Government spokespersons tell the world that the ‘feelings of the Chinese people’ have been offended. But, generally speaking, within a week or so the protesters are gone and the causes for which their fury ascended like a whirling dervish become mild breezes. To wit: for all the bluster of Chinese ‘nationalists,’ French products and stores were not boycotted after the pro-Tibet protests, Japanese cars and electronic products remain highly prized, and applications to American colleges and universities have not declined because of dissatisfaction with American policies or actions. When observing the contemporary China scene a gambling man would never lose by betting long on economic self-interest over any contemporary ‘ism’.

I raise these issues to make a larger point about how we empirically evaluate any sentiment or ideology in China, whether it is nationalism or Marxism. Now is a particularly opportune time to think about this given the widespread acceptance of the notion that ‘nationalism’ replaced Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as China’s reigning ideology in the reform period.

What is the evidence for this?

Yes, it is true that the government has promoted ‘patriotic education’—but it is not clear that this campaign—which began, not coincidently, after the 1989 legitimacy crisis—has worked, that people who are otherwise quite cynical about corruption, the education system and rampant materialism would suspend their disbelief and become ‘patriots’. What about all of those ‘nationalists’ who stage colorful street protests and shout slogans, vent on the web or hack foreign websites? They are, overall, a tiny sliver of the Chinese population, and unrepresentative at that. The American Tea Party has a flair for the dramatic, but one could hardly conclude that ‘Americans’ share their sentiments about the government.

I would suggest that it is critical to examine long term behaviors and commitments as a more accurate measure of patriotism in China, or anywhere else. Are Chinese economic nationalists? By the measure of calls for boycotts and statements of outrage at ‘x’ (take your pick: the US, Japan, France), yes; by a sustained boycott that requires sacrifice? Not really. There is no evidence that Chinese consumers prefer ‘Made in China’ products because they are manufactured in China and support Chinese workers.

The same can be said about military matters, both historically and in the present. During the Korean War, for example, the Chinese government mounted a propaganda campaign to mobilise support for the war (‘Resist American, Support Korea’). Unsurprisingly, the state media produced evidence of ‘rising nationalism’: protests, citizens happily contributing money to buy bullets for the army and the like. Many Western analysts concluded that Chinese supported the war, and the government enjoyed heightened legitimacy as a result, despite the high costs and stalemate.

But what happens if we shift the spotlight away from easily mobilise-able populations, like students, government workers and the press? Materials in archives, unlike newspapers and film clips, reveal that many ordinary citizens in Shanghai objected to the war, were confused about its objectives and admired the United States for its high standard of living; fear of reprisal should they not contribute to the war effort led many to hand over their money; peasants were often forced into the army and recruiting officers resorted to lies to recruit them; landlords and other ‘class enemies’ were sent to the front to fight the CCP’s war. When soldiers returned from the war, they were not treated well by employers or their fellow citizens, even those who were supposedly most exposed to state propaganda in cities.

The same sorry story repeated itself after China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1979: ballyhoo in the press and expressions of outrage against Vietnam, but archival documents show that veterans had a very difficult time taking advantage of their patriotic status when they sought better employment. Wives of military personnel soldiers could not easily capitalise in their status either. During the Cultural Revolution, when urban youth were parading around the county wearing military uniforms, investigations by the Shanghai Supreme Court revealed dozens of cases involving the rape of real soldiers’ wives, and soldiers who went AWOL seeking to avenge the crime. In fact, there is little conventional wisdom in Chinese politics that can survive the test of archival data unscathed.

Nationalism is a convenient concept for Western analysts to use—it ‘fits’ the way Westerners understand their own history and seems to explain various protests. But there is little documentary evidence that nationalism, Marxism or even hatred of Japan motivated millions of peasants to support the CCP in its rise to power. Nationalism did not prevent the bloodletting of the Cultural Revolution or contribute to better treatment of those who served their country in wartime or peacetime. At the moment, and until more archives are opened, we do not know how many current day ‘nationalists’ or ‘patriotic hackers’ are on the government payroll and directed by the party.

In the meantime, I would rather take the long-term view and ask: do the speeches and online chat result in meaningful, long-term action, and are they even authentic? Does evidence about actual behavior match the evidence from orations and comments to reporters? As with anything that we deem significant, the proof has to be in the data pudding.

Neil J. Diamant is an Associate Professor of Asian Law and Society at Dickinson College, Pennsylvania.