And so for political programs to see light of day, they must necessarily be grafted onto the preferences of traditionalist politicians.

Ozawa gets this. He understands that, unless you are a mercurial character like former Prime Minister Koizumi, able to appeal over the heads of your own political establishment to drive reformist legislation, you have to roll up your sleeves and get down to the dirty job of legislative sausage-making. Ozawa understands, too, that traditionalist constituencies are less fickle in their voting patterns than the median urban voter, a lesson the DPJ greenhorns should have learnt (but did not) when Koizumi maintained power on the back of these constituents in the 2005 general election.

And the Ozawa approach of LDP-ising the DPJ has won the party handsome parliamentary numbers. Besides, the Japanese median voter’s policy preferences are not necessarily aligned with the stove-piped nature of Japanese interest-group politics — a disheartening feature of Westminster-style Asian parliamentary systems.

Kan, meanwhile, is agnostic about this whole process. He appears to understand neither policy nor politics and it would seem that he would prefer to remain a community organiser who happens to be PM than a PM who reorganises his political community.

But the real (political) problem in the DPJ is that its young, modernising core — Maehara, Noda and Edano, ably shepherded by Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, are driving Kan’s approach while they yet remain a numerical minority within the party. It is true that Kan does not have enough independent support within the party, and depends to an extent upon these figures. With Kan tucked away inside their hip-pocket, the DPJ’s modernisers may imagine they can divorce politics from policy and engineer cross-aisle coalitions on tough legislative issues. But they are wrong. The LDP will call their bluff, leaving them naked on the Diet floor.

If Kan loses this election, he will have only himself to blame. He was first offered the option of ditching the young reformers by removing them from the top tier of government and party; he was subsequently offered the option of recreating the triumvirate-style (Kan, Hatoyama, Ozawa) management of party and government. He passed up on both, choosing to throw his hat with the young crew, and remain personally popular, even though the government faces no electoral test for a fair amount of time.

And on this occasion at least, if the election produces internal division, it will not be Ozawa’s fault. Rather, responsibility will lie at the feet of those who hijacked his parliamentary majorities for their own policy programs without knowing how to actually get the super-majority necessary to put these policy programs in place.

Ozawa-style politics may not have much of a shelf life.  But, as the continued support for Ozawa within the DPJ proves, it has certainly not yet reached its use-by date.

Sourabh Gupta is a senior research associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc. An earlier version of this article originally appeared in the Nelson Report from Samuels International Associates, Inc.