Nevertheless, some 40 political parties have been registered, many of them from regional areas, fulfilling at least on the surface the regime’s goal of making it a ‘multi-party election’, and so far regime objections to specific parties have been minimal. All of this is aimed at avoiding a repeat of the outcome of the 1990 election, an unexpected and overwhelming win for anti-government parties.
A forum of Canberra’s Burma experts and observers at the Australian National University recently agreed that the prospects were remote that the elections would be free or fair or sufficiently inclusive to be acceptable to the international community, let alone credible for the Burmese people.
Some commentators at the forum supported the election boycott by major opposition parties (including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy) and doubted that such a flawed process could deliver any worthwhile progress. However, several observers regarded the elections as at least potentially important, and saw the participation of a variety of political groups as providing political expression for regional and ethnic groups for the first time.
Not surprisingly, the elections are timed to be held just before the expiry of Aung San Suu Kyi’s current term of house arrest. This is not so important, since her party is not participating in the elections and she could not be a candidate having been found guilty of a criminal offence. But her voice not being heard adds to the impression that the election process is seriously flawed.
Will these elections contribute to urgently needed political reform in Burma?
It is important to be realistic as to what might be expected from Burma’s return to a form of elected parliamentary government, stage managed by the current military leadership and circumscribed by fixed military representation in the various assemblies, as well as by the residual powers vested in the President and the Commander in Chief under the Constitution. But we should also not ignore the fact that the elections mean the opening up of new political space which could eventually result in the military gradually losing their absolute control, as happened in Indonesia.
While the post-elections political structures will not immediately involve much, if any, devolution of power in line with genuine federal arrangements, they will result in more decentralisation than has existed at any time since Burma’s independence in 1947. And although limitations are likely to frustrate ethnic and other groups aspiring to greater real autonomy, they could nevertheless change the dynamic involved in political power sharing. Over time, any increased decentralisation could prove a significant development for the exercise of state authority, even if initially local military and business supporters of the military regime exercise de facto control. In this sense, the elections should be seen as significant.
The elections should also be seen as a first step towards more fundamental reforms. Indeed, many people in Burma see them that way, even though the main opposition parties clearly do not. Many Burmese accept that change cannot be achieved overnight, although they look for change in many areas: political governance; economic policy; legal rights; improvements in social equity; and, simply, better opportunities to exercise more choice about what they do. There are some signs, for example in the rediscovered area of privatisation, that the military leadership also anticipate changes occurring in a stable climate after the elections.
Observers who take a pragmatic and realistic approach would also acknowledge that many of the underpinnings of democracy and good political governance, that would sustain longer-term reforms, are not yet present. Indeed, there are many ways in which the international community could help strengthen civil society institutions that support democracy. We should not punish the Burmese people by imposing more sanctions against a regime they have never chosen as their government.
It is deeply regrettable that the elections will apparently take place with the 2,100 political prisoners not freed under some form of amnesty, which has happened in the past and which would immediately enhance their credibility. Nor will they occur in the presence of impartial and independent international election observers, who could provide essential verification of the process. Both of these measures could have been adopted by the military regime without jeopardising their desire to ensure the stability of the whole process and to safeguard their own interests. Without such minimal measures in place, the military regime can hardly expect the international community to lift sanctions or otherwise endorse the election result with any enthusiasm.
In such circumstances, expectations that the elections might represent some definite and early progress towards national reconciliation seem doomed to be disappointed. But the possibilities that may arise from this admittedly highly restrictive, and disappointing, process are greater than might initially appear to be the case.
Trevor Wilson is a visiting fellow at the Department of Political and Social Change, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, Australian National University and a former Australian ambassador to Burma.