These developments include:

• the exploitation by the United States of the Cheonan incident to forge stronger US–Japan relations and maintain a strengthened alliance structure in Northeast Asia in order to keep China in check
• the use of the Cheonan incident by the United States to nullify opposition to the United States in Japan in its negotiation of the Futenma issue, which they now have now settled
• the juxtapositioning of China and Russia against the United States and Japan in their approach to the incident and to North Korea
• the deployment of a US carrier off China’s coast, regarded by China as a provocation that will disaffect the Chinese public from the United States
• the three-year delay of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the South Korean military until 1 December 2015—OPCON was to be transferred in April this year
• the massive increase in the South Korean defence ministry’s draft budget for 2011, up 6.9 percent or 2.05 trillion won from this year to 31.6 trillion won (US$26.1 billion). (More than one-third of the planned increase for next year is reportedly allocated to weapons programs designed to counter North Korean threats with short-range missiles and submarines.)
• the maintenance of scepticism to the talks by South Korea, the United States and Japan, with South Korea arguing that there is no point in resuming them without solving the Cheonan incident, and pushing for increased sanctions, despite a generally positive attitude by North Korea, China and Russia about resuming the Six Party Talks as rapidly as possible

The United States also voiced scepticism in saying that if North Korea ’wants to engage seriously in the six-party process, there are very specific actions that North Korea has to take first before we would consider a resumption of the six-party process’. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley reportedly told reporters, If they’re not prepared to show through affirmative actions a willingness to fulfill existing commitments under the six-party process—that it’s prepared to give up its nuclear program—then you have to ask the fundamental question: What are we going to talk about?’

In effect, the Cheonan sinking triggered the resemblance of a new Cold War in Northeast Asia. On the Korean peninsula, relations between the North and South had already moved back to the Cold War era soon after President Lee took office in February 2008, when he declared his hard line ‘Vision 3000’ policy, which demanded North Korea’s complete abandonment of its nuclear weapons program for economic aid. The North immediately cut off virtually all dialogue with the South.

Following the Cheonan incident, increased pressure on North Korea through sanctions and other punitive measures being sought by South Korea’s allies, the United States and Japan, has been seeding fierce and potentially dangerous confrontation with China, Russia and North Korea.

North Korea’s close allies, China and Russia, which have maintained equal relations with both North and South Korea since the ‘end’ of the Cold War, continue to question the results of the Lee Myung-bak administration’s Cheonan Joint Investigation Group—made up of experts from five countries, including Australia—and are concerned that South Korea, the United States and Japan are aiming to corner North Korea. They see US manoeuvres in Japan as evidence of that.

According to the South Korean progressive daily newspaper, Hankyoreh, the Russian Government notified its independent investigation results on the Cheonan incident only to China and the United States, which infuriated South Korean officials who found out about its contents indirectly through those two countries. It would seem that the confrontational posture of the Cold War era is re-emerging, at least in Northeast Asia.

The different geopolitical perspectives in Northeast Asia are an important factor in this context. I have already listed some of the developments that have resulted from these perspectives. But they could have serious consequences. China, according to Agence France-Presse, warned the United States and South Korea against holding joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. China is obviously concerned that the US-led Northeast Asia Alliance will strengthen because of the Cheonan incident. Both China and Russia see any escalation of military activity in the region as provocative and are demanding ‘calmness and restraint’ in response to the Cheonan incident, arguing that retaliation against the North would increase tensions and could result in military action.

China and Russia are concerned that increased tensions on the Korean peninsula could damage their vital interests, but South Korea and the United States seem unconcerned about the threat of imminent conflict. In fact, US–South Korea focus on the need to resolve the Cheonan incident by imposing sanctions on the North has, in effect, put a halt to the far more important Six Party Talks. Can the South Korean or the US response be successful in dealing with the Cheonan incident?

North Korea has consistently used a strategy of ‘action for action, dialogue for dialogue’ toward South Korea, the United States and Japan. It has demanded that sanctions be lifted as a condition for resuming the Six Party Talks, and any additional sanctions or denouncements will therefore prevent the resumption of the talks.

Now that the UN Security Council has issued a presidential statement which reflects a China–US compromise, if not cooperation, by denouncing the Cheonan sinking without directly blaming North Korea, the way may well be open for renewed dialogue. Any dialogue is a better option than none at all, and from this viewpoint, the 90-minute talks between the US-led UN Command and the North Korean military at Panmunjom to discuss the sinking on 8 July is promising.

To prevent the Cheonan incident from re-igniting the Cold War posture in Northeast Asia, I would argue that three things must be resolved. Firstly, the cause of the Cheonan sinking must be re-investigated, by way of a joint investigation team involving all key parties, including North and South Korea, the United States and China. This is not to suggest that North Korea should conduct its own investigation into the sinking of the Cheonan as it has been demanding.

Secondly, inter-Korean relations must be normalised as soon as possible, for peace and stability in Northeast Asia are geopolitically improbable without stabilising inter-Korean relations. And thirdly, the Six Party Talks must resume at the earliest possible time. Dealing with the investigation of the Cheonan sinking now and the talks later is not an appropriate approach.

The Cheonan sinking essentially illustrates the need to establish a peace regime and resume the Six Party Talks to denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Of particular importance is the need to build a consensus between South Korea and China on the conditions for genuine peace and stability on the peninsula, thus providing China with a greater facilitative role in the region and establishing a solid strategic partnership.

In this respect, the Cheonan incident presents the momentum to initiate negotiations on such a partnership.

This article was originally published in the July 2010 issue of Asian Currents.

Hyung-A Kim is Associate Professor of Korean Politics and Director of the Australia–Korea Leadership Forum at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University.