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Power, lies and secrecy in North Korea

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In Brief

It is often said that North Korea is the world’s only communist monarchy. But is it yet a true monarchy? The care with which Kim Jong-il has taken over the last 18 months in manoeuvring his third son, Kim Jong-un, into position to succeed him suggests that the dictator has some limits on his power in the North Korean system.

The reality of where power lies in Pyongyang is not as obvious as it might seem and there are indications that even Kim Jong-il must approach this transition carefully.

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In 1994, two events shed light on power in North Korea: the first was the death of Kim Sung-il and his succession by Kim Jong-il; the second was the implementation of songun or ‘military first’ policy that elevated the army above the party as the main revolutionary force in North Korean politics. Kim Il-sung’s death gave Kim Jong-il the opportunity to inherit power, but it was songun, which cemented this transfer of power by bringing the army behind the new leader. In some ways, it was an elegant solution: rather than worry about the loyalty of the army, as the Soviet Communist Party and Romanian Communist party did in 1990, Kim Jong-il replaced the party with the army. The new apparatchiks of North Korea serve as a sort of armed civil-service. While the Party remains a potent force in North Korea, it is the weakest leg of the North Korean trinity of Kim family, army and party. Following last week’s promotion of Kim Jung-un to a number of senior military and party posts at the Delegate Conference, will the new transfer of power be successful or will challenges arise from either the party or military?

According to an article in the South Korean newspaper Chungang Ilbo, South Korean officials have confirmed that they and their American counter-parts are updating CONPLAN, a contingency plan for dealing with sudden changes on the Korean Peninsula. The changes are allegedly updates to reflect ‘growing uncertainty’ in the North. But where would the challenge to the Kim family come from? The lack of a strong civil society or any historical experience of democratic institutions would seem to rule out a popular uprising. The party might present difficulties, but given the Kim family’s strong claim over the state ideology Juche, the party has long-since forfeited its ideological authority. Therefore the only realistic challenge to the young heir can come from one of two directions: (1) from within the Kim family itself or (2) from the senior members of the army.

Kim Jong-il’s sister, Kim Kyung-hui was also promoted to protect Kim Jong-un’s succession, along with her husband Chang Song-taek, a senior figure on the National Defence Commision, the country’s ruling council. Between the two, there is a formidable mix of military power and Kim titular authority and if they chose, they could present a major threat to the young, inexperienced heir. A second possibility is a challenge coming from senior members of the military, who may baulk at the continuation of Kim rule. Some might see the military junta-style rule of Myanmar as the correct direction for the country to go, citing Kim Jong-il’s mismanagement of the economy over the last 15 years. General O Kuk Ryul is one such figure: last week’s photograph of the ruling elite found the General demoted from his usual front-rank position to the second row. For a man who was considered the most likely successor to Kim Jong-il in 2003, watching a 27 year-old man without military or political qualifications march past might be too much to bear.

As always, the secretive nature of North Korea makes much of this discourse speculative. However, even in the absence of facts, information can be inferred, and trends can be mapped. Ultimately, the future of North Korea and the key to successful transition to Kim Jong-un is dependent on a number of key individuals in Pyongyang. Which direction they decide to go is still anyone’s guess. The rest of the world must sit and watch and wait. Given the economic importance of the region, and the number of weapons of mass destruction controlled by Pyongyang, the waiting game is indeed one for us all.

John Hemmings is a Studies Coordinator and Research Analyst at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Whitehall, London.

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