Globally, many states have made commitments to strengthen existing mechanisms, such as the African Union (AU) which evolved from the Organisation of African Unity, and others have signed up to new agreements, such as Mercosur. Intra-state organisations in Asia have been caught up in this regional resurgence.
But Asian regional organisations are unique in one significant respect: they do not permit social activists to contribute to policy formation or implementation.
There is a clear global trend toward involving social activists in deliberative decision-making. Individual actors and NGOs are increasingly being called upon by under-resourced officials to provide specialised information and skills. Their knowledge is then used to design and implement policy. The UN has attempted to formalise civil society participation by giving civil society organisations ‘consultative status’. Using this mechanism, regional organisations such as the EU’s Economic and Social Committee have institutionalised their relationship with civil society organisations (CSOs).
In Asia, by contrast, social activists cannot formally influence regional policy. It is true that some business interest groups and elite think tanks have been granted advisory roles. One example is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, a think-tank that advises the ASEAN Regional Forum. Another is the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, a business interest group that counsels APEC. But grassroots social movement activists have no formal position within regional organisations. Campaigners, including those for human rights, women’s rights, labour rights and the environment, are forced to voice their opinions through rival mechanisms such as the ASEAN People’s Forum.
ASEAN has attempted to become more people-centred by establishing the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) and formulating the ASEAN Charter. Unfortunately, both initiatives highlight the formidable task at hand. The ACSC provides a channel for dialogue between CSOs and state leaders, but this exchange does not genuinely pluralise decision-making processes because it is highly informal and depends on the wishes of the host government or the mood of ASEAN leaders. And while the ASEAN Charter recognises 58 affiliated CSOs, this list includes organisations such as the ASEAN Kite Council and the ASEAN Vegetable Oils Club. Meidyatama Suryodiningrat has argued that this list displays ‘the intent by which ASEAN perceives its subjects: with ridicule and condescension.’
Why is Asia’s lack of participatory regionalism a problem?
The closed nature of Asian regional regimes limits their ability to address complex transnational concerns. Participatory regionalism helps inter-governmental organisations because it provides them with a perspective drawn from the grass-roots of Asian society. This addresses criticisms regarding the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ of Asian regional regimes. In addition, including CSOs in policy formulation means that overstretched officials can turn to community-based specialists when designing and implementing policy.
At the same time, CSOs benefit from participation because they are recognised as relevant actors on the issue in question. This legitimacy helps them achieve their objectives. Widening participation in regional regimes also benefits the populace at large, because individuals affected by policy can petition CSOs to lobby on their behalf. While there are concerns regarding the legitimacy of CSOs themselves, legally imposed transparency mechanisms ensure that information regarding the funding, membership and objectives of CSOs are publicly available.
When in power, Kevin Rudd attempted to position Australia at the forefront of Asia-Pacific regionalism with his proposed Asia Pacific Community. As the oldest liberal democracy in the Western Pacific and with a robust civil society that is embedded in regional activist networks, Australia can also play a leading role in widening participation in regional regimes. The anticipated Asia-Pacific Century poses vast economic and political challenges to the region. These challenges demand that regional regimes assess how their decision-making structures can be adapted to better solve complex security threats. Participatory regionalism offers substantial benefits. Asian regional regimes should take serious steps to institutionalise civil society relationships.
Kelly Gerard is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Western Australia.
This article was an entry in the recent EAF Emerging Scholars competition.
This is a nicely written, punchy little article. It’s not easy to wrap up such complex issues in 1000 words. But, perhaps it points to there being a lot of ‘food for thought, which would benefit from deeper examination and separate treatment?
First, we are well into the Asia Pacific Century already.
Rudd’s idea was simply a variation on a very old theme for Australian foreign policy – go back to Paul Keating, regarding his (at the time criticised) remarks about Australia’s role and place in the region. Look at the long term development of Australia’s foreign, trade and aid policies and how these place us firmly at the heart of international affairs, and with a particular focus on the countries in our region – our sphere of influence. There are many fora that are not mentioned here, and perhaps should be, apart from APEC, the East Asia Summit, there’s Asean Regional Forum, not to mention the Pacific oriented groupings and probably half a dozen others of different purpose and slant, including the growing network of regional free trade agreements. Take your pick. Australia has been fully engaged in all these, often providing leadership and sometimes various forms of moral and financial support. There is a well established historical context of Australia looking outwards to our region, not with fear but with a genuine sense of wanting to engage with our nearest neighbours in a spirit of cooperation.
Second, the issue of the role of civil society is a different issue.
It’s an interesting and important issue. But, at the end of the day it’s not a one-way process of international or regional forums and organisations allowing space for CSOs/NGOs to participate. The other side of the equation is that these groups have to lobby and fight for this position. There are many groups in the Americas, for example, which would point out what a hard battle it has been for them to secure the space to voice their concerns, on behalf of a rather diffuse constituency. Nor is it simply a matter of being invited and being funded to express an alternate view. The CSOs/NGOs may operate according to different dynamics and value systems to ‘official’ channels. This dictates how they engage with official organisations. Some deliberately choose to disengage from formal processes, because of ideological disputes. Sometimes such groups or movements coalesce through their opposition to global issues eg., have a look at the multilateral trade talks and how certain developing country CSOs rallied around their key interests. Basically, it has to be considered that while international organisations have an obligation to invite these groups and views, it’s like the old saying, ‘you can bring a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink’.
Thirdly, nothing can drive civil society and participatory democracy in East Asian and Pacific countries but the internal forces operating within those societies themselves.
We are, as Australians, foreigners looking into these societies. It would be worthwhile getting more of a sense of what the internal diagnosis is about how these forces are shaping up, as seen by observers in these countries themselves. To suggest that Australian leadership is the only factor involved might, in some circles, be negatively received.
Fourthly, to add to your point, officials don’t simply turn to CSOs to defray overstretched resources.
These groups have ideas, knowledge and expertise that’s worth tapping into by virtue of it representing a diversity of views. They may provide avenues for consultation that government’s are not well equipped to undertake. More importantly, it’s about ownership of the directions of policy, helping to sort out the relative priorities of what is or is not important. The Philippines, for example, has an incredible history with participatory involvement of ‘people’s organisations’ in policy and basic service delivery, so much so in fact that it now exports its experiences to other ASEAN countries.
Lastly, not all global issues have negative ramifications, as much as the popular media would like us to think this way, particularly around federal elections. There are many aspects of regional (and international) cooperation whether in foreign policy or trade that are intended to deliver real benefits and positives. Generating more equitable economic growth and market access, for example, is one of the goals of regional free trade agreements eg., of which MERCOSUR is one of the older, international examples.