As David Webster has pointed out, Papuans as a group have all of the trappings of a nation; a flag, ceremonies, national myths and a sense of ‘us versus them’ ethnicity. In opposition, the central Indonesian government has been trapped by its historical focus upon a cohesive Indonesian native state.
Brief history
Historically, the central Indonesian government adopted a very strong centralist political discourse. In 1969, the Indonesian government proclaimed that Papua was a part of Indonesia, and incorporated the territory into the Indonesian state. As Indonesia transitioned to a democracy with the fall of the Suharto regime there was a marked increase in secessionist fervor on the part of East Timorese, Achenese, and Papuans. The newly democratic government was no longer able to use the old mainstay of repression and violence to control secessionist movements, and so adopted a unique array of conflict amelioration techniques; partition for East Timor, autonomy and dialogue for Aceh, and preservation of the status quo for Papua.
At present, a narrative impasse has developed ¾ the Indonesia/Papua conflict has been described as ‘manageable but not solvable.’ Unlike the GAM group in Aceh, which was a direct danger to the Indonesian state, there is no serious Papuan group threat to the Indonesian state. But the current situation is unsustainable. The conflict weakens Indonesia’s legitimacy and ability to govern democratically.
What solutions have been attempted?
A number of accommodative conflict amelioration techniques have been employed since the fall of the Suharto regime. But all six of Indonesia’s Presidents have sung from the same book of national integrity, and have emphasised state cohesion. For these leaders, Papua is understood to be as important a part of the Indonesian nation as any. It has thus been seen as inseparable from the rump state. This approach has obviously failed to solve the conflict.
In 2001 an autonomy package similar to that employed in Aceh, but minus the processes of dialogue and negotiation, was implemented in Papua. Nine years later it has yielded poor results. Citing poor implementation, many analysts and western advocates for Papua, including Rodd McGibbon, have argued that the package shows the need to grant Papua independence.
Neither the Indonesian strategy nor the Western arguments for independence capture the true solution to the Papua/Indonesia conflict. The Indonesian strategy, as previously discussed, has suffered from poor implementation. But the Western obsession with independence is simply unrealistic. It has caused impoverished conversations about peace. Papua has been discredited by this knee-jerk approach where every failure to garner peace is taken to authenticate separatism. On a broader level, the messy politics of state sovereignty versus the developing international law responsibility to protect has rendered the international community incapable of facilitating peace outside of enforcing self-determination.
Dialogue and a new peace process – a durable solution
What is needed to begin solving the Papua/Indonesia conflict is a re-conceptualization of what is meant by the term ‘peace process’. As Druckmans has pointed out, negotiations and peace processes occur in a haphazard not linear fashion. The increasing number of opinion pieces discussing peace options in Indonesian newspapers highlights an unacknowledged reality ¾ many Indonesians harbor sympathies towards Papuans and want a workable solution. This can only propel the resolution of the conflict. Further, as Aspinall has stated, and as the Aceh peace process demonstrates, peace is a learning process ¾ mistakes along the way teach us what is necessary for a sustainable settlement.
The Papua/Indonesia conflict’s greatest chance for resolution lies in processes and conversations. Peace is a process and not an event. This view has prevailed in relation to many other conflicts around the world. It should be given a chance here. And as the Aceh peace process illustrated, negotiation and compromise are the key aspects of any sustainable solution.
Eleanor Kennedy is a recipient of a 2010 Endeavour Research Fellowship.
This article was an entry in the recent EAF Emerging Scholars competition.
The above is misleading and invalid. Indonesia sold mining rights to Freeport in 1967, that was a commercial statement in 1967 that West Papua was an Indonesian possession. There have been Papuan protests since August 1962 to the US drafted deal trading them to Indonesian administration. West Papua had held national elections in January 1961 and it was the elected New Guinea Council which wrote the manifesto of West Papua and designed the Morning Star flag etc on 18 Oct 1961 hours after hearing of the US plan for the UN to trade them to Indonesian rule (the US also offered the UN $200m at the time).
The above claim “Western obsession with independence” is not supported by the facts and ignores the Papuan insistence on independence since 1961. The assertion that independence is “unrealistic” is without supporting argument.
Hi Andrew,
when I say “western obsession with independence” I am not ignoring the long and persistent calls for independence that have been harboured and articulated by certain West Papuan groups. What I mean to highlight is that within the Western world we have a tendency to be blinded by Independence as the only solution to such conflicts. I don’t think independence is likely for Papua or necessarily viable and I am interested in people opening up to new possible avenues to peace. I see the autonomy package which was implemented in Aceh as a good example of this.
My reasons for stating independence is unrealistic is that we are now with a situation where the entire Papuan population are not supportive of independence there are certain groups which are pro and others who are not. I believe independence would be a messy and hard path to pursue. I believe peace can be obtained more easily.