unexpected prize.
Prime Minister Gillard is a very talented and polished political leader. There are likely to be few fundamental changes in Australian foreign policy direction. Rudd has chosen to continue in play. His foreign policy initiatives and big international diplomatic goals, in relation to China (of which Ms Gillard has a very sure grasp), climate change and regional architecture, are matters of deep foreign policy strategy that will not change and on which Rudd’s talents are likely deployed in some way.
The transfer of leadership has cut the Australian Prime Minister out of the G20 Summit in Toronto, where Rudd was also due to have important bilateral discussions with President Obama. That is a pity and an important cost to Australia’s national interests of the events of the last week in Canberra.
Peter Drysdale is Editor of the East Asia Forum.
Sir,
Although Mr. Rudd possessed an enormous amount of experience with regard to the Chinese language and internal workings of the People’s Republic, it should be acknowledged that this did not readily translate to a deeper engagement with China. This shortcoming comes at a time when China’s international profile, and importance to Australia’s future, is becoming increasingly prominent.
I understand where this comment is coming from, given the problems in the relationship last year, but it is a very peculiar comment in the context of the development of the relationship that was symbolised by the visit of Vice President Xi last week and all that flowed, and will flow, from it. Rudd dealt with with growing challenges in China’s relationships with Australia and the world at the different level from how they were dealt with before. The comment also sits oddly against what are very widely held public perceptions in China of what Rudd achieved for the relationship. It is a comment that just does not stack up against the facts.
Peter Drysdale
Sir,
Perhaps I should further elucidate the point I was attempting to raise. The visit of Vice President Xi, alongside the address to President Hu Jintao at APEC 2007, constituted definitive highs of Sino-Australian relations under Kevin Rudd’s tenure.
However, these victories were isolated events in the context of Rudd’s management of the Australia-China relationship. The Defence White Paper (2009), which called for a build-up of Australian naval capabilities in the face of an unnamed aggressor (but the implication was China), hamstrung deeper relations between the two nations. Moreover, the Stern Hu detention, the decision to grant a visa to Ms. Kadeer and Rudd’s (leaked) comment that the Chinese were attempting to “ratf**k” a deal at Copenhagen were undoubtedly deleterious to the relationship. Anecdotal evidence further suggests Rudd raised the ire of China. After his 2008 speech at Beijing University, which raised the issue of Tibet, he did not deliver another speech on China until this year. The visit from Vice President Xi, in and of itself, does not “reset” the relationship. Sino-Japanese ties demonstrate that the Chinese have long memories.
I appreciate that certain events can be utilised to support our respective positions. However, I believe that the little progress made over contentious issues in the Australia-China relationship, such as investment or regional security, demonstrate the gap between Rudd’s ambition and reality.
The assertion that the product Xi’s visit (and Li’s earlier) were isolated events, measured equally with others on the diplomatic scorecard, is a naïve metric whereby to measure impact in the relationship. All facts are not equal – and some in the preceding comment are quite wrong. And none elucidate the impact of Rudd at the other end of the relationship, about which I’ve been in extensive conversation over the last 4 days. Time will judge, but presently I remain comfortable with my assessment of the impact of Kevin Rudd’s Prime Ministership on the relationship with China. We’ve begun to deal with the relationship on a whole new level and with more sophistication. That does not mean there is not quite a way to go.
Peter Drysdale