Yet, at this point in time, neither Washington nor Beijing are exactly comfortable with facing it.
In Washington, and in American political psychology, there is a perhaps justified confidence in continuity. For Beijing, the question has come too soon, when the pre-occupations of domestic development still overwhelm.
In an early contribution on this Forum White argued that changes in the structure of power in Asia and the Pacific require the construction of a new concert of Asian powers and that, however difficult to set up, it has the best prospect of ensuring Asian security. Union, a la Europe is remote; American primacy is unlikely to remain; a balance of power system is unstable. A grouping involving the United States and Asian powers, therefore, provides an alternative. But, he concluded, such a grouping is a long shot.
In this week’s lead essay, from a longer piece in Quarterly Essays, White focuses forensically on America’s choice.
A peaceful new order in Asia to accommodate China’s growing power can only be built if America is willing to allow China some political and strategic space. Such concessions do not often happen. History offers few examples of a rising power finding its place in the international order without a war with the dominant power. Conflict is only avoided when the dominant power willingly makes space for the challenger, as Britain made way for America in the late nineteenth century. Will America do the same for China? Should it?
As America confronts these questions, it too faces a choice between influence and order. Like China, it wants as much influence as it can get, with as little disorder as possible, so it has to balance its desire for Asia to remain peaceful against its desire to remain in charge. Washington has not faced this choice before. Since Nixon went to China, US primacy has been synonymous with order, and the more influence America has had, the more stable Asia has been. Now China’s rise means that the region might be more peaceful if America settles for a more modest role. If instead America tries to retain primacy in the face of China’s power, it will provoke a struggle that upsets the region. It would be sacrificing Asia’s peace to preserve its own primacy.
Whether or not we share his underlying pessimism about the possibility of serious conflict, White’s brutal enunciation of these choices commands respect. If the transition of Asia Pacific power is to be navigated successfully, they are issues that need to be set out clearly. Perhaps White assumes too ready a translation of Chinese economic power in to military power. Perhaps he underestimates the multilateral instincts in the American polity. Perhaps White also misunderstands the constraints on both China and America that might lead them to develop a shared modus operandi over the next few decades. And perhaps he underestimates the nature of dynamics and time that there is in which to make the accommodations that need to be made.
Whatever the case, White does us a great service in forcing us to think carefully about all these issues. And think carefully about them we must continue to do, including prominently on this Forum.