When Kim Jong Il, 68, was consolidating his leadership following the death of his father Kim Il Sung in 1994, he courted the military, rather than the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, to create his power base.
Kim Jong Il’s regime is one of co-existence between his family and the military.
The promotion of Jang Song Thaek, director of the party’s Central Committee administration department, to vice chairman of the National Defence Commission offers an insight. Jang, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, is considered a guardian of sorts to Kim Jong Un. The promotion signaled Kim’s intention of maintaining and strengthening that synergistic relationship.
However, intelligence officials are already pointing to signs of a major power struggle among the core of the leadership elite in Pyongyang.
There has been speculation about increased tensions and confrontation arising from a battle for loyalty between those aligned with Kim Yong Chol, who heads the bureau dealing with special operations vis-a-vis South Korea, and those allied with Jang’s associates.
There have even been rumours that Kim Jong Il is displaying memory impediments.
If the transition process goes ahead too swiftly, Kim Jong Il could become a lame duck leader. That could trigger a power struggle between father and son.
A U.S. administration official handling North Korean affairs said, ‘An extremely dangerous situation is emerging, which is peculiar to the period of power succession. The situation is not unlike what was seen during the 1980s when a bomb exploded and destroyed a Korean Air jet.’
Under this line of thinking, a possible sign of that development was the torpedo attack in March that sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan.
One disturbing aspect of the attack is the likelihood, as pointed out by CIA Director Leon Panetta, that ‘the skirmishes going on are in part related to trying to establish credibility for’ Kim Jong Un with the military.
There is near-unanimous agreement among those working in the intelligence field in Japan, the United States and South Korea that Kim Jong Un himself gave instructions for the torpedo attack and that Kim Jong Un may be even more dangerous than his father.
As for the motive and background of the attack, theories abound.
One is the revenge theory. This states that the attack was in retaliation for an encounter in the Yellow Sea in November 2009 between small navy ships of the two countries.
Intelligence officials in Japan and South Korea believe Kim Yong Chol directly gave the order for the torpedo attack on the Cheonan that killed 46 sailors. Pyongyang wanted to punish ‘the arrogant attitude’ of the administration of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak.
Under a second theory, the attack was part of moves to create a myth around Kim Jong Un and his ‘brilliance’ as a military tactician.
A third theory is closely related to what is described as the prospect theory in psychology, in which unusual action is taken to break through uncertain and negative conditions. This theory states that an attack on the enemy provides a psychological cleansing effect for those living under a dark cloud for too long.
Another theory can be dubbed ‘the Mafia theory.’ A U.S. official handling North Korean intelligence said, ‘While the example may not be a good one, one test of whether an individual is a bona fide Mafia member is whether he can kill people. Similarly, an individual may have tried something dramatic in order to be recognised as a loyal associate of Kim Jong Un.’
Yet another theory points to the need to shore up domestic unity for a successful transfer in leadership and draw public attention away from North Korea’s disastrous attempt at currency denomination last year. The torpedo attack created external tension that could be used to strengthen domestic control.
There is also a theory that while North Korea was set on mounting a sneak attack, it blundered by never giving consideration to the possibility that fragments of the torpedo would be found and traced back to Pyongyang.
The mission may have been shrouded in secrecy, but intelligence officials apparently picked up the movements of North Korean submarines before and after the torpedo attack.
There are also reports of North Koreans living close to the border with China as openly stating the attack was the work of North Korea.
North Korea vehemently denied involvement in the incident in response to condemnation from overseas. But there have been suggestions that the rumour mill in North Korea is claiming a major military victory for Pyongyang.
The biggest diplomatic loser from the incident is China, North Korea’s long-time ally.
It is a case of ‘the tail (North Korea) wagging the dog (China),’ according to John Park, a senior research associate at the United States Institute of Peace.
In early May, when Kim Jong Il visited China, Chinese President Hu Jintao asked him about the incident.
Kim Jong Il replied that Pyongyang was not involved.
China did not respond to overtures from South Korea to assist in a joint investigation of the incident. Beijing apparently felt it had no alternative but to persist with its stance that North Korea was blameless.
For that reason, China has persistently called for caution amid talk of the U.N. Security Council imposing sanctions against North Korea.
There are some in China who perceive North Korea as a strategic liability and are calling for more pressure to be applied on Pyongyang. However, Beijing’s Communist Party leadership cadre is standing adamantly behind North Korea.
Beijing’s approach toward North Korea can be viewed as a Chinese-style sunshine policy that places priority on stability. Conversely, it could reflect China’s fears about the increasing instability of the North Korean regime.
North Korea’s fragility lies in its unique elite structure.
Ken Gause, a research analyst at the U.S. Center for Naval Analyses, said, ‘If the regime loses its ability to placate the elite through goods and services, there is a real chance for the creation of factions.’
Even ‘military warlords’ could emerge, he said.
China has rejected calls to enter into discussions with other countries about North Korea’s ‘instability scenario’ on grounds it would only provoke North Korea and make Northeast Asia more unstable.
However, a high-ranking Chinese government official told me privately that ‘China, Japan and South Korea should consider establishing a forum for an exchange of opinions toward a soft landing by North Korea.’
Perhaps, China is losing confidence in being able to rein in Pyongyang. It is no longer a viable policy to count on China to exert pressure on Pyongyang.
Meanwhile, the United States is moving to reinstitute financial sanctions that were imposed during the administration of President George W. Bush.
However, financial sanctions will directly hurt Kim Jong Il and his family as well as North Korea’s ruling elite.
One high-ranking Pentagon official said, ‘Because of that, unless we are careful, it could trigger a military retaliation from North Korea.’
While some action must be taken in response to the Cheonan incident, it is enormously difficult to calibrate the level of pressure to apply on North Korea.
Perhaps the stage has been set whereby the nations concerned need to initiate a quiet exchange of opinions about a future unification vision for the Korean Peninsula.
This process would require those countries to first draw up a vision of a unified Korean Peninsula and then work together to create the environment and conditions to allow that to emerge.
Kim Jong Un will not only gain power. He will also inherit a failed state, one which has nuclear weapons. It is inconceivable that the son would get rid of any nuclear weapons inherited from his father.
The world must brace itself for even greater difficulties in handling the nuclear issue once Kim Jong Il is no longer calling the shots.
The only way to simultaneously resolve the leadership succession crisis and the issues of a failed state and nuclear weapons will be to devise a multi-faceted and comprehensive exit strategy based on a unification vision for the Korean Peninsula.
This article first appeared here in the Asahi Shimbun.
Yoichi Funabashi is Editor in Chief, Asahi Shimbun.